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Abstract 
 
 
 This dissertation focuses on the ethnic separatist conflicts within the internationally 
recognized borders of Georgia: the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian cases. 
Recognizing that the prolongation of these two conflicts has been a major obstacle for 
the stability and development of the region, this paper has particularly aimed to analyze 
a multitude of factors driving the entrenchment of the impasse in their peace processes. 
The study of the ‘conflict prolonging factors’i has been the groundwork for 
progressively examining the context within which the conflicts have evolved and 
identifying the causal explanations behind the ensuing stalemate. In particular, this paper 
has intended to discover and specify the external and internal actors, as well as their 
motives and objectives which have accumulated to hinder or delay the settlement of the 
conflicts. Moreover, it is acknowledged that external players, most notably Russia, have 
been more powerful than internal players in affecting the parameters that determine the 
course of the conflicts. That is to say, the concrete analysis of the dynamics and forces 
that tend to sustain the conflicts will provide an insight for understanding the lack of 
progress towards resolution in these two specific cases.  
 
 
 
                                                 
i For a comprehensive account on the use of this term, as well as on its origin, see infra footnote 8.  
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Özet 
 Bu tez, Gürcistan’ın uluslararası tanınmış sınırları dahilindeki etnik ayrılıkçı 
çatışmalara, Gürcü- Abhazya ve Gürcü- Osetya vakalarına, odaklanmıştır. Bu makale, 
bu iki çatışmanın uzamasının bölgenin istikrarına ve gelişimine başlıca engel olduğunu 
görerek, Abhazya ve Güney Osetya barış süreçlerindeki açmazları kuvvetlendiren 
faktörleri analiz etmeyi amaçlamıştır. ‘Çatışmayı uzatan faktörler’ üstünde yapılan 
derinlemesine çalışma, bu çatışmaların zaman içerisindeki gelişimlerini 
gerçekleştirdikleri bağlamların incelenmesi ve sonunda ortaya çıkan açmazların 
ardındaki nedensel açıklamaların tanımlanması için zemin oluşturmuştur. Bilhassa,  bu 
makale, bu iki örnek olaydaki içsel ve dışsal aktörleri ve bununla beraber bu 
çatışmaların sona ermesini engelleyecek veya geciktirecek şekilde sentezlenen bu 
önemli aktörlerin amaçlarını ve dürtülerini ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Dahası, dış 
aktörlerin, özellikle de Rusya’nın, çatışmaların seyrini belirleyen parametrelere 
etkilerinin iç aktörlerden daha güçlü olduğu kabul edilmiştir. Çatışmaların sürmesine 
neden olan dinamikler ve kuvvetlerin somut analizi, bu iki özel vakada çözüme yönelik 
ilerlemenin eksikliğine ilişkin içsel bir anlayış sağlayacaklardır.  
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1. Introduction   
 The disintegration of the Soviet Union was remarkably peaceful, however as the 
newly-emerging states based their independence on the rejection of the central Soviet power, 
some autonomous entities with different titular nationalities revolted against their parent 
states. Thus, post-Soviet Eurasia was gravely hit by numerous conflicts that emerged as a 
territorial struggle by two competing populations. In particular, Georgia has been the most 
troublesome republic in South Caucasus, facing with two separatist regions1 and a loss over 
one fifth of its territory. The existence of these breakaway states has been a major impediment 
to reform and development not only in Georgia, but in the whole region, since the on-going 
conflicts have had negative consequences on the functioning of the region’s security complex. 
Hence, every observer concludes that a stable system requires the peaceful settlement of these 
conflicts and a final resolution for the status of the breakaway regions. However, the latest 
events of August 2008 revealed that such a resolution process is fraught with difficulty.  
 In 8 August 2008, Russian tanks and artillery from its 58th army marched across its 
southern border into Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway state-let of South Ossetia. This 
move was preceded by the decision taken in the Security Council of Kremlin following 
Georgia’s incursion into the area and alleged Russian air strikes on Georgian targets the night 
before. Observers had little doubt that the Georgian side had planned a military offensive in 
an attempt to increase or maybe even to regain its control over South Ossetia. Supporting 
South Ossetia in its fight against Georgia and claiming a right to intervene in order to avoid 
Georgian troops attacking Russian peacekeepers and civilians,2  Russia showed its readiness 
to indulge in an open conflict with its neighbor. Georgian retreat followed as Russian troops 
                                                 
1 Following the collapse of the SU, four breakaway states emerged along with fifteen recognized states, namely 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdniestria (which split from Moldova) and Nagorno Karabakh (which split from 
Azerbaijan.) 
2 “Russian Troops and Tanks Pour into South Ossetia,” 9 August 2008, The Guardian. Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/09/russia.georgia 
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took control of Tskhinvali and constantly bombed Georgian villages surrounding the city. The 
crisis further escalated as Russia sent paratroopers and armoured vehicles not only into the 
tiny enclave of South Ossetia, but also to the another breakaway Georgian province of 
Abkhazia. As Georgia failed to respond militarily, Abkhazia seized the moment to expand its 
territorial control over the mountainous Kodori Gorge, a small, but strategically significant 
enclave in north-eastern Abkhazia inhabited by ethnic Georgians.3  
 Taking into account the disastrous circumstances of such a move, the real initiative of 
Saakashvili still remains elusive. In the face of a disproportionate Russian counter-attack, 
Georgia must have realized that achieving an advantageous resolution for its break-away 
enclaves who have been for long impairing its territorial integrity and sovereignty would be 
increasingly difficult. This short, but bloody war manifested the fragile situation in the region 
as the conflict reached to its zenith since the wars of early 1990s in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of the Soviet federation. More importantly, it portrayed that Russia has been more 
eager to keep its control and power over its traditional sphere of influence inherited from 
Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union.  
 What is more, as the two neighbors came on the edge of a full-scale war, an 
atmosphere of panic erupted in the international arena. By glancing at a map, one can easily 
understand why the international community4 has been suddenly so concerned about the 
recent developments in Georgia. Due to its proximity to the oil rich and strategically 
important regions of Central Asia and the Caspian Basin, Georgia, has long been a focal point 
of attention for the Great Powers. However, until this last outburst, Georgia’s conflict with its 
                                                 
3 “Russia takes control of South Ossetian capital after Georgian retreat,” 10 August 2008, guardian.co.uk 
“Russian Forces Capture Military Base in Georgia,” 12 August 2008, NYTimes, Hearst, D. “Dangerous proxy 
war gains an international dimension,” 9 August 2008, The Guardian  
4 It is recognized that the term ‘international community’ is used vaguely in international relations. In this paper, 
it refers to a general term that includes all governments, which are widely recognized by the others, as well as all 
groups and organizations formed by these governments. The use of this term bears significance in this study as it 
reflects the common norms, values and understanding by the member states of the international arena.  
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separatist regions had been largely ignored by these powers, which instead chose to focus on 
the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan during the 1990s and 2000s. Bearing the hallmarks of a 
resurgence of the hard line Russian posture and resurfacing the reflections and implications of 
these regional conflicts on international politics, this ‘five-day’ war has achieved to reignite 
heated debates across the globe about the future of the region and of Georgia, in particular. 
 1.1 General Introduction of the Conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
 At the time the Soviet Union dissolved, the Georgian Republic had three autonomous 
entities: Abkhazian ASSR, the Ajarian ASSR and the South Ossetia Autonomous Oblast. 
Since the last years of the Soviet rule, the nationalist policies of the Georgian state together 
with the national and regional aspirations of the autonomous regions have contributed to the 
separatist tendencies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, reopening past wounds. Mobilizing their 
own ethnic populations in the face of a new unitary Georgian state, Abkhazians and Ossetians 
began to demand broader autonomy and ultimately outright secession. In that context, the 
process of ‘Georgianization of Georgia’ in the early 1990s was very much related to the 
emergence of contestation over these break-away regions. Following the two violent conflicts 
that broke out between them and the Georgian center in the early 1990s, low-intensity 
skirmishes flared up sporadically, but nevertheless a large-scale war was ultimately avoided 
for fifteen years.   
 Throughout the last decades, not only Georgian attitude, but also the mentality of the 
separatist authorities and of Russia was instrumental in polarizing the conflict and 
maintaining the longstanding status quo. The status quo, as defined in this paper, is the state 
of existing conditions due to the lack of major alterations in the statuses of the de facto states 
and in the course of the peace processes. In August 2008, the dynamics driving the conflicts 
have ultimately transcended into a new phase which effectively thwarted the already fragile 
peace process and destroyed the nearly 16 year old status-quo as Georgia descended into a 
 4 
war in South Ossetia for the second time, but this time confronting Russia as its major enemy. 
Russia’s direct involvement in the struggle of these separatist regions for the first time since 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union manifested that change was underway.    
 The Georgian-Russian war in South Ossetia that spilled over to Abkhazia made it 
clear that the prospect of a high-intense conflict was present and indeed awaiting for ignition. 
Before the war, the absence of large-scale fighting in Abkhazia and South Ossetia for almost 
sixteen years had generated a misleading image that a level of stability was preserved in the 
course of the conflicts. Similarly, the existence of the separatist conflicts in these regions had 
not threatened the international security until the last Russian-Georgian confrontation and 
consequently the international community had chosen to label them as ‘frozen conflicts’. As a 
matter of fact, the conflicts were for long host to a chaotic stalemate in which periodic clashes 
were erupting, producing a cycle of violence. To elaborate, although these separatist regions 
were not involved in a large-scale war from the early 1990s until the war of August 2008, 
they were still witnessing a number of fierce incidents, such as sporadic fighting, kidnappings, 
murders and military maneuvering. Some analysts recognized these regions’ vulnerability to 
dangerous outbursts of violence, asserting that they experienced prolonged periods of ‘uneasy 
peace’ or in other words ‘precarious stability’. 5  
 It is significant to note that Abkhazia always had remained in danger of ensuing 
violence since the war in 1992. On the other hand, in South Ossetia, until the relatively large-
scale fighting in 2004, a level of stability had been present, increasing the hopes for a 
sustainable peace in the region. However, as the existing stability was broken down in the 
summer of 2004, South Ossetia as well had become susceptible to a serious acceleration of 
violence.  Without a doubt, the nature of the protracted conflicts in these two cases 
                                                 
5 Hunter, S. T. (2006). “Borders, Conflict, and Security in the Caucasus: The Legacy of the Past”, SAIS 
Review, 15:1, pp. 120.  
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perpetuated a high level of instability and insecurity, making the regions vulnerable to a 
continuous violence. Hence, in both of these cases, the conditions were already ripe for 
escalation in the summer of 2008 when Russian and Georgian forces directly faced up to each 
other within the de facto borders of South Ossetia.  
 It is remarkable in hindsight that the international community failed to recognize that 
the forces behind these conflicts were dynamic and constantly developing. Essentially, it is 
not only enough to understand why these conflicts emerged at the very beginning, but also to 
comprehend  the evolving nature of the underlying forces behind these conflicts and thus to 
analyze how it impedes their peaceful resolution. Thus, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the 
break-away regions that lie on Georgia’s border with Russia, require closer scrutiny. To 
elaborate, this paper will aim to illustrate that the conflicts in Georgia should not be viewed in 
isolation, but a complete picture can only be achieved when a complex web of factors, which 
drive the continuation of the conflicts, are taken into account. That is to say, all major players 
and their underlying patterns of interaction as well as already established structural factors 
have combined to hinder the conflict resolution process.  
 1.2 General Introduction of the Players Involved  
 The conflicts of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have experienced the involvement of a 
multitude of players, not only the parties siding to the conflict, but also the ones that have 
sought to influence the parties in the conflict resolution process. The contradictory interests of 
all these participating players have accumulated for the conflicts’ prolongation, ultimately 
impeding the achievement of a lasting peace in the region. In essence, more or less all key 
actors have perceived their own interests inextricably linked to the persistence of the impasse 
in the peace processes as the conflict has evolved to a zero-sum game where gains for one 
party are considered to be losses for the other. Thus, a mutually acceptable settlement seems 
far from attainable, especially when considering the clashing interests and lack of willingness 
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displayed by the key players. It also holds true that some actors are more influential and 
powerful than others in affecting the parameters that determine the course of the conflict. 
 To begin with, Georgia can be attributed with the lion’s share of responsibility for the 
original phases of a struggle that has recently developed to a dynamic deadlock that underpins 
the relations between the country and its separatists regions. This does not necessarily mean 
that Georgia is solely responsible for the current situation but rather represents only one piece 
of a larger puzzle. The Georgian side has been adamant to subside to Abkhazian and South 
Ossetian demands simply because this would translate to a substantial loss of territory. 
Moreover, the existence of approximately 200,000 Georgian internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) due to forced migration from Abkhazia  remains one of the key factors plaguing the 
conflict resolution process  as Georgia does not wish to resort in a compromise that excludes 
the demands of these IDPs. In their part, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have showed few signs 
of willingness to negotiate over the re-distribution of power in their territories, since they 
have been reluctant to concede authority on the regions which they fought to acquire and won 
with painstaking struggle. Though these breakaway states have desired to gain the recognition 
of the international community, their main objective has been to maintain their survival which 
under current conditions has been guaranteed by the preservation of the deadlock in the peace 
processes.  
 In addition to the directly engaged parties of the conflict, Georgians and many of the 
observers believe that Russia played a key role in consolidating the status quo ante6 for 
almost two decades and thus preventing the resolution of the conflict. In both Abkhazian and 
Ossetian cases, Russia’s strategic policies that aim to withhold both Georgia and its separatist 
regions under its influence have become invariably intertwined with the on-going conflicts. It 
is not a secret that for their survival, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been heavily 
                                                 
6 Status quo ante here refers to the state of conditions that were present before the war. It is recognized that with 
the war in August 2008, the long-standing status quo is destroyed, bringing out changes in the statuses of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as in the context of their conflicts and peace processes.  
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dependent on Russian support. Eager to challenge Georgia, the break-away states historically 
have looked for ‘protection’ from Russia, the former Soviet center and neighboring state. On 
the other hand, Russia for years sent mixed signals to Georgia, in a clear effort to avoid the 
total break-down in their relations, executing a dual power game to retain control over the 
region. 
 Additionally significant, the increasing geopolitical importance of the South Caucasus 
region has attracted the attention of other external powers, such as various international 
organizations and more importantly the United States, which is fundamentally incompatible 
with Russian aspirations. Furthermore, apart from these major political powers, North 
Caucasus people has also secured their roles in this power game by providing support and 
legitimacy to the contested de facto states of Georgia. In brief, it can be seen that the fact that 
both Georgia and its break-away states have continued to seek support from outside powers to 
empower their positions has further complicated the issue. In the absence of a final political 
solution, a complex web of overlapping players have found space to maneuver the conflict 
according to self-interested aspirations, consolidating the continuity of the power struggle in 
the region and the maintenance of the contemporary conflictual situation. 
 1.3 Introducing the Content of the Study  
 The research question for this study is: “Why Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts 
have been protracted for almost two decades?” Drawing upon this research question, this 
study aims to analyze the dynamics and forces driving the continuation of these two conflicts. 
In this vein, the purpose of this paper is to study the relation between the peace processes7 and 
a large array of historical, economic, political and cultural factors that impede or delay these 
processes in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian cases. These factors are labeled as ‘conflict 
                                                 
7  Throughout the paper, sometimes it is called as conflict resolution process. These concepts are further 
operationalized in the Chapters (2.3) and (2.4). 
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prolonging factors’ (CPF), as originally identified by Andreas Mehler.8 To elaborate, the so-
called conflict prolonging factors refer in this study to a multitude of factors which tend to 
sustain the conflicts. Recognizing that these two conflicts have been entrenched for almost 
two decades, this paper intends to find out the structural and interactive dynamics, as well as 
the external and internal actors, which have substantial impact on the duration of these 
conflicts. It is claimed that the existence of various and highly intertwined CPFs have been a 
major impediment to the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Thus, it is significant to identify the key factors that account for the current stalemate in the 
course of these two conflicts, as well as to examine the level of intensity of these specific 
CPFs. In this regard, this project produces high volume of research and commentary. 
 In order to make the analysis of CPFs more straightforward, they are first categorized 
on the basis of the duration of their endurance, as well as their openness to change. The long-
term CPFs are the historical and structural factors that have been rooted in the core of the 
conflicts and have created deeply-entrenched cleavages and animosities between the 
adversary parties. The short-term CPFs are those underlying features, which have been shaped 
within the political, economic and geo-political context concomitant to the progress of the 
conflicts. In this light, the short-term CPFs are the ones which are open to constant evolution, 
whereas the long-term CPFs are inherently less amenable to alteration. Second, the short-term 
conflict prolonging factors are divided as ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dynamics. Internal 
                                                 
8 In this paper, the use of the term ‘conflict prolonging factors’ is inspired by Andreas Mehler’s works. Mehler 
in his working paper titled “Major Flaws in Conflict Prevention Policies towards Africa” introduces the concept 
of ‘conflict prolonging factors’. He defines them as a number of factors that “contribute to the predominance of 
logics of war over logics of peace after an escalation of violence has taken place.” See Mehler, A. (June 2005). 
“Major Flaws in Conflict Prevention Policies towards Africa,” working paper published by German Overseas 
Institute (DÜI), pp. 8. Available at www.duel.de/workingpapers. Mehler stresses out the significance of 
changing the peace research focus from analyzing ‘root causes’ of the conflicts to the factors which tend to 
sustain the conflicts. He claims that the nature of the conflicts in Africa change over time as new factors and 
actors are added. Thus, he concludes that in order to understand why these conflicts are so enduring, the 
specific factors behind these conflicts’ continuation should be analyzed. See also Mehler, A. (2006). “Area 
Studies, Conflicts and Preventive Practice in Africa,” in P. Chabal (ed.) Is Violence Inevitable in Africa?: 
Theories of Conflicts and Approaches to Conflict Prevention, Leiden, NLD: Brill, N. H. E. J. , N. V. 
Koninklijke, Boekhandel en Drukkerij, pp. 105-106.  
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dynamics include the roles of the domestic players, namely Georgia, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. On the other hand, external dynamics include the outside actors such as Russia, the 
United States, NATO and international organizations, most notably UN and OSCE, as well as 
the impact of the international law. This study accepts the fact that there have been many 
other players involved in the course of Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts, but the ones 
which are examined throughout the paper are the key players which have contributed to the 
current deadlock in the peace processes.  
 In particular, the specific roles of the external and internal players provide the largest 
portion of the CPFs to be evaluated. It is claimed in this paper that a wide range of players 
have directly or indirectly obstructed the conflict resolution processes in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. A partial explanation for this is that some members of the parties involved have had 
continuing interests in the maintenance of the conflicts. Thus, they have pursued actions with 
the intent to hinder or delay the peace processes. Besides, it also holds true that some other 
actors have unintentionally spoiled the peace processes, since their motives have somehow 
added to the insoluble characteristic of the conflicts. In this vein, it is recognized that the 
analysis of ‘spoilers’ and ‘spoiling behaviour9’ in Abkhazian and South Ossetian cases 
remains a significant feature of the study on the CPFs. Additionally, this paper seeks the 
answer to the question of whether Russia is a ‘peace spoiler’ as acclaimed by Georgians and 
many other scholars or not. 
  As acknowledged in this paper both the external and internal forces have contributed 
to the prolongation of the conflicts. Nevertheless, a distinction might be drawn between these 
two groups on the basis of their overall impact on the progress of the conflicts. It is claimed 
here that external actors have been more influential in determining the course of the conflicts, 
                                                 
9 ‘Spoiler’ is as term used in the conflict resolution field, which refers to a party or a member of a party who 
tends to hinder or delay the peace processes, mainly because it has substantial benefits from the continuation of 
the conflicts. Similarly, a spoiling behavior adds to the entrenchment of a conflict, since it somehow impedes the 
peaceful resolution of a conflict. A spoiling behaviour, though, might be either intentional or unintentional.   
 10 
since they have dictated the rules of the peace process as well as the rules of the geopolitical 
game in the region. Although Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been the directly 
engaged parties of the conflicts, they have failed to take the lead of the conflict resolution 
mechanisms. As these domestic players were unable to reach a settlement arrived at inter se, 
they have sought the support of foreign sources with the aim of strengthening their positions. 
However, due to their structural and diplomatic weakness, they have remained prone to heavy 
handed manipulation by the external actors. Holding the potential to exploit the differences 
between the adversary sides, the foreign powers have eventually gained an upper hand in the 
conflicts. These external players have tried to compel the internal players to abide by their 
self-perceived interests. Especially, Russia and the United States have aimed to extend their 
relations with the domestic actors in order to increase their control over the region. The 
involvement of these powerful actors has subsequently limited the maneuverability of both 
Georgian leaders and Abkhazian and South Ossetian de facto authorities. 
 Briefly, this paper analyzes the conflict prolonging factors in the cases of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia by progressively examining the context within which the conflicts have 
evolved and identifying the causal explanations behind the ensuing stalemate. The bulk of this 
paper will be concerned with examining the relevant parameters of these conflicts and 
providing a detailed analysis of its dynamics and the forces behind the volatile contemporary 
situation. This process will provide a coherent analytical framework within which the motives 
of the directly or indirectly engaged parties can be evaluated and discussed. It will be under 
this spectrum that relevant historical, social, political and economic dimensions will be 
encompassed to provide an enhanced understanding of the impasse behind the conflict 
resolution in these two specific cases.  
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 1.4 Summarizing the Chapters Involved 
 To begin with, Chapter (2) labeled ‘Analytical Framework’ first introduces the 
concept of de facto states so as to provide a platform for the subsequent discussion and 
analysis of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian questions. Second, it define sthe nature of the 
conflicts as ‘dynamic’, ‘ethnic’ and ‘intractable’ in principle. It is asserted that these 
protracted conflicts have originally evolved on an ethnic dimension and have become 
insoluble over the course of time, carrying the features of an ‘intractable conflict’. Third, a 
variety of studies on conflict resolution are analyzed and a number of relevant theories and 
their application evaluated, providing an insight on the dimensions of the conflicts, as well as 
the elements of the peace processes. Lastly, in this chapter the concept of conflict prolonging 
factors is defined and contextualized in the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As fore 
mentioned, CPF refers to a large array of factors which have accounted for the current 
impediment, delaying or hindering the conflict resolution processes. The study of the CPFs 
underlies the basic framework of this paper so as to provide a coherent understanding of the 
issue at hand.  
 It is recognized that the conflicts can not be understood independently of their 
historical contexts. In this vein, chapter (3) labeled ‘Historical Synopsis’ explores the 
progression of Georgian relations with Abkhazians and South Ossetians and scrutinizes the 
historic roots of the conflicts to provide an accurate analysis of the causal dynamics for the 
emergence of the conflicts. Chapter (4) labeled ‘Long-Term Conflict Prolonging Factors’ 
argues that the long-term CPFs, such as competing ethnic nationalisms, challenging 
perceptions of the past memories, ‘constructed’ ethnic identities and rival sentiments have 
emerged as the original sources of the conflicts and have developed throughout the course of 
the time, adding to the intractability of the conflicts. Chapter (5) labeled ‘Short-Term Conflict 
Prolonging Factors’ first scrutinizes the roles of the directly engaged parties, namely Georgia, 
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Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the conflicts and their individual contributions to the ensuing 
stalemate. Second, it analyzes the involvement of external actors such as Russia, the United 
States, NATO, UN and OSCE, as well as the role of the ambiguity of the international law. It 
is claimed that these actors and factors have added to some extent to the ‘spoiling’ activities 
and ultimately to the present dead-lock in the conflict resolution process. Chapter (6) labeled 
‘Evolving Dynamics after 2008 Georgian-Russian War’ prescribes the changing dynamics 
following the August 2008 war, as well as their implications on the conflicts. Finally, the last 
chapter summarizes and combines the analytical parameters and explanatory evidence 
addressed throughout the paper, ultimately communicating its concluding remarks. 
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2. Analytical Framework 
 2.1 Abkhazian and Ossetian State Structures: Introducing De Facto States  
 Since the beginning of the 1990s, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been de facto 
outside Georgian control; however they have failed to gain international recognition as 
independent sovereign states. Thus, they have been often referred as ‘de facto states’ or as 
‘unrecognized quasi-states’ in the international relations parlance, sharing many common 
characteristics with a number of other pronounced separatist regions. These breakaway 
regions lack ‘external sovereignty’, which is in Kolsto’s words the lack of recognition “as the 
sole representative of the nation in international fora.”10 On the other side though, they do 
secure ‘internal sovereignty’ which simply means that they exert control over their territory 
and people.11 To be more specific, Scott Pegg defines the ‘de-facto state’ as a political entity 
“that exists where there is an organized political leadership which has come to power 
through some degree of indigenous capacity; which receives popular support and which has 
capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territory 
maintaining effective control for a specific time period.” Besides, he adds that a de-facto state 
seeks full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition as a sovereign 
state.12 On the other side, Charles King opts to label them as ‘state-like entities’, since they 
have almost all the features of a state, but no international recognition.13   
 In addition to the fact that they have not been accepted as legitimate by the 
international community, Rywking categorized the ‘common trends’ of these states as 
following: (i) separation from their parent states due to state disintegration or ethnic or 
                                                 
10 Kolsto, P. (2006). “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States,” Journal of Peace Research, 
43:6, pp. 724.  
11 Kolsto (2006), p. 724;  King, C. (July 2001). “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Euroasia’s 
Unrecognized States,” World Politics, 53, pp. 525.  
12 Lynch, D. (Oct. 2002). “Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944- ), 78: 4, pp. 834, cited from Pegg, Scott (1998). International Society and the De-
facto State, Aldershot, Brookfield, USA: Ashgate.  p. 26. 
13 King (2001), p. 525 
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religious conflicts; (ii) they have functioned like ‘mini-states’ with their economies, 
currencies, armed forces, health and education services and administrative units etc; and (iii) 
there has always been an ‘outside protector’.14 On the other hand, Kolsto summarized the 
reasons behind the survival of these de facto states as: (a) the internal support from their local 
population, (b) militarization of the regions; (c)  the support of the powerful ‘protector state’ 
d) the weakness of the parent state and e) the ineffectiveness of international organizations 
such as OSCE, UN and NATO.15 Aside to these, Dov Lynch, further developed this 
explanation and added that ‘fear and insecurity’ and ‘subsistence syndromes’, which make 
these regions’ seek profit through illegal means, have been instrumental to their prolonged 
existence.16  
 South Ossetia and Abkhazia are two of the four de facto states that emerged following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and have remained until today outside the political map.17 
Only very recently, Russia and Nicaragua officially recognized the sovereignty of these two 
separatist states, whereas for the rest of the world they remain non-existent.  Though they 
failed to gain a membership in the states’ club, they have continued to live stubbornly, 
exerting control over their territories and constructing necessary state apparatuses. Both South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia have created their organized political leaderships and have formed their 
own administrative structures providing governmental services. Since 1990s, they both have 
acted as ‘mini-states’ with their constitutions, political parties, parliamentary and presidential 
elections and established ‘nation-state’ formats such as national education systems including 
instruction of their mother-languages. Furthermore, they  have both maintained their survival 
not only through the means of nationalism, but also through military means allocating 
                                                 
14 Rywkin, M. (2006). “The Phenomenon of Quasi-States,” Diogenes, 210, pp. 25.  
15 .Kolsto (2006), p. 729 
16 Lynch, D. (Nov. 2001). “Managing Separatist States: A Eurasian Case Study,” Occasional Paper, Institute for 
Security Studies of WEU, no: 32. Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/707/02/occ2e.html 
17 Lynch (2002)  
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extensive resources for defense resulting in the high level of ‘militarization’ of the regions.18 
Dealing with ‘state-building’ efforts, they have been heavily reliant on Russia, their ‘protector 
state’, for economic, diplomatic, moral and military support giving Moscow an opportunity to 
exploit the separatist conflicts in order to create advantageous conditions in the whole region. 
Enjoying the backing of Russia, they have further developed their internal forces and 
consolidated their de facto existence. In addition, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been 
routes for illegal trafficking of drugs, goods and arms due to the power vacuum that emerged 
in this chaotic environment. As the international community labeled any economic activities 
in these regions ‘illegitimate’, the majority of the populations began to earn their living frum 
such illegal activities. Their parent state, Georgia, on the other hand failed to attract 
Abkhazians and South Ossetians due to its fragile and weak status, further contributing to the 
emerging deep divisions solidified by its uncompromising stance and exclusive rhetoric.  
 The analysts claim that de facto states “are temporary entities” and sooner or later 
their existence will end.19 Since they do not have the chance of surviving indefinitely, their 
current status will eventually transform into a different format. According to these analysts, 
four available possibilities are anticipated for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as for all de facto 
states: (i) gaining international recognition; (ii) uniting with the protector state; (iii) 
reabsorbing into the parent state or (iv) achieving an autonomous status within the parent state 
in some kind of a federal arrangement.20  
 To say the least, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as in other similar breakaway 
regions, the existence of the de facto structure was a key factor in blocking the peaceful 
settlement of the conflicts and thus in entrenching the status quo ante. On the other hand, as 
Dov Lynch asserts, the continuation of the status quo ante was crucial for the survival of the 
                                                 
18 Kolsto (2006), p. 731 
19 Ibid., p. 735 and Rywkin (2006), p. 28 
20 Kolsto (2006), p. 734-738, Rywkin (2006) p. 27 and Lynch (2002 
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de facto states. 21  In other words, in the absence of a political solution that would settle the 
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the existing conditions would keep stimulating the 
survival of these ‘state-like entities’ which in return would further obstruct the peace process.  
 2.2 The Nature of the Conflicts 
 a. ‘Frozen’ or ‘Dynamic’? 
 The international community and many of the scholars kept referring to the conflicts 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as ‘frozen conflicts’22 failing to see their evolving nature and 
the dynamic factors that shape their background. The fact that almost no progress has been 
achieved towards the resolution of these conflicts and that no major event to change the status 
of the breakaway regions has occurred has eventually led to this misinterpretation. Moreover, 
that there had been relatively peaceful and stable periods in the regions following the wars in 
1990s and preceding the ‘five-day’ war in August 2008 has given the wrong impression that 
they were ‘frozen along ceasefire lines”.23 As Dov Lynch rightly pointed out that these 
conflicts have actually remained all, but frozen and thus “the image of a dynamo is a more 
fitting way of understanding why there has been no conflict resolution.”24  For years now, the 
driving forces behind the conflicts contributed to sustain the stalemate in the context of the 
conflicts, blocking the peace settlement whereas shifting the conflicts to different phases over 
the course of time. In other words, in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia what is frozen has 
been the conflict resolution process, not the conflict itself. Thus, it would be more correct to 
                                                 
21 Lynch, D. (Feb. 2006). “Why Georgia Matters,” Chaillot Paper, no: 86 (Institute for Security Studies, Paris), 
p. 36.  
22 Blank, S. (2008). “Russia and the Black Sea’s Frozen Conflicts in Strategic Perspective, Mediterranean 
Quarterly, 19-3; Khutsishvili, G. (2006). “The Abkhazia and South Ossetia cases: Spoilers in a nearly collapsed 
peace process,” in E. Newman & O. Richmond (ed.), Challenges to peacebuilding: Managing spoilers during 
conflict resolution, (pp. 282-300). Tokyo: United Nations University Press; Asmus, R. D. & Jackson, B. B. 
(2004). “The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom,” in R. D. Asmus and B. B. Jackson (ed.), A New Euro-
Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region,  (pp.17-26). The German Mashall Fund, Washington D.C..; Alieva, 
L. (2004). “South Caucasus: Going West,”  in R. D. Asmus and B. B. Jackson (ed.), A New Euro-Atlantic 
Strategy for the Black Sea Region,  (pp.65-76). The German Mashall Fund, Washington D.C.; Socor, V. (2004). 
“Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge to Euro-Atlantic Interests”, in R. D. Asmus and B. B. Jackson (ed.), A New 
Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region,  (pp. 127-137). The German Mashall Fund, Washington D.C. 
23 Cornell, S. E (2000). Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, 
London &New York: GBR Curzon Press Limited, p. 2.  
24 Lynch (2006), p. 2 and Lynch (2001)  
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refer to these two conflicts as ‘dynamic’ given their progressive development and the 
contemporary forces behind their continuing existence.   
 b. Ethnic Conflicts? 
 The Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts have been generally described as ‘ethnic 
conflicts’ by political scientists, analysts and politicians.25 However, there have been some 
critics expressing that the ethnic dimension has not been the basis of the conflicts, but rather 
only a tool for manipulation handed by external and internal political forces.26 Another line of 
criticism has been that they should not be only defined as ‘ethnic’, but ‘ethno-national’, 
‘ethno-territorial’ or ‘ethno-political’.27  
 To begin with, this paper recognizes that Abkhazians, South Ossetians and Georgians 
can be classified as ‘ethnic communities’, since linguistic and cultural differences as well as 
conscious awareness of distinctive boundaries and a sense of solidarity within each population 
have been observable and arguably enduring.28 Besides, in these cases ethnicity has been 
considerably significant both for group commitment and group entitlement. In other words, 
the characteristics of ethnicity such as a common name, common sentiment of homeland, 
shared ancestry myths, histories, traditions and customs have been the determinants in the 
categorization of these communities.29 However, considering the conflicting parties as distinct 
                                                 
25 For example see Toff, M. D. (Jan. 2001) “Multinationality, Regions and State-Building: The Failed Transition 
in Georgia,” Regional and Federal Studies, 11:3, pp. 123-142;  Coppieters, B. (Summer 2001). “Ethno-
Federalism and Civic State Building Policies. Perspectives on the Georgian-Akbhaz Conflict”, Regional & 
Federal Studies, 11:2, pp. 69-93;  Suny, R. G. (1996a). “Nationalism and Social Class in the Russian 
Revolution: The Cases of Baku and Tbilisi,” in R. G. Suny (ed.), Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social 
Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, (pp. 241-260). The University of Michigan 
Press.;Zverev, A. (1996). “Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-94,” in B. Coppieters (ed.),  Contested Borders 
in the Caucasus. Brussels: VUB Press, pg. 46.  
26 Coppieters (2002), p. 73-74.   
27 Ibid. p. 73-74. On the other side, S. Cornell calls these conflicts as ‘ethno-political’. See Cornell (2000), p. 247 
28 Ethnicity has been approached and defined by different views such as primordialist, constructivist or moderate 
constructivists. For a study comparing the theories on ‘ethnicity’ , see Fowkes,B. (2002). Ethnicity and Ethnic 
Conflict in the Post-Communist World, Gordonswille, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, pg. 1-6..  
29 The understanding of ethnicity here has been derived from A.D Smith’s definition of ‘ethnicity’ in Smith, A. 
D. (1986). The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford: Blackwell, pg. 32. 
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‘ethnic communities’, does not necessarily mean that the conflicts should be invariably 
labeled as ‘ethnic’, since it constitutes a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one.   
 In the cases of Georgia’s separatist conflicts, animosities between the opposing sides 
have been deeply rooted along historical cleavage lines, generating hatred and ‘self-other’ 
distinctions. Besides, proclaiming their ethnic identities and taking action with the aim to 
maximize the benefits of the members of their ethnic groups, these communities have been 
determined to fight for their common will, such as ‘secession’. Carrying similar weight, the 
underlying ‘fear of domination’30 and insecurity tended to dictate the inter-ethnic communal 
relations, ultimately breeding ethnic tensions. Considering all these, Abkhazian and South 
Ossetian conflicts will be labeled as ‘ethnic conflicts’ throughout this study.31 On the other 
side, it will be also acknowledged that national, political and territorial dimensions should not 
be undermined, bearing in mind the miscellaneous factors that generated the conflicts such as 
competing nationalist projects, distribution of political rewards, intelligentsias’ attempts to 
retain  power and prestige, allocation of high-rank positions and scarce resources and 
demands for territorial control and autonomy.32 
 c. ‘Intractable’ or ‘Tractable’?  
 One way to classify ethnic conflicts (as well as social and inter-communal conflicts) 
has been according to their persistence, longevity, intensity and severity. In this regard, 
introducing the ‘intractability’ of conflicts as an analytical concept, Kriesberg aimed to 
categorize conflicts on an intractable-tractable axis. At the pole of the intractable dimension 
                                                 
30 In his theory of ‘ethnic conflict’, Horowitz links the inter-group relations and violence to ‘fear of domination’.  
Horowitz, D. L. (2000). Ethnic Groups in Conflicts (with a new preface), Berkeley, Calif. ; London : University 
of California Press. 
31 For  an in-depth analysis on ethnic conflicts, see Williams, R. M. (1994). “The Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts: 
Comparative International Perspectives”, Annual Review of Sociology, vol: 20, pp. 49-79; Horowitz (2000) and 
Brown, M. E. (1993). “Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflcit” M. E.  Brown (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and 
International Security, (pp. 3-26). Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press. 
32 Territorial dimension of an ethnic conflict has been systematically analyzed in Coakley, J. (2003). ‘The 
Challenge’ in J. Coakley (2nd ed.), The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict, (pp.1-22). London; Portland, 
Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers.  
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are the conflicts in which participating parties are unwilling to seek a peaceful settlement for 
the conflict, manifesting the incompatibility of their demands, ultimately resulting in the 
entrenchment of ‘a cycle of violence’. On the other side, tractable conflicts are the ones in 
which parties acknowledge their mutual interests, recognize the propriety of each other’s 
claims and agree to solve their differences through peaceful means, avoiding violence.33 Bar-
Tal expanded Kriesberg’s formulation on intractable conflicts and summarized their 
characteristics as (1) protracted-persisting for a long time, generally more than a generation; 
(2) violent- involving human losses, physical damage and refugees; (3) ‘zero-sum’ in nature- 
whatever one side gains is perceived at the expense of the other ; (4) significant sectors of the 
engaged parties have vested economic, military and ideological interests in the conflict’s 
prolongation; (5) perceived ‘irreconcilable’- the participating parties consider their goals as 
extremely opposite and they are reluctant to make concessions; (6) the issues are about values 
and basic needs which are considered ‘essential’ for the parties’ existence; (7) central- the 
conflict constantly occupies a salient place on the political agenda.34 Intractable conflicts 
might end in two ways; (i) if the antagonists will to use only peaceful means and conduct 
routine and fruitful negotiations to settle the conflicts, in other words, if the conflicts 
transform into tractable ones; (ii) if one of the engaged parties is destroyed or collapsed.35  
 The Abkhazian and South Ossetian cases examined in this study have experienced the 
above features of intractability as the conflicts remained unresolved for almost two decades, 
resulting in wars in early 1990s followed with heightening of tensions, large-scale skirmishes, 
relatively low-intensity fighting, military threats and counter-threats, large out-flow of 
persons and a five-day war in August 2008 with the direct involvement of Russia into the 
                                                 
33 Kriesberg, L.(1998). “Intractable Conflicts” in E. Weiner (ed.) The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence, (pp. 
332-342). The Continuum Publishing, New York. p. 337 ; Bar-Tal, D. (2003). “Collective Memory of Physical 
Violence: its Contribution to the Culture of Violence, in  E. Cairus (ed.), Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict,  
(pp. 77-93). Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Machmillan and Kriesberg, L. (2005). “Nature, Dynamics, and 
Phases of Intractability” in C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (ed.), Grasping the Needle: Analyzing 
Cases of Intractable Conflict, (pp. 65-97), Washinton D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
34 Bar-Tal (2003), p. 77 and Kriesberg (1998), p. 333.  
35 Kriesberg (1998), p. 337.  
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confrontation. As stated before, the demands of the separatist regions and Georgia have been 
perceived highly incompatible and no party has been willing either to make compromise to 
settle the conflicts in a peaceful way or to initiate routine negotiations in a civilized manner. 
In addition to the irreconcilability of goals, the constructed ‘self-other’ distinctions and 
deeply- rooted grievances between the opposing sides have been instrumental for these 
conflicts to be perceived ‘zero-sum’ in nature. Furthermore, as will be analyzed in depth 
throughout the paper, a number of significant members of the parties involved have vested 
interests in continuing the struggle. In line with the acknowledgement of the conflicts as 
‘dynamic’ rather than ‘frozen’, it can be suggested that the level of intractability has changed 
over the course of time, whereas some periods have appeared to be less intractable and some 
others more.36  
 2.3 Analyzing Studies on Conflict Resolution and Their Application 
 In the field of conflict studies, the academic interest has predominantly concentrated 
on disarmament and demobilization;37 post-conflict peace reconciliation and peace-building;38 
unilateral conflict management and collective security mechanisms.39 Many of these have 
been directed around specific cases, such as Northern Ireland, South Africa and 
Israel/Palestine peace processes.40 On the other hand, most of the intractable ethnic conflicts 
                                                 
36 Kriesberg suggests that intractable conflicts can be evaluated on various phases over time as the course of the 
conflict changes. For the framework of ‘phases’ he developed see Kriesberg (2005), p. 68-77.  
37 Stedman, S. J. (2003). “Peace Processes and the Challenges of Violence,” in J. Darby (ed.), Contemporary 
Peace Making: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, (pp. 103-113). Gordonsville, VA. USA: Palgrave 
Macmillan; Gamba, V. (2003). “Managing Violence: Disarmament and Demobilization,” in J. Darby (ed.), 
Contemporary Peace Making: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, (pp. 125-136). Gordonsville, VA. USA: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
38 Hamber, B. (2003). “Transformation and Reconciliation,” in J. Darby (ed.), Contemporary Peace Making: 
Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, (pp. 224-234). Gordonsville, VA. USA: Palgrave Macmillan; Lederach, 
J. P. (1998), “Beyond Violence: Building Sustainable Peace,” in E. Weiner (ed.), The Handbook of Interethnic 
Coexistence. (pp. 236-246). New York: Continuum Publishing. 
39 Lepgold, J. & Weiss, T. G. (ed.) (1998). Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics, New 
York: Suny Press.   
40 For examples see Gidron B., Katz, S. N. & Hasenfeld, Y. ed., (2002). Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict 
Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa, Oxford University Press and Chabal, P. ed. 
(2006). Is Violence Inevitable in Africa?: Theories of Conflicts and Approaches to Conflict Prevention, Leiden, 
NLD: Brill, N. H. E. J. , N. V. Koninklijke, Boekhandel en Drukkerij.  
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have not only remained within the context of the region that the conflict resides, but have also 
been externalized. With this regard, the academics of conflict studies have begun to construct 
theories on internationalization of the conflicts, more specifically their diffusion and 
escalation building up a link between protracted ethnic conflicts and international security, 
and on third-party interventionism.41 The general outlook is notably supporting the fact that 
international involvement, as well third party interventionism has been instrumental in 
spoiling or delaying peace settlement in many of such conflicts.42  
 Recent trends illustrate that although the major practices in international conflict 
management and conflict resolution have been based on the state system dominant in world 
politics, the traditional understanding has been challenged with the increased emphasis on 
sub-state and non-state actors, as well as multilateral actions outreaching national interests 
and state boundaries.43 Indeed, external powers including outside actors as well as 
international organizations have not only been interested in interfering in ethnic conflicts, but 
also in mediating them. Thus a wide range of literature on conflict or conflict resolution has 
drawn attention to the role of international mediation, most remarkably the role of ‘UN’ as an 
                                                 
41 Review of literature on the ‘internationalization’ of ethnic conflicts  and third party interventionism, see 
Lobell, S. E. & Mauceri, P. (2004). “Diffusion and Escalation of Ethnic Conflict”, in S. E. Lobell  (ed.), Ethnic 
Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation, Gordonsville, (pp. 1-10). VA. USA: 
Palgrave Machmillan; Horowitz, S. (2004). “Identities Unbound: Escalating Ethnic Conflict in Post-Soviet 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan,” in S. E. Lobell  (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: 
Explaining Diffusion and Escalation, Gordonsville, (pp. 51-74). VA. USA: Palgrave Machmillan and Lake, D. A 
& Rothchild, D. (1998). “Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict”, in D. A. Lake and D. 
Rothchild (ed.), The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, (pp. 1-10). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press.  For detailed studies on third party interventionims see Berdal, M & Cooper R. (1993). 
“Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts,” in M. E. Brown (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and International Security, (pp. 
181-205). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press and Toscano, R. (1998). “An answer to War: 
Conflicts in Intervention in Contemporary International Relations,” in E. Weiner (ed.), The Handbook of 
Interethnic Coexistence. (pp. 263-279). New York: Continuum Publishing. 
42 Lobell & Mauceri (2004); Gurr, T. R. (1992). “The Internationalization of Protracted Communal Conficts 
Since 1945: Which Groups, Where and How.” in M. I. Midlarsky (ed.), The Internationalization of Communal 
Strife, London: Routledge; Carment D. (1993). “The International Dimension of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, 
Indicators, and Theory”, Journal of Peace Research, vol: 30, issue: 2, pp. 137-150 and Brown, M. E. (1996). 
“International Conflict and International Action.” in M. E. Brown (ed.) The International Dimension of Internal 
Conflict. Cambridge: MIT Press.   
43 (Art. G-5) 
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arbiter.44 Although in principle the UN propagates the abstraction from involvement in the 
domestic affairs of other states, this has not obstructed individual states and the UN itself to 
meddle in conflicts with the aim of contributing to the settlement of the differences through 
peaceful means. Ironically, the fact that the mediators of such conflicts have often taken sides 
has tended to impede their resolution. Besides, the problematic structure of the UN in coming 
to consensus and implementing action has limited its ability to provide ‘collective security’.45  
 These peace processes are predominantly dictated by the motivation of the 
international community which often neglects the demands of the local parties failing to 
address the underlying causes of the conflicts as well as the internal dynamics behind the on-
going confrontation.46 Darby and Ginty defined peace processes as the certain combinations 
of a set of peace initiatives with systematic and vigorous qualities that enable it to resist some 
of the arising pressures. In a peace process, a peace initiative might be at any time and it 
might be formal or informal, private or public, directed by popular support or confined to 
elite-level concurrence.47 A peace process can not be completed unless a final political 
decision is agreed upon. In this regard, achieving a successful outcome in a peace process 
depends on the inclusion of all key actors in the process, the willingness of the parties to 
compromise, as well as the avoiding the use of military force as an available option.48  
 Whereas some academic work has focused on the content of the peace initiatives, 
which outlines an outcome meeting the aspirations of all engaged parties within a conflict;49 
                                                 
44 Walker, J. (1993). “International Mediation of Ethnic Conflicts,” in M. E. Brown (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and 
International Security, (pp. 165-179). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press and Roberts, A. (1993). 
“The United Nations and International Security,” in M. E. Brown (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and International 
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Zartnam’s ripeness theory has drawn attention on the timing rather than the substance of the 
proposals for conflict resolution. Particularly, Zartnam’s work has suggested that conflicts are 
open to reconciliation when the engaged parties arrive at a moment of ‘mutually hurting 
stalemate’ (MHS), where victory seems impossible on either side as well as any continuation 
of the conflict would be dramatically costly to the parties involved.50 When the moment is 
perceived to be ‘ripe’, the parties involved are ready to put an end to the stalemate with the 
aim of finding a mutually acceptable solution. If the parties observe the possibility of a 
negotiated solution, in other words if they “sense a way out”, they will commit themselves to 
initiate fruitful negotiations.    
 Negotiations in that sense are a crucial element of a peace process, since the 
willingness of the engaged parties to initiate negotiations is vital to sustain progress towards 
conflict resolution. Guelke adds that for negotiation to be successful flexible leadership is 
adamant and grasping Zartnam’s ‘ripeness theory’ also posits the significance of the right 
timing.51 It follows that although “more or less a symbiotic relationship” seems to reside 
between negotiations and peace processes, it holds true that the negotiations are not merely 
challenged by violence.52 On the other hand, the failure of achieving a negotiated political 
solution may not result in the eruption of a violent conflict, “as the case of Cyprus’s long, 
largely bloodless conflict since partition in 1974 underlines.”53  
 It should be acknowledged that a peace process might entail at some point or other a 
possibly extensive period of impasse54 in which the negotiations are dead-locked and 
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ultimately the peace process is amenable to prolongation. This is mainly because it creates 
groups or individuals who have a vested interest and clear incentives in the continuation of 
the conflict. Recently, numerous studies have begun to focus on the factors that disrupt a 
peace process and explore the phenomena of ‘spoilers’ and ‘spoiling’, generally defined as 
“groups and tactics that actively seek to hinder, delay or undermine conflict settlement 
through a variety of means and a variety of motives.”55  It is recognized by a number of 
scholars that ‘spoiling’ is a natural part of a conflict resolution procedure, since every peace 
process creates ‘spoilers’ with different intentions, goals, motivations, attitudes and 
commitment.56 Spoilers, who believe that the materialization of a peace accord would threaten 
their power and interests, might be both from inside or outside the peace process.57   
 Additionally significant, most of the actors in a peace process are more interested in 
prolonging the peace process, rather than totally dismissing it or reaching a sustainable peace 
settlement. They benefit from manipulating the whole process in order to access the potential 
financial and political resources provided, to achieve recognition and legitimacy, to gather 
material gains as well as support from allies.58 As Newmann and Richmond asserts, “spoiling 
behaviour, at its most successful, seems to lead not to the end of a peace process, but to the 
inclusion of new sets of interests, the recognition of proto-political actors, and sometimes 
further concessions and the commitment of more international resources.”59  In short, with 
the desire to retain the assets of a peace process, the so-called ‘devious objectives’, they 
accept to be a part of the negotiations, even if they constantly reject any peace proposal. That 
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is to say, “by not ending the process, everything remains on the table” and they can continue 
to reap the benefits of the stalemate.60 Thus, insider spoiling especially becomes very likely 
when one or more of the adversaries revert from conceding the benefits of an on-going peace 
process where these benefits exceed the gains of a peace agreement.61   
 It is also significant to note that intractable conflicts by nature are vulnerable to 
spoiling activities, since its aforementioned inherent features predicate the difficulty of 
negotiation and compromise. Besides, as Karin Aggestam stresses out, such conflicts are 
subject to ‘asymmetrical relations’ in which the stronger parties dominate the rules of the 
peace process and try to impose their self-perceived interests, whereas the weaker ones 
attempt to undermine the conflict settlement assuming that the process “denies them 
justice”.62 In this kind of situations, the biggest responsibility falls upon the international 
community which has the ability to stipulate necessary conditions for the resolution of 
conflicts. However, the simultaneous involvement of many external actors can complicate the 
process and unintentionally generate opportunities for spoiling activities.63  
 Furthermore, in intractable conflicts, the negotiation strategies are directed by 
competitive motives, which inevitably acquire certain spoiling qualities. In this vein, Karin 
Aggestam draws attention to Morgenthau’s realist paradigm where peace processes are 
subject to a struggle of power between rival forces which employ a combination of 
persuasion, compromise and coercive threat to manipulate negotiations and maximize 
potential benefits. 64 As such, the peace process reflects the ultimate pursuance of self-
interests which inescapably conflict, resulting in inflexible preferences and incompatible 
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demands. As it can be seen, competitive negotiation strategies and spoiling behavior are 
largely interchangeable concepts which in turn blur the intentional-unintentional trajectory. 
Thus, in practice, the diagnosis of spoilers, as well as the categorization of spoiling behavior 
is highly problematic and subject to contestation. What is more, the predictability of the 
‘spoiling’ theory is further limited since “the notion of spoiling tends to be viewed as a rather 
static phenomenon, whereas in practice it is highly dynamic, as the actors’ goals may alter 
during a peace process.”65  
 Conflict resolution theorists, consistent with the notion of the rationality theory, focus 
on the realist conception that underpins the maximization of self-perceived interests as the 
ultimate goal of actors involved. However, diverging from international relations theorists; 
they recognize that self interests may override the national interests.66 Hence, they assume 
that the engaged parties of a conflict, whether people or institutions, compete to gain wealth, 
power, territory or any other scarce resources of particular value.67 Furthermore, sometimes 
people may act in a fashion that contradicts their interests, since they might be driven by 
passion that stifles any rational behaviour. Morton Deutsch explains that attempts to increase 
one’s gains in the expense of other’s might be in reality ‘self-defeating’, since the perceived 
‘zero-sum’ understanding might yield in return a ‘lose-lose’ outcome.68 Thus, the conflict 
resolution theories should take into account the irrational and unpredictable behaviour of 
human beings who often succumb to psychological adversities.   
 In this light, one can claim that what has been generally neglected in scholarly works 
on conflict, conflict management and resolution has been the need for comprehending the 
peace processes beyond the reach of the negotiations between the political leaders of the 
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engaged parties. It was only after Roger Fisher developed the concept of ‘interactive conflict 
resolution’ that attention was redirected away from inter-governmental dialogue to a broader 
understanding of peace settlements achieved at lower levels of interaction.69 Saunders 
emphasizes that, “policy for ending deep-rooted human conflict will not be realistic unless 
policy makers think in terms of a multilevel peace process that embraces both official and 
public peace-making efforts.”70 This sheds light to the psychological dimension of conflicts 
that draws from group-based emotions constituting an integral part of conflict resolution by 
building on the inter-communal trust between negotiating parties necessary for the 
achievement of peace reconciliation by means of ‘positive-sum’ solutions.71  
  On the other hand, the emotional dimension of the conflicts is often crucial to the 
cultivation of enmity between conflicting populations driven by exclusive identity politics.72 
The problematic aspect of ethnic-driven conflicts resides on the fundamental human need of 
identity formation against a constructed constitutive ‘other’, generating a breeding ground for 
the manipulation of masses along ethnically divisive lines. As such identity-related and 
emotionally-charged conflicts are far more complex and enduring and consequently are often 
“not amenable to split-the-difference, cake-cutting solutions based on compromise.”73  
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 2.4 The Conflict-Prolonging Factors Contextualized 
 Although there has been growing academic interest in constructing conflict 
management and conflict resolution techniques which contribute in developing better 
frameworks for resolving the conflicts in specific regions. Most of the conflicts are too 
complicated to be understood by general attachments. Particularly, the protracted conflicts 
can be better understood if analyzed within their specific geopolitical and regional context. 
Furthermore, the traditional conceptualization of conflict resolution, conflict management or 
peace-building might be limited to comprehend the causes behind the persistence of these 
intractable conflicts. Thus, in order to bring the prospect for a future peace settlement closer 
to realization, they should be analyzed idiosyncratically with specific conflict resolution 
structures that are designed according to the dynamics that determine the course and 
development of each conflict.  
 Keeping in line with this understanding, this paper will concentrate on two particular 
ethnic and intractable conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are two de facto state-
like entities within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia. To remind, the conflicts 
in these regions have been designed as ‘zero-sum’ conflicts in which the adversaries over 
years have accumulated hatred, hostility and prejudiced perceptions towards each other 
feeding mistrust and existential fears within their societies. Besides, in these two cases of 
ethnic conflicts the constructed ‘identities’, as well as ‘nationalist ideologies’ have served as 
the basis for distinction from the opposing side generating legitimacy for the local political 
leaderships. The conflicts have become intractable as in such an insecure environment parties 
have tended to resist any concession considered disadvantageous for their perceived interests. 
Eventually, the parties have sought to undermine the conflict resolution mechanisms, freezing 
the peace process and supporting the prolongation of the conflicts.  
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 Until recently, the studies on Abkhazia and South Ossetia have either explored the 
root causes of the conflicts, most notably within the historical and socio-cultural context or 
have discussed state-building forms in Georgia and possible federative arrangements for the 
future, generally neglecting the current dynamics that shape these separatist conflicts. What is 
more, there has not yet been a systematic and in-depth analysis of the major circumstances, 
players and factors that have hindered the conflict resolution process in these particular cases. 
On the other hand, there were several recent studies on de facto states, particularly on the ones 
in former-Soviet territories which have attempted to analyze the sustainability of their 
existence.74 The overall insight was that in these conflicts there emerged a prevalent structure 
which benefited a number of engaged actors in such a way that suppressed any incentive to 
alter the status quo. In particular, Dov Lynch in his work ‘Managing Separatist States: A 
Eurasian Case Study’75  highlighted that the dynamic forces driving these separatist states and 
the existing conflicts entrenched the pervasive logic that sustained the status quo. These 
nomothetic explanations were useful for providing a set of concepts as well as constructing 
frameworks that explained the insolvability of the conflicts in Eurasian de facto states, yet 
acquired a general outlook that failed to grasp the particularities of specific cases, such as the 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian contextual paradigms. Only by employing a more systematic 
and qualitative analysis can one provide a complete interface on the cases that ultimately 
transgresses over-simplistic understandings on the nature of the conflicts and the dynamics 
that drive their evolution.  
 The concepts like ‘conflict-resolution’, ‘conflict-management’ and ‘conflict 
prevention’ have been frequently used in international diplomacy or in conflict studies, but 
mostly with ‘vague’ meanings. In this case, it will be useful to conceptualize ‘conflict 
resolution’ and ‘conflict resolution/peace process’ to show what kind of a meaning they will 
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bear throughout this paper, as well as to draw their  distinction from the other commonly used 
concepts. Conflict resolution is a set of approaches which seeks to remove the sources of a 
conflict and achieve an ‘outcome’ by peaceful means. Its distinction from conflict 
management is that conflict management deals with the on-going conflict, rather than the 
outcome of a peace process. Conflict resolution/peace process on the other hand is the whole 
process from the beginning of a conflict until the ‘end’ of it, which ‘end’ here does imply the 
termination of the ultimate peace accord or the final political solution to an existing question. 
Although the term ‘peace process’ might be sometimes interchangeably used with the term 
‘negotiation process’, in this paper the peace process with reference to Guelke will imply a 
distinctive concept. Hence the termination of the negotiation talks will not insinuate the end to 
the conflict resolution process. Besides, the emotional and psychological aspects of non-
official communal relations will be also taken into account. 
 In conventional wisdom, conflict resolution methods generally rely upon the concepts 
of concession, compromise and conciliation. Thus, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
willingness of the parties, a mutually accepted peace proposal as well as the ‘right timing’ or 
in Zartnam’s conceptualization a ‘ripe moment’ are needed to achieve progress in a peace 
process. Yet, what is neglected are the forces working behind the conflicts that thwart the 
emergence of these necessary conditions. Hence, before conflict resolution strategies are 
considered, one should initially develop a clear view of the conflict itself, predominantly its 
causes and effects. To be more concrete, an insight into the nature and dynamics of the on-
going conflicts is crucial to produce a well-developed conflict resolution framework and 
peace proposal. In this light, this paper does not aim to advocate methods for eradicating the 
conflicts or examining the criteria required for an ultimate peace accord in the Abkhazian and 
South Ossetian cases. Rather, it aims to study the relation between the peace process and a 
wide range of historical, economic and political factors that yield a substantial effect on it.  
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 This paper acknowledges the fact that the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia also 
involve a large array of actors and motives. Consistent with the current approach in the 
international relations field, it is recognized that not only states, but also sub-state and non-
state actors have been involved in one way or the other in the conflict resolution process 
Moreover, taking the rationality theory as its basis, this paper assumes that all groups and 
individuals in a conflict tend to act on their self-perceived interests, pursuing gain 
maximization on the ground of cost-benefit analysis. Nevertheless, it allows for the possibility 
of ‘irrational behaviours’, as well as the unpredictability of actions due to existential free will 
and the changing context.    
 As fore mentioned, peace processes in intractable conflicts have played host to a wide 
range of players, the so-called ‘spoilers’ who have been involved directly or indirectly by 
attempting  to keep the conflict unresolved and the process in dead-lock. The cases in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia both confirm and challenge this approach. The fact that the 
conflict resolution processes have remained standstill for almost two decades and that a 
variety of actors, not necessarily only the immediate participants, have benefited from this 
impasse validates the existence of ‘spoilers’ and ‘spoiling behaviour’. However, the 
complexity of these players’ motives and the multitude of the factors that determine their 
attitudes, as well as the competitive zero-sum nature of the conflicts have clouded the 
identification of ‘spoilers’, as well as the diagnosis of the intentional/unintentional dichotomy. 
 Still, whether deliberate or not, the impact of spoilers remains detrimental for the 
insoluble characteristic of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Spoiling behaviour, 
however, remains only one feature of a vast range of conflict prolonging factors that combine 
to impede the conflict resolution process. Conflict prolonging factors (CPF) in this study refer 
to aspects and circumstances which contribute to the sustaining of the logic driving the 
endurance of a conflict within its multifaceted and changing nature. As such, the diverse 
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dynamics that prescribe the course of the conflict will be subjugated under the umbrella of 
conflict prolonging factors. That is, a collection of complex interactions of different external 
and internal forces, which reciprocally influence and determine the context of the conflict.  
 Although highly intertwined, the dynamics of the conflict need to be categorized in 
order to simplify and clarify the composite dimensions of the ensuing conflicts. To put it very 
simply, it is not possible to address the causes behind the persistence of the confrontation in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia without distinctively determining the most notable conflict-
prolonging factors. In line with this, it will be acknowledged that these factors might emerge 
in both short and long term trajectories. Long-term conflict prolonging factors will cover the 
dynamics that have been shaped by the historical and socio-cultural context in the regions 
which in turn determine the very structure of the conflicts. It is contended here that although 
the elements within the long-term CPF have originally implied the roots of the conflict, they 
have transcended in the current situation resulting in disrupted inter-communal relations and 
polarized attitudes, which eventually have added to the vicious circle that has characterized 
the conflicts. On the other side, the short-term CPF will mainly focus on the political, 
economic and geopolitical dynamics both within regional and international context that have 
been developed concomitant to the progress of the conflict. Lastly, although a variety of 
factors will be analyzed in isolation, the overall judgment will remain that only when these 
assorted dynamics are considered together can they provide a meaningful and substantial 
framework for understanding the lack of progress towards the resolution of the conflicts in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
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3. Historical Background 
 3.1 Pre-Soviet Union Period 
 3.1.1 Georgia under Tsarist Russia 
 The roots of the current conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians and Ossetians do 
not stretch back to centuries preceding the Tsarist Russian rule, mainly because in the 
medieval times the peoples of the region were not consciously mobilized nationalities, lacking 
a “territorial or ethno-cultural sense of homeland or nation.”76 The underlying reason was 
that until the 19th century, the lands of present-day Georgia had been largely fragmented with 
the exception of a brief period of the united Georgian kingdom of Abkhazeti-Kartli including 
present-day Abkhazia and eastern Georgia, during the 11th century. Paradoxically, it was the 
Tsarist Russia which ended the fragmentation within Georgia by bringing its lands under a 
single political authority in the beginning of 19th century. Though resisted hard, Abkhazia was 
also incorporated into the Tsarist Empire in 1810 with the assistance of Mingrelian troops and 
the puppet prince, Seferbey, installed by Russians.77 Not surprisingly, throughout the 19th 
century, the Abkhazian communities led constant popular uprisings against the oppressive 
Tsarist regime. Following the biggest revolt in 1866, Russians began to force a large number 
of Abkhazians, mainly Muslim ones to migrate to various parts of the Ottoman Empire.78  
 3.1.2 Brief Period of Independent Menshevik Georgian Republic 
 On the other hand, Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian rivalry articulated 
itself as the communities chose different wings of the Socialist Party in the early 20th century. 
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Whereas Abkhazian and Ossetian socialists preferred Bolsheviks linking themselves with 
Lenin’s Russia, Georgian socialists preferred to follow the more liberal Mensheviks.79 
Following the October Revolution that put the Tsarist rule to an end, the Georgian socialists 
achieved to found a Menshevik Republic in 1918,80 merging socialism with nationalism and 
grasping the support from most layers of the Georgian society. Slightly later, a group of 
Ossetians, who had arrived to the southern side of the Caucasus Mountains escaping from the 
Mongol invasion in 13th century and settling in the present-day South Ossetia, came under the 
rule of this new Republic, together with the Bolshevik Abkhazians. On the other side, South 
Ossetian’s ethnic counterparts, North Ossetians, became attached to the Terek Soviet 
Republic.81 Although the most stable republic in Transcaucasia of the time was Georgia, the 
Red Army’s invasion in February 1921 brought the end of its brief independence 82 leaving 
the process of the Georgian national movement incomplete. Articulating the first attempts of 
‘Georgianization’, the period of the first independent Georgian Republic had led to mounting 
tensions and conflict with Abkhazians and Ossetians.83 Hence, not surprisingly, the tyranny of 
the Red Army was welcomed with enthusiasm in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
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 3.2 The Soviet Union Period 
 3.2.1 Foundation of the USSR and Integration of New Nationalities System  
  After Lenin’s Bolsheviks regained control in the former Russian Empire lands, they 
officially established the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), as a federal 
multinational state, by signing the Union Treaty in December 1922 in which some non-
Russian nationalities were given the status of a Union Republic within the federation offering 
them considerable political autonomy in exchange of their full sovereignties.84 Though given 
the status of a Union Republic, Georgia would be tied up to the USSR not as a separate entity, 
but rather as a part of the Transcaucasian Federation (TSFSR) until its dissolution in 1936.85  
 On the other hand, whereas Ossetians in South Ossetia were only given partial 
autonomy as an ‘autonomous oblast’ within Georgian Republic, Abkhazia had become an 
independent Soviet Republic in March 1921 and by the end of the same year had joined with 
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) under a treaty relationship. Sharing the same status 
with Georgian SSR, Abkhazia became one of the signatories to the formation of TSFSR. 
However, in 1931 the Union Republic status of Abkhazia was downgraded to an Autonomous 
Republic (ASSR) within Georgia, generating discontent among the Abkhazians.   
 Georgians began to involve heavily in the Soviet system, mainly by the help of the 
nativization (korenizatsiyaa) policies of the early Soviet period which gave enormous 
privileges to the titular nationalities of each union republics and autonomous territories, such 
as leading positions in the state apparatus and large subsidies for cultural and linguistic 
development. These policies were intended “to woo non-Russians into the Soviet camp”.86 
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Due to korenizatsiyaa policies, by the mid-1920s, almost all significant posts of the union 
republic were allocated to Georgians, whereas Abkhazians and Ossetians were over-
represented in their local administrative and political structures. Additionally significant, 
korenizatsiyaa introduced instruction in the languages of the titular nationalities, notably 
Georgian, Abkhaz and Ossetian in schools, contributing to the cultural development of all 
titular nationalities in Georgia.87   
 3.2.2 Stalin and Beria: An Iron Fist over Abkhazia and South Ossetia  
 During the period of Stalin, the undisputed and authoritarian leader of the Kremlin, 
and his loyal client Lavrenti Beria88 an ethnic Mingrelian born in Abkhazia, an iron fist 
clamped down not only on Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but on every part of the 
Union. The collectivization and industrialization policies of the late 1920s were followed by 
Stalin’s Great Purges that devastated the political opposition and wiped out a great majority of 
the cultural intelligentsia and party leadership.89 Aside to this, Abkhazians and Ossetians had 
become subject to assimilationist policies pursued by Georgian officials, particularly by 
Beria. This period witnessed a campaign of Georgification that distributed key official 
positions to Georgians, changed non-Georgian place names to Georgian, closed all Abkhaz 
and Ossetian language schools, ceased publishing in other languages than Russian and 
Georgian, and altered the Abkhaz and Ossetian scripts to the Georgian based alphabet.90 
 Particularly significant, Abkhazians further suffered from the new ‘resettlement 
policy’ orchestrated by Beria as an aspect of the ‘forced collectivization’ policies of Stalin, by 
which a large number of non-Abkhazian populations, mainly Mingrelians from Western 
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Georgia, were brought into Abkhazia throughout 1940s and 50s. Further altering the 
demographics of the region, Abkhazians perceived these policies as a strategy to turn 
Abkhazians into a minority within their own homeland and to suppress their political and 
economic development.91 Abkhazians not only lost demographic power in their region, but 
also political power in their local administrative structure since a large number of ethnic 
Abkhazian officials and party members were removed and the percentage of Georgian party 
cadres began to increase at the expense of their ethnic Abkhaz and Russian counterparts.92  
 3.2.3 After Stalin, Before Gorbachev: Signals for the Future’s Ethnic Conflicts  
 After Stalin’s death in 1953, with the de-Stalinization efforts of Khrushchev, central 
control loosened and limitations on ethnic expression were to some extent reduced.93 In line 
with this, as compensation to the policies of the previous two decades, publishing and 
broadcasting in Abkhaz and Ossetian was allowed, new Abkhaz newspapers were issued, 
Abkhazian and Ossetian schools were re-opened and a sector of Abkhaz language and 
literature was established in Sukhum(i)94 Pedagogical Institute.95 Furthermore, over the course 
of the following years, Moscow increased the number of leading positions held by 
Abkhazians in local structures and granted Abkhazia greater administrative autonomy in 
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various fields,96  yet still fell short of avoiding public disturbances in Abkhazia to come to the 
fore periodically.  
 On the other side, provoked with the fear to lose their privileged status after Stalin, 
Georgians held demonstrations in 1956, which ended with the bloody intervention of Soviet 
troops and tanks.97 In late 1970s, Georgians began to campaign more passionately for their 
national and linguistic rights,98 even demanding secession from the Union. In April 1978, 
hundreds of people, mainly students, demonstrated in Tbilisi to protest a government plan 
attempting to amend Georgian’s status as the state language.99 Following this event, a 
package of concessions, primarily in the cultural sphere, was given to Georgians, which drove 
them to consolidate their privileged status and their threatening stance against non-Georgians.   
 In the meantime, tensions between Abkhazians and Georgians had become particularly 
evident in 1956, 1964 and 1967 but tensions came to a head in late 1977 with the discussions 
over the drafting process of the ‘Brezhnev’ constitution. In December 1977, around 130 
Abkhazian intellectuals signed a letter of ‘collective protest’ and sent it to the CPSU Central 
Committee and to the Supreme Soviet of USSR. Following this, in May 1978 thousands of 
Abkhazians gathered in the village of Lykhny in support of this letter and demanding the 
secession of Abkhazia from Georgia.100 In order to relieve Abkhazians’ anxieties, Moscow 
gave some concessions, such as transforming Sukhum(i) Pedagogical Institute into an 
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Abkhazian State University and establishing high quotas for Abkhaz students.101 Yet, with 
respect to Abkhazia’s status as an Autonomous Republic, there was no manifested alteration. 
 Approaching mid-1980s, the situation in Georgia was increasingly chaotic and 
complicated. For years now, minorities, and most notably the Abkhazian people opposed the 
perceived oppressive rule of the Georgian state, consistently criticizing Georgian 
administration for mistreatment and exploitation. Being the most vocal and vociferous 
ethnicity in demanding national rights and cultural and political autonomy, Abkhazians 
constantly showed their reaction against what they perceived as the ‘Georgianization’ of their 
communities. On the other hand, Georgians believed that the Abkhazians were given 
preferential treatment, but their biggest concern at the time was reacting to the Russification 
policies and protecting their national rights and the status of Georgia. Thus, by the 1980s 
some extent of Georgianization policies had been implemented by the Georgian authorities 
toppled with certain attempts to embark on a revival of Georgian language and culture, yet the 
Georgian politicians and intelligentsia would find the opportunities to express their national 
identity only after Gorbachev came to power in Moscow.  
 3.2.4 Gorbachev Era: Rise of Hopes; Fall of an Empire: 
 After Gorbachev came to power in Kremlin, he devoted himself to make a radical 
difference in the SU’s system. During the first three years of his era, together with his 
supporters, he began to carry out large-scale political, economic and social reforms, known as 
perestroika and glasnost.102 In particular, Gorbachev was willing to create conditions for 
independent public opinion, which he saw as a prerequisite for democracy, and to loosen the 
hold of the center over the local administrations and political elites. Yet what he failed to take 
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into account was that conceding too much independence to union republics and their 
autonomous regions would “unleash pent-up nationalist aspirations and ethnic hatreds in the 
vast multinational Soviet”103 and would grant space to increasing or emerging nationalisms 
based on ethnic lines. Revival of national consciousness in these entities was instrumental in 
bringing the collapse of the Soviet Union and thereby the emergence of new sovereign states 
and breakaway regions inheriting the ethnic problems of the past.  
 Freedoms introduced by glasnost and perestroika provided the opportunities for the 
national elites of the titular nationalities in Georgia, notably of Georgians, Abkhazians and 
Ossetians, to establish national and regional organizations and ethnically based political 
parties. Moreover, they paved the way for these titular nationalities to use nationalism as their 
biggest weapon in order to access greater control on local administrative structures and to 
legitimize their demands towards more autonomy and even independence. In an atmosphere 
of ethnic upheaval, further eradication of central power raised the stakes of ethnic competition 
and led the local national authorities to implement policies beneficial only to their own 
communities.  
 In Georgia, the radicals that formed the first political organizations with national 
connotations, namely the Helsinki Union Ilia Chavchacadze Society, were ironically the ex-
dissidents and human rights activists of 1970s and of early 1980s, notably Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, Merab Kostova, Giorgi Tchanturia and Irakli Tseretli.104 Pursuing extreme 
nationalism with sharp critiques of the Soviet rule and getting the support of the masses, these 
radicals began to organize strikes, protests and demonstrations with the attendance of 
thousands of people. 105 Although the Georgian Communist Party was employing an ‘official 
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nationalism’ encouraged by Georgian political elites in order to broaden its support base, the 
political victory of the radical nationalist movement was unavoidable. Nevertheless, the 
elections in October 1990 that made Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s Round Table-Free Georgia bloc 
the leading party to the new Georgian Supreme Soviet  marked the end of the communist 
power in Georgia and eventually transformed Georgia’s political and ideological profile.  
 After Gamsakhurdia came to power, he orchestrated exclusive policies coupled with 
the slogan of ‘Georgia for Georgians’. He not only implemented policies of homogenization, 
but also intensely campaigned on the rights of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. At the same time, Georgia was preoccupied with terminating Moscow’s central 
control and with obtaining their full sovereignty. As Moscow lost power, Georgians grabbed 
the opportunity to hold a republic-wide referendum on independence, finally declaring its 
independence on April 9, 1991.106 Gamsakhurdia became the first president of Georgia in 
May 1991 receiving 87 percent of votes; however his presidency lasted very brief since he 
was ousted by the military coup in December 1991.107  
  Relations between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia had deteriorated rapidly 
in the last years of the Soviet rule. Due to the subjection of increasing Georgianization 
policies, Abkhazia and South Ossetia took a more ethnic stance against Georgia, simultaneous 
to the Georgian anti-Soviet campaign. As Ronald Grigor Suny stated, in both South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, “the titular nationality had a dominant, though contested political weight that 
was increasingly becoming intolerable to nationalist Georgians.”108 Besides, the fact that 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia posed a challenge to Georgian independence outlined by their 
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desire to remain within the SU and thus Moscow could exploit these conflicts against 
Georgia, further increased the Georgian hostility towards these regions. Eventually, not only 
had Georgia started to seek independence, but also South Ossetia and Abkhazia began to look 
for secession from Georgia, their popular fronts, respectively Ademon Nykhas (Popular 
Shrine) and Aydglara (Unity) becoming the main vehicles for this goal.109   
  Georgia had taken some steps to make Georgian the sole language for public use, 
which had angered both South Ossetians and Abkhazians. In response, in early September 
1989, Ossetian authorities attempted to give equal status to Russian, Georgian and Ossetian 
and then declared Ossetian as the state language of the oblast. Moreover, the Ademon Nykhas 
sent a petition to Moscow asking for South Ossetia’s unification with North Ossetia.110 
Meanwhile, Gamsakhurdia and other Georgian nationalists were organizing demonstrations in 
Sukhum(i) and Tskhinvali defending the rights of the Georgian population in these regions.111 
The situation steadily worsened after the Georgian government abrogated South Ossetia’s 
autonomous province status in December 1990, following South Ossetian Soviet’s demand to 
stay within the USSR and to upgrade its status.112 Moscow announced the annulment of 
sovereignty claims made by both Georgia and South Ossetia.113 However, Moscow was no 
longer potent enough to avoid the declaration of the Georgian Supreme Soviet affirming its 
right to secede from the Union.114 Consequently, skirmishes broke out in Tshkinvali in April 
1991 in which Soviet militia units and troops came to restore order and to maintain peace.  
 On the other side, by 1988 Abkhazians intensified their activities towards separation 
from Georgian SSR. In that respect, in June 1988, a group of leading Abkhazian figures sent a 
letter of grievances against Georgians to the 19th Party Conference in Moscow and in March 
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1989, more than 30,000 people signed a petition at a mass meeting at the town of Lykhny 
organized by Aidgylara, in both cases calling on Moscow to alter the status of Abkhazia to 
that of a union republic.115 The first large-scale clashes erupted between Georgians and 
Abkhazians in March 1989 preceding the even more violent fighting that broke out in July 
1989 due to the Georgian attempt to establish a branch of Tbilisi University in Sukhum(i) 
with the aim to serve the needs of Georgian students.116  Furthermore, in August 1990, the 
Abkhaz Supreme Soviet declared the sovereignty of Abkhazia, in the absence of its Georgian 
deputies, but failed to mention about its relationship with Georgia.117 After the historian 
Vladislav Ardzinba was chosen as the Chairman of the Abkhazian Soviet in December, 
Abkhazians became even more unwilling to remain an autonomous region within Georgia.  
 As the Soviet system approached its collapse, Gorbachev’s last hope was the 
referendum on March 17, 1991, on the new ‘Union Treaty’ which would preserve the Union 
of Soviet Republics as a renewed federation. Georgia not only refused to participate in the 
referendum, but also banned its autonomous territories from taking part.118 However, both 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia participated in the referendum and voted in favor of the 
preservation of the Union.119 Yet, it was soon realized that the maintenance of a strong 
centralized Soviet Union was increasingly futile. With the Belocezhkaya Pushcha agreement 
in December 1991, the Union was replaced with the CIS in which eleven republics joined, 
excluding Georgia.120  
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 3.3 The New Georgian State 
 3.3.1 Georgia on the Edge of Collapse 
 As it became clear that the dismantling of the Union was unavoidable, Abkhazians and 
Ossetians wanted to make sure that their sovereignties would be preserved. It seems clear that 
the exclusive Georgian attitude resulted in further radicalization of their attitudes and made 
political compromise almost impossible. Georgian government failed not only to frustrate the 
secessionist ambitions of Abkhazia and Ossetia, but also to establish its political authority on 
these two communities. Eventually, the chaotic situation in both regions was unavoidable.  
 War in South Ossetia 
 The skirmishes that began in South Ossetia in the beginning of 1991 culminated into 
open warfare that lasted for approximately 18 months, resulting in the deaths of hundreds and 
the migration of thousands. During the war, North Ossetians sided with their ethnic brethren, 
cutting off a Russian natural gas pipeline heading towards Tbilisi, as well as strongly 
lobbying in favor of South Ossetia.121 The conflict only came to an end with the signing of 
Sochi Ceasefire Agreement in June 1992 between the Russian President Yeltsin and 
Shevardnadze in the presence of both North and South Ossetian leaders who nevertheless did 
not constitute the signatories.122 The agreement foresaw the establishment of the Joint Control 
Commission (JCC) to monitor the ceasefire and to assist the demilitarization efforts in the 
region.123 After its first meeting, JCC on a tripartite basis, including representatives from 
Russia, Georgia and North Ossetia, decided to deploy Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) 
consisting of a Russian, a Georgian and a North Ossetian battalion.124 In 1994, the JCC 
mechanism changed into a quadripartite basis by the formal participation of South Ossetia.125 
                                                 
121 Cornell (2000), p. 158 
122 Ibid., p. 158.  
123 Reeve, R. (2006) “The OSCE Mission to Georgia and the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict: An Overview of 
Activities”, Helsinki Monitor, no:1, p. 57.  
124 Ibid., p. 58  
125  Ibid., p. 58.  
 45 
Eventually, South Ossetia was divided into South Ossetian and Georgian controlled 
territories, monitored by peacekeeping forces of four parties. Up until 2004, uncertainty and 
insecurity prevailed, but nevertheless devoid of a serious escalation in bloody conflicts.  
 War in Abkhazia  
 On the other hand, in Abkhazia the tensions between Georgians and Abkhazians 
mounted in February 1992, where the Military Council of Georgia led by Shevardnadze 
abolished Georgia’s 1978 Constitution and rather reinstated the 1921 Constitution in which 
the nature of the relationship between Georgia and Abkhazia was never specified.126 In 
response to Georgia’s decision, as a temporary measure the Abkhazian parliament reinstated 
the 1925 Abkhazian Constitution by which Abkhazia’s status was co-equal with Georgia on 
the basis of a special-union treaty.127 Not surprisingly, the Georgian parliament immediately 
declared its annulment of Abkhazia’s decision. On the other hand, the parliament in Abkhazia 
was in a state of paralysis due to the confrontation of Georgian deputies on one side and 
Abkhazian and other non-Georgian deputies on the other. Discontented with the unilateral 
acts of the Abkhazian parliament, the Georgian deputies of Abkhazia walked out from the 
parliament building in Sukhum(i) in early August.128 On 12 August 1992, just two days 
before the war broke out in Abkhazia, the Abkhazian parliament sent an appeal to the 
Georgian parliament to initiate discussions on the draft treaty prepared by the Abkhazian side 
on the possible future federative relations with Georgia.129 However, this proposal failed to 
meet with approval in Tbilisi. The conflict in Abkhazia moved to a bloody climax as 
Georgian units commanded by Tengiz Kitovani, the then defense minister and former leader 
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of a paramilitary organization named the Georgian National Guard, entered Sukhum(i) on 14 
August.130 The Georgian official explanation to justify the deployment was the protection of 
the railways and highways and to free Georgian officials who were taken hostage by the 
supporters of ousted President Gamsakhurdia, the so-called Zviadists.131 As a response, 
Abkhazians claimed that Georgia was using these reasons as pretexts to crush the separatist 
movement in Abkhazia. As Abkhazians were ill-prepared for a sudden military attack, 
Georgian troops easily took control of Sukhum(i). A ceasefire was signed in July 1993 with 
the initiative of President Yeltsin; however it failed due to the reluctance of both Abkhazia 
and Georgia to withdraw their forces and resign their weapons.132  
 Although by mid-1993 Georgian forces were still occupying the capital and the port, 
Abkhazians did not concede the remaining large parts of the region. During the war, non-
Georgian communities of Abkhazia sided with Abkhazians and thus Abkhazian troops did not 
only consist of Abkhazians, but also of Russians, Armenians and other non-Georgians living 
in Abkhazia. As the war prolonged the Abkhazian position begun to strengthen, mainly due to 
the flow of volunteers from Russia’s North Caucasus, including large groups of Chechens, 
Circassians ad Ossetians. Additionally, many Turkish Abkhazians, who passed the border 
from Turkey, arrived in Abkhazia to fight Georgians.133 Furthermore, the Russian military 
allegedly was assisting Abkhazia providing the Abkhazian army with heavy weapons and 
artillery and in fact participating in air-attacks on Georgian targets.134  
 In mid-1993, Georgian territorial integrity was also threatened by a civil-war within its 
borders led by Zviadist militia who staged an open revolt in Western Georgia, particularly in 
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Mingrelia and succeeded in gaining control over the region.135 As the Georgian army was 
troubled with Zviadist forces, Abkhazians grasped the opportunity and initiated a surprise 
offensive attack in mid-September recapturing their provincial capital, Sukhum(i) and 
restored their control in almost all of the former Abkhazian ASSR’s territory with the 
exception of the upper reaches of K’odor Valley and some parts in the Gali region.136  
 After Abkhazians forces drove the Georgian army out in 1993, a ceasefire was signed 
in October 1993 with the mediation of Russia that drew a ceasefire line along the Inguri River 
and introduced CIS peacekeeping forces.137 Since then, Abkhazians have retained their 
authority over their region, without avoiding however relatively small-scale incidents like 
kidnappings, murders and skirmishes mainly between Georgian and Abkhazian militias. For 
years, the mountainous Kodori Gorge that lies in northwestern Georgia, adjacent to 
Sukhum(i) has remained the only territory of the region under Georgian control and has been 
the most dangerous terrain in the area, host to numerous battles between the two sides and 
resurfacing fears over a renewed war. Particularly, the Georgian guerilla attacks in May 1998 
and October 2001 in the Gali region resulting in the killings of Abkhazian police and militia 
were interpreted by the Abkhazian side as failed attempts to restore Georgian control over 
Abkhazia.138 The fragile situation was aggravated once more in August 2002 as Abkhazian 
guerilla fighters launched operations in upper Kodori Gorge.139 Since then, sporadic clashes 
continued to erupt in Abkhazia, especially along the Inguri River sharply deteriorating the 
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security situation in the region. The on-going armed clashes and tensions also made it harder 
for UN officials to function in the area, confronted by military attacks and hostage crises.140  
 3.3.2 Analyzing Shevardnadze: Fragile Balance between West and Russia  
 In his previous years of rule, Shevardnadze had been troubled by the simultaneous 
escalation of the insurgence of the Zviadist movement in Western Georgia and with wars in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Realizing that the Zviadist movement was a large threat to the 
already fragile nation-state building process of Georgia, he asked Russia for help. However, 
as Ghia Nodia stated, “joining the CIS and further compliance with Russia’s geopolitical 
aspirations was the price to be paid.”141 After Georgia reluctantly signed up for membership 
to CIS and signed a number of treaties with Russia, Russia began to guard Georgia’s border 
with Turkey and establish military bases all over Georgia. Georgia trusted in Russia that it 
would hand over the Abkhazian separatist leader, Ardzinba and give Abkhazia back to 
Georgia.142 However, in the following years Georgian expectations and predictions fell into 
the drain. Georgia not only could not establish its control over its separatist regions, but also 
could not avoid Russia’s interference into its domestic and external politics.  
 On the other hand, Shevardnadze was admired by the West due to his diplomatic 
career, his western attitude and civilized manner. During his period, Georgia’s relations with 
the United States and Western Europe improved to a great extent. However, in contrast to 
Shevardnadze’s expectations, neither Europe nor the US intervened in the conflicts, both 
failing to restrain Russia’s ensuing manipulation. Although, Shevardnadze normalized 
Georgia’s relations with its neighbors, reduced crime and corruption and took generous steps 
side with the Western camp, he could neither succeed to convince separatist regimes to unite 
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with Georgia in a federal framework nor to secure the return of Georgian IDPs back to 
Abkhazia. As stated by Jones & Parsons, “Shevardnadze managed to save the Georgian ship 
of state when it was perilously close to sinking, but gave it very little direction.”143  
 3.3.3 Saakashvili Era 
 Saakashvili’s Mission of Re-Unifying Georgia and Escalation of Tensions in 
South Ossetia  
 On November 2003, Shevardnadze was pressured to resign following the mass anti-
Shevardnadze slogans and the strong opposition movement led by his successor Mikhail 
Saakashvili. 144 After coming to power with this peaceful power change described as the 
‘Rose Revolution’, Saakashvili made establishing Georgian territorial integrity a priority. His 
first political triumph was driving out Adjaria’s 145 autocratic leader Aslan Abashidze and 
restoring Georgian control over the province. This victory made him more determined to 
reassert authority and control in the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In his speech to 
Adjarians in Batumi, he articulated his objective as: “I congratulate everyone on this victory, 
on the beginning of Georgia’s unification. Georgia will be united.”146  
Tensions between Ossetians and Georgians began to escalate in the summer of 2004 
as it soon became clear that South Ossetia would be Saakashvili’s next target. Saakahsvili was 
interested in regulating and monitoring trade within Tshkinvali in order to prevent smuggling 
and to achieve economic integration of the region. In line with this policy, Georgian 
authorities attempted to close down the large Erghneti market known to be used for 
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unregulated trade and to block the roads between Georgia and South Ossetia by activating 
military and police services.147 Also, in July Georgian officials intercepted a Russian cargo on 
its way to Russian peacekeepers in Tskhinvali fearing that the weapons would be handed to 
South Ossetian militants.148 These Georgian attempts triggered the South Ossetian reaction, 
resulting in an exchange of fire and the deaths of dozens. The ceasefire signed in August 2004 
succeeded in bringing an end to the violence, but not a sustainable solution, as South Ossetia 
has remained a break-away province in which violence has been flaring sporadically with 
numerous incidents including provocations and occasional skirmishes.  
Saakashvili’s Peace Proposal for South Ossetia 
 Especially, during the last decade, there were attempts to resolve the conflict in South 
Ossetia, which were encouraged not only by the international community, but also by the 
conflicting parties and Russia. ‘Memorandum on Measures for Providing Security and Mutual 
Trust’ signed between the two parties in May 1996 and the “Russian-Georgian inter-
governmental agreement on cooperation in restoring the economy in South Ossetia and on 
the return of refugees” of December 2000 had increased the hopes for the peaceful resolution 
of the conflict.149 The biggest Georgian effort for conflict resolution in South Ossetia was the 
introduction of a peace plan on September 2004 by President Saakashvili, as he outlined a 
three-stage plan including (1) confidence building between the two countries: (2) 
demilitarization, decriminalization of conflict areas and increased role for the international 
community and (3) establishment of a broad autonomy for South Ossetia.150 Although it 
received wide praise from the international community, it fell short of South Ossetian 
President Kokoiti`s demands and was eventually rejected by South Ossetian authorities.151 
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 3.3.4 ‘Alternative Elections’ and ‘Parallel Structures’  
 On 12 November 2006, South Ossetians went to the polls to vote for the referendum 
confirming the independence of South Ossetia with an overwhelming ‘yes’, re-electing 
Eduardo Kokoiti as their president. However, neither the Georgian government nor the 
international community recognized the referendum results.152 On the other hand, the same 
day in South Ossetia, an alternative referendum and alternative presidential elections were 
held, supported by the Georgian government and the Ossetian opposition to Kokoity’s regime, 
the Salvation Union of South Ossetia.  In these ‘alternative elections’ ethnic Georgians and a 
relatively small group of Ossetians voted in favor of launching negotiations with Georgia on 
the status of South Ossetia and elected Dimitri Sanakoev, former South Ossetian prime 
minister fired by Kokoity in 2001, as their president.153 Since Kokoity and the separatists did 
not show interest in Saakashvili’s peace proposals, Georgian authorities aimed to initiate 
negotiation talks with this parallel administration. In that respect, in May 2007 the Georgian 
parliament passed a resolution to establish ‘Provisional Administrative Entity of South 
Ossetia’; and appointed the ‘alternative president’ Dimitri Sanakoev as its head.154 
 On the other hand, in Abkhazia the Georgian government had never recognized the 
Abkhazian parliament in Sukhum(i) claiming that it had no jurisdiction over Abkhazia, since 
it failed to represent the majority of the Abkhazia, excluding 200,000 Georgian IDPs who 
flew from Abkhazia to other parts of Georgia following the war in 1993. Rather an ‘exile 
government of Abkhazia’ was set up in Tbilisi in March 1994 by the former Georgian 
deputies of Abkhazia. In line with its policy of establishing ‘alternative regimes’ to separatist 
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authorities, in late 2006 Georgia announced to form the Abkhazia’s legitimate government in 
Upper Abkhazia., moving the Abkhazian government-in-exile from Tbilisi to the region. 155   
 3.3.5 Emergence of Russian-Georgian Confrontation and its Implications  
 In recent years, the tensions between Russia and Georgia ran high culminating in the 
most dangerous confrontation between the two sides since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. Rising animosity between Russia and Georgia was primarily a by-product of the 
unresolved conflict between Georgia and its breakaway regions. The already fragile Russian-
Georgian relations of the 1990s reached an unprecedented high in the millennium following a 
number of incidents, clashes, threats and counter-threats. In August 2004 Georgia threatened 
to sink the ships including the ones ferrying Russian tourists approaching to Abkhazia 
whereas Russian Foreign Ministry announced that any actions against Russian ships would be 
regarded as a “hostile act with all the ensuing consequences”.156 Starting with Russia’s 
decision to increase the  price of gas supplies to Georgia in January 2006, while later issuing a 
ban on Georgian wine and mineral water, the most important Georgian export products, 
Georgian-Russian relations headed towards a downward spiral. Following the arrests of four 
Russian military officers whom Georgia had accused of espionage in October 2006, Kremlin 
ordered Russian troops to ‘shoot to kill’ in the case of an attack to their military bases in 
Georgia, launching a multitude of sanctions on Georgia and recalling its ambassador from 
Tbilisi.157 Due to provocations from both sides, fears mounted in Abkhazia and in South 
Ossetia as well, putting an end to the peace process. In June 2007, gunfire erupted once again 
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between ethnic Georgians and South Ossetians in South Ossetia. Russian planes allegedly 
were involved in attacks on Georgian targets.158 
  Encouraged with Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence and its recognition 
by more than 40 countries, including United States and most EU countries, South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia increased their efforts for recognition claiming Kosovo would set a precedent for 
them on legal grounds. In April 2008, Russia declared that it would expand its support for 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as establishing diplomatic ties with the regions’ separatist 
authorities.159 Following a short period, tensions flared up between Russia and Georgia as 
both sides accused each other for building up military forces along the disputed border of 
Abkhazia. Georgia was concerned with the increase of Russian peacekeeping forces in 
Abkhazia without its consent whereas Russia claimed that Georgia was planning a military 
attack on the region and “amassed more than 1500 troops to mountanious Upper Kodori 
Valley”.160 Although for long signals were present for the most dangerous military 
confrontation between Russia and Georgia in recent years, it was nevertheless a surprise for 
everyone when Russian troops marched into South Ossetia in early August.  
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4. Long-Term Conflict Prolonging Factors 
 4.1 Introducing the Legacy of the Past 
 Ironically, during the Tsarist Russian period, the biggest perceived enemy for 
Abkhazians, as well as for other non-Georgians, had not been Georgians, but rather Russians, 
as they were faced with the restrictive and suppressive policies imposed by the Russian 
center. The foundation of the Menshevik Georgian Republic had generated not only the first 
phase of ‘Georgian nationalism’, but also the genesis of ethnic competition, hatred and 
regional tensions. Throughout the Soviet era, the hostility between Georgians and Abkhazian 
and Ossetians had flared with the flourishing of a hard-lined Georgian nationalism and the 
simultaneous emergence of vocal and strong Abkhazian and Ossetian nationalisms. The 
characteristics of these three versions of nationalisms had very much in common as they all 
grasped the opportunities provided by the Soviet federal system, though while Georgian 
nationalism was a counter-measure to Russifiying aspects of the imposed ‘Soviet culture’, 
Ossetians and Abkhazians developed their nationalisms in juxtaposition to the Georgian 
identity.  
 Aside to the heightening of ethnic consciousness, the administrative system of SU 
with ethno-territorial divisions provided them autonomous territories and thereby their own 
local administrative structures, from which around they could mobilize their peoples, 
facilitating the exacerbation of the arising tensions. Furthermore, in the particular Abkhazian 
case, the Georgian settlement policies combined with perceived ‘assimilation’ have been an 
important driving force for Abkhazians to secure their control over their region and ultimately 
to seek secession from Georgia.   
 It is significant to highlight here, that the legacy of the Soviet administrative system, 
as well as the legacy of the past ethnic tensions, nationalist tendencies, competing demands 
and ethno-demographic shifts have not only been the main reasons for the eruption of the 
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conflicts in the early 1990s, but have also remained as major forces driving the existence of 
today’s de facto Abkhaz and Ossetian states, and as significant factors impeding the conflict 
resolution process, given that they have shaped perceptions, created ‘memories’ and 
generated ‘enemy’ images, diminishing the level of trust and confidence between the 
conflicting sides.  
 4.2 Legacy of the Soviet Nationalities Question and Emergence of Nationalisms 
 When the SU was founded in the early 1920s, it was designed as a multi-ethnic 
federation with four hierarchical levels of regional administrative units constructed on ethno-
territorial lines. In other words, the basis of Soviet system was based not on simply 
geographical entities, but rather ‘national-territorial states’, in which the titular nationalities 
were identified by a particular autonomous territory and an administrative unit.161 In addition 
to this system which drew rigid boundaries between ethnicities, the Kremlin implemented the 
policy of registration of one’s ethnic origin on internal passports and introduced 
korenizatsiaa, which promoted the establishment of national-cultural institutions, as well as 
the preferential treatment of titular-nationalities, “treating nationality as an ascriptive 
characteristic determined by birth.”162 These in turn led to the emergence and development of 
solid ethnic identities, indeed placed ‘ethnicity’ as the main criteria for social identity, 
overriding all other forms of social identities.163 Whatever the intensions of the Soviet 
nationalities policy were,164 it eventually elevated ethnic consciousness, consolidated national 
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identities and provided the titular nationalities with a coherent organizational form to 
articulate their perceived national aspirations.165 Most importantly, it contributed to the 
construction of ethnic nationalisms, which acclaimed the inherited attachments of an 
individual to national membership. 166 
 The emergence of ethnic nationalisms in SU, especially after 1970s, was fueled with 
the institutionalization of indigenous ethnic leaderships within the territorial administrative 
units, who have sought to construct nations as a means of legitimizing their rule.167 
Constructing national identities defined around titular nationalities, the ruling elites aimed to 
adopt nationalism to gain control over the allocation of resources and the governance of the 
local soviets. The ethnic intelligentsias’ aspirations for administrative power combined with 
the ethnically conscious individuals’ demands for cultural and linguistic rights rendered the 
development of nationalisms in union republics, posing a threat to the solidarity of the Union, 
as well as breeding ethnic tensions within these union republics.  
 The exclusive Georgian nationalism had drawn its base from the ‘sense of superiority’ 
that has been cultivated by the desire to foster the Georgian identity as the dominant ethnicity 
and to strengthen the position of Georgians vis-à-vis non-Georgians. Although Georgia for 
long had been a multi-national landscape with distinct small and ancient ethno-linguistic 
populations, Georgians in the early 1980s, being the dominant population, have devoted 
themselves to exclude other nationalities in order to consolidate their national independence 
and to assert their authority over their territory. The national aspirations towards an 
independent and unitary Georgian state were initially encouraged “as a national self-
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protection against the feared domination of Russian ‘higher’ culture and its potential for 
Russification.”168 However, the nationalist policies evolved as the constitutive other to the 
Georgian identity was reconstructed away from Moscow and rather towards the ethnic 
minorities present in Georgia. The firm Georgian rhetoric developed a ‘siege mentality’ 
where any resistance to the dominant Georgian nationalism was perceived as a danger against 
the newborn Georgian state.169 Subsequently, Georgians started to blame non-Georgians in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia for serving as ‘Russian agents’ and encouraging Russian 
expansionism on Georgian soil.170 Georgia’s exclusionary posture was clearly absorbed in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and transposed into counter-nationalist tendencies that threatened 
Georgian national identity and territorial solidarity. In other words, as the perceived threat of 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian ethnic chauvinism and political dismemberment pushed 
Georgians to implement harsh policies to vitiate their aspirations, separation became the 
preferred option for these ethno-regions.171 
 Abkhazians and Ossetians had their own national and territorial grievances, but were 
directed against the Georgian administration, rather than the central Soviet rule. Although 
these two communities had enjoyed a large-array of privileges in their local regions, they had 
felt threatened by the ‘Georgian domination’, indicating the existence of inequality between 
them and Georgians. Nationalist challenges over Abkhazia were constantly on the surface 
throughout the Soviet period, but Ossetians on the other hand had developed a relatively 
stable relationship with their Georgian neighbors. However, feeling extremely insecure as 
they faced with rising Georgian nationalism, they too began to demand more cultural equality 
and access to economic and political power. It was clear that, excluding non-Georgians within 
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the unitary republic and treating minorities as ‘aliens’, Georgian nationalism had ultimately 
paved the way for the emergence of counter-nationalisms in its two autonomous regions.   
 As Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost legitimated the expression of ethnic claims, it 
strengthened the hands of nationalists within Georgia and fostered their mobilizations towards 
secession. Georgian nationalism not only centered on the struggle to gain independence, but 
also to prevent its autonomous regions’ aspirations for separation. On the other side, facing 
with Gamsakhurdia’s exclusive Georgian nationalism propagated by the motto ‘Georgia for 
Georgians’, Abkhazians and South Ossetians felt extremely insecure, and mobilized for 
liberation from Georgian threat.172   
 Georgian, Abkhazian and South Ossetian nationalisms emerged during the Soviet 
period had become a strong force driving their attempts for independence in early 1990s 
culminating ethnic conflicts in the regions. The disturbances driven by nationalist aspirations 
of Soviet era not only  have shaped the course of the wars in early 1990s,  but also turned out 
to be a very powerful legitimating tool for the political leaders of Georgia and of the newly 
emerged de facto states. Although the characteristics of the nationalisms in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia evolved over time, the perceived enemy image remained the same, as well as 
the ultimate goals. Hence, one can claim that in these two de facto states the nationalist 
feelings of the past have constructed today’s memories and future’s great expectations. 
 4.3 Legacy of the Soviet ‘Autonomy’  
 As mentioned in the previous section, Soviet administrative system had granted the 
titular nationalities of the federal units a particular autonomous territory, as well as the 
“symbolic attributes of national self-determination.”173 These features of the Soviet system 
created distinctive opportunities for these nationalities to establish a separate state or de facto 
territorial control, following the collapse of the Soviet center, “the powerful glue that held this 
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ethnic patchwork together”.174 The unitary republics, like Georgia, were already afforded 
‘right to secede’ in the Soviet system as a first-level administrative unit and thus had no 
difficulty to gain international recognition for their new statehoods. On the other hand, some 
second or third level autonomies, like South Ossetia and Abkhazia, did not accept to remain 
under control of these new states, but rather used the attributes of Soviet period ‘autonomy’ to 
institutionalize their national movements and to create their own territorial entities as de facto 
states . Hence, one can say that autonomy became a contributing factor for the ethnic conflicts 
in the post-Soviet space, since these regions had been already constructed in “manner of 
states” with borders, state institutions, state-like symbols and political leaderships essential to 
any process of statehood, entailing their motivation to mobilize.175  
 On the other side, territorial autonomy within the Soviet federation did not only 
contribute to these secessionist states’ initial de facto establishment, but also their continued 
existence. The fact that past memories of being autonomous in the Soviet system have shaped 
the way they perceive the concept of ‘autonomy’ has ultimately enhanced their insistence to 
deny their home states’ offers for a federative arrangement.176 To elaborate more, today’s de 
facto states do not view ‘autonomy’ as a well-designed structure capable enough to secure 
their governance and to protect their identities within their territories. Since the Soviet federal 
system had not granted them any economic or political autonomy, only substantial autonomy 
on the cultural sphere, they were vulnerable to a strong central control and the suppression 
associated with it. Svante Cornell states that “the obvious result of this past is that now that 
the national minorities have acquired self-rule on their own, often with the use of force, they 
are extremely reluctant to accept a return to an autonomous status which they now know will 
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probably never give them the amount of self-determination they have been, or will be, 
promised.”177  
 Particularly, South Ossetians and Abkhazians do not share much faith in ‘autonomy’, 
at least in the implementation of it, believing that they have experienced Georgian oppressive 
policies and the dilution of the local autonomy during Soviet years, as well as Georgian 
attempts to reduce their autonomous status. Eventually, the legacy of Soviet ‘autonomy’ made 
them feel insecure with the idea of a future status in a federative arrangement, leading them to 
refuse the peace proposals offering autonomy within Georgia. Thus, they chose to preserve 
their de facto subsistence within an entrenched state of conflict.  
 4.4 Ethno-demographic perspective 
 The way Abkhazians and Ossetians interpret history has placed the ethno-
demographic perspective at the core of their nationalist aspirations. The ‘demographical’ 
standing has been particularly important for Abkhazians. Abkhazians claim that they were 
subject to extensive assimilation policies, as well as Georgianization of their homeland during 
the Soviet period, which resulted on considerable effects on the demographic balance 
reducing the proportion of the ethnic Abkhazian population. Anderson and Silver point out 
that, “numerical dominance is a vital factor in the relations among ethnic groups; it is both a 
consequence and a cause of ethnic antipathies and alliances”.178 In this framework, one can 
say that the numerical superiority of Georgians in the pre-war Abkhazia was perceived by 
Abkhazians as a consequence of Georgian demands to turn Abkhazia into a ‘Georgian land.179 
The ethno-demographic perspective in the past can also largely explain the present Abkhazian 
anxieties over the return of Georgian IDPs.  
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 The first significant number of Kartvelians180 had begun to move to Abkhazia in mid 
19th century, following the Tsarist Russian expulsion of Muslim Abkhazians into the Ottoman 
Empire, reducing the ethnic homogeneity in the province.181 During the Soviet period, as a 
result of the voluntary settlement policies imposed by Tbilisi and Moscow, Abkhazia was 
faced with new-comers, predominantly Mingrelians from Western Georgia, radically altering 
the demographics in Abkhazia. In the 1989 census182 Georgians constituted approximately 
45.7 % of the whole population, whereas Abkhazians constituted only 17.8%.183 The sudden 
increase in growth rate of Georgian population boosted Abkhazian fears over the process of 
‘Georgianization of Georgia’, as Abkhazians were concerned over their demographic and 
cultural decline. In addition, the sensitivity of the issue was partly due to the fear of a possible 
implementation of increased representation of ethnic Georgians in regional administrations 
based on their powerful ‘ethno-demographical’ status. This would specifically mean for 
Abkhazians to lose their excessive privileges provided by being the ‘titular nationality’, and 
hand in the power to ethnic Georgians. In other words, turning into a minority in Abkhazia 
after 70 years of Tbilisi’s rule reawakened the fears of Abkhazians to lose the claims to power 
over their territory. 
 In short, the developments over the last 150 years with the Tsarist Russian expulsions, 
followed by the extensive Mingrelian settlements, eventually had turned Abkhazians from a 
                                                 
180 Kartvelians are a group of people speak Kartvelian (or so-called South Caucasian) languages. This group 
includes Georgians, Mingrelians, Svans and Laz. Among these groups, Laz live mainly in Turkey. Mingrelians 
and Svans are not considered minorities, but rather Georgians in Georgia, although they have some linguistic and 
cultural distinctions from the ethnic Georgians.  
181 By 1923, the percentage of Abkhazians among the whole population in Abkhazia had already fallen to 48 % 
whereas the percentage of Georgians rising up to 18.4%. See Mueller, D. (1999). “Demography: ethno-
demographic history, 1886-1989” in G. Hewitt (ed.), The Abkhazians, (pp. 231-237). Richmond, Surrey: Curzon. 
182 It is noteworthy to add that a number of ethnic groups, including Mingrelians and Svans, which are also 
Kartvelian peoples like Georgians, and Bats people (Bats are known to be related to Chechens and Ingush and 
they have settled for at least two centuries in the Georgian village of Zemo Alvani) were re-classified as 
‘Georgians’ in the censuses after 1926. See Hewitt (1995), p. 52-53. This ‘census policy’ was perfectly in line 
with the process of ‘Georgianization of Georgia’. 
183 Mueller (1999), p. 237. Also see Henze, P.B. (1991). “ The Demography of the Caucasus according to the 
1989 Soviet Census Data,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 1-2, pp. 147-170. 
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‘natural majority’ into an ‘artificial minority.’184 The Abkhazians viewed the patterns of the 
population change in their homeland as an outcome of Georgian aspirations to assimilate the 
Abkhaz identity into the Georgian one. Additionally significant, this perception has 
eventually resulted in Abkhazian resistance towards the return of Georgian IDPs, fearing that 
returning to the pre-war demographic balance will undermine their numerical power, as well 
as their claims to authority, which they achieved through the 1993 military victory.185  
 4.5 Perceptions, Sentiments, Memories and Identities 
 A careful observer can easily realize that the existing ethnic cleavages in these 
regions, as well as feelings of fear and historical injustice have been cultivated mainly by the 
past memories and constructed perceptions. The irreconcilable demands and goals of these 
communities have pushed them to create ‘self-other’ images, in which the ‘other’ has been 
portrayed as the ultimate enemy, eventually harboring ethnic boundaries by clear-cut identity 
markers. In this vein, grievances have been enshrined and the feelings of uncertainty have 
been materialized, generating perceived insecurities on the part of the allegedly vulnerable 
groups.  
 Competing for the state apparatus and full control over the regions in order to 
safeguard their interests in the absence of high level of trust and credibility, the rival groups 
have tended to create ‘collective memories’ and ethnic myths constructed in opposition to 
‘others’, provoked by the perception of injustice and fear of domination. Besides, it can be 
added that ‘collective fears of the future’ have perpetuated the conflicts, since groups feared 
for their physical safety and survival when faced with social uncertainty.186  
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 In the Georgian perception of the Soviet past, the ethnic Georgian inhabitants of the 
autonomous regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia were subject to constant discrimination 
due to the over-representation of the titular nationalities in the political and economic spheres. 
These Georgians eventually felt the fear of injustice and domination, perceiving the policies 
of the local leaders severely unjust. Furthermore, Georgians manifested their belief that 
Abkhazians and South Ossetians had turned out to be puppets of Moscow to thwart the 
Georgian aspirations to nationhood, creating a sense of distrust towards Abkhazians and 
Ossetians. On the other hand, Abkhazians and Ossetians had also developed a sense of 
injustice following the Georgianization policies fed by the exclusive Georgian nationalism. 
As they felt their very existence was threatened, they mobilized on behalf of their own 
communities, showing their resentments against the perceived ethnic prejudice and imposing 
Georgian attitude. Hence, the fear of assimilation motivated them to seek independence from 
Georgia and secure their survival in their own state-lets. 
 Particularly significant, the constructed ‘them-us’ illustration in these regions has 
further intensified the rivalry between the opposing communities since the nation state-
building processes, such as glorifying the language and  refashioning the national holidays 
and homeland myths, has tended to mirror images of each other. In this light, history-writing 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have played a vital role in shaping national identities in 
opposition to the Georgian ‘enemy’ figure whereas Georgian history-writing attempted to 
discredit Abkhaz and Ossetian arguments, arousing resentments and hostility.187  
 In addition to internalizing prejudiced beliefs and opposing attitudes towards each 
other over the course of the Soviet period, the hostile activities carried out by the opposing 
parties, as well as the fighting of the last two decades, have accumulated increasing amounts 
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of hatred and mistrust among members of the rival communities.188 Indeed, as the violence 
caused irreparable damage to the societies and generated new grievances, it dramatically 
transformed the conflicts into another phase. That is to say, the difficulties to reach a mutually 
acceptable solution increased and the on-going confrontation tended towards prolongation.  
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5. Short-Term Conflict Prolonging Factors 
 5.1 Internal Dynamics 
 5.1.1 The Role of Abkhazia and South Ossetia  
 a. Introducing the Dynamics in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  
 As fore mentioned, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been two separatist regimes, de 
facto outside the control of Georgia, but de jure remained under the Georgian territory by the 
international community. Holding ‘internal sovereignty’, they have achieved to establish 
‘mini state-like’ regimes with their own education systems, health services, domestic 
economies, commercial relations, military forces, etc.189 Yet, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
have been isolated in their foreign relations, because they lack ‘external sovereignty’. In other 
words, their foreign contacts have been very limited, since they have not been considered to 
be ‘legitimate’ in the international arena. Besides, they have had embryonic state structures, 
weak economies and impoverished societies. Still, partly due to Russia’s strong backing and 
partly due to the internal forces driving their survival, their continued-existence has lasted for 
over a decade and a half. To be able to understand how the dynamics in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia have played a role in hindering the conflict resolution, one should simultaneously 
evaluate why their de facto statuses could be sustained.  
 To begin with, the de facto leaderships of these breakaway enclaves have achieved to 
endow with almost full control and authority over their local populations, enjoying great 
power and legitimacy. They have consistently used the basic tools of nationalism to extend 
their authority and popular support and to justify their demands for maintaining their de facto 
governance. The separatist leaders in these regions have not been willing to concede power by 
succumbing to any possible arrangement with Georgia, especially given the fact that they 
have not perceived their Georgian counterparts in the negotiation table as credible and 
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trustworthy. Eventually, Abkhazian and South Osseian leaderships have taken a ‘radical’ 
attitude, in other words they have become more demanding and less compromising, which has 
discouraged the achievement of a mutually acceptable political solution.  
 Not only the authorities, but also the populations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia have 
been eager to accept any resolution that would ratify their secession from Georgia. Due to the 
perceived lack of trust and confidence towards Georgians combined with fear and insecurity 
heavily incorporated in their mental thinking, they have felt safe and sound only through the 
maintenance of their current way of life as the peoples under the jurisdiction of their de facto 
regimes. There can be little doubt that these peoples have been afraid to face renewed 
oppression by the Georgian state and to lose their ‘privileged’ citizenship statuses and 
national identities, a fear that has been mainly shaped by historical grievances. Besides, the 
fact that these secessionist regions have enjoyed being on the ‘winning’ side of the armed 
struggles with Georgia has further fueled their determination to revert from granting any 
concessions regarding their sovereignties in the on-going negotiations. 
 A number of political analysts have tended to label the de facto states of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia as ‘fragile’ and ‘failing’ due to the fact that they have been isolated in foreign 
relations and weak in their economic and political structures. However, the fact remains that 
they could maintain their existence longer than expected, owning this partly to the 
militarization of their societies and to the emergence of organized crime, notably illegal trade 
and smuggling, as well as Russian support for their subsistence. The dynamic forces 
integrated within their internal structures have pushed them to overcome the social and 
economic difficulties they have faced with, and rather to sustain their survival at any cost. 
 b. The Rigidity of the Political Leaderships 
 Being one of the most fundamental and necessary attributes of statehood, the 
organized political leaderships have been integral in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian de 
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facto structures. These political leaderships, as in Scott Pegg’s words have “come to power 
through some degree of indigenous capacity”, receiving popular support and have had the 
ability “to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territory 
maintaining effective control for a specific time period.”190  In this respect, Abkhazian and 
South Ossetian leaders have been enjoying their ‘privileged’ positions by firmly holding on to 
their power, authority and legitimacy over the regions. In the absence of external legitimacy, 
they have achieved to amass high-level of popular support and ultimately to sustain effective 
governance and control over the existing resources. For instance, both Abkhazian Sergei 
Bagapsh and South Ossetian Eduard Kokoity were elected for presidency in their regions, 
respectively in 2005 and 2006 with more than 90 percent of the votes.  
 In spite of the accusations for their ‘authoritarian’ stances and non-democratic acts, it 
is beyond doubt that the leaders in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have got the sufficient internal 
support from their populations. A partial explanation for this might be that the leaders in these 
separatist regions have successfully used the tools of ‘nationalism’, in particular propaganda 
and identity-building, to build up local support and ultimately attract the loyalty of their 
inhabitants. According to Kolsto, “nation-hood and national identity are not inherent 
qualities of a state’s population, but are developed and sustained through nation-building.”191 
In a similar fashion, Abkhazian and South Ossetian identities have been consolidated through 
the cultivation of  national symbols such as national anthem, flag, emblem and national 
holidays; history-writing; promotion of national customs and traditions;  propaganda and 
creation of the ‘common foe’, notably the perceived image of the ‘Georgian enemy’. 
Eventually, a sense of ‘common past’, ‘common identity’ and ‘common destiny’ has been 
constructed to unify their local populations under the name of a national struggle against 
Georgians. Equally important, in both cases ‘ethnicity’ has been a key factor not only to foster 
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the distinction with Georgians, but to justify the separatism from Georgia. Waller and 
Malashenko rightly points out that in former Soviet autonomous regions, as well as in former 
Soviet republics, the ethnic factor “did not diminish in its salience with the acquisition of 
independence, but it changed character. From being the basis for mobilization in a struggle 
for a national liberation, ethnicity was in many cases invoked to legitimate a new order.”192  
Having gathered popular support and exerted control and authority, Abkhazian and South 
Ossetian leaderships have been unwilling to grant concessions or negotiate over the 
sovereignty they have henceforth enjoyed.  
 Moreover, Abkhazian and South Ossetian leaders have consistently drawn attention to 
the fact that their regions have already accomplished their ‘statehood’ with only ‘recognition’ 
being deficient. The idea of ‘being a separate state’ was institutionalized in reality by the 
establishment of the basic attributes of statehood, such as governmental services, parliaments, 
political parties, municipalities and education systems. Insisting on being an ‘independent 
state’ they have taken an inflexible stance during the peace talks. The concept of ‘statehood’ 
has been particularly significant in Abkhazian rhetoric, since they have used their “historical 
tradition of statehood” 193  to legitimize their claims over jurisdiction in their territory. In this 
vein, Abkhazians have repeatedly pointed out that they have experienced a long narration of 
statehood since the foundation of the independent Abkhazian Kingdom in the early 8th 
century.194  
 In due course, the leaderships in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have taken a non-
conformist attitude with adherence to more radical views, since they have never been willing 
to give up from their local level of power and authority. Although initially Abkhazians and 
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South Ossetians were ready to discuss a possible arrangement of con-federal ties with Georgia 
or –in the case of South Ossetia- ‘a very broad autonomy’, their demands shifted towards 
extremism as the course of the conflicts progressed. Presently, they refuse to be a part within 
Georgia, demanding recognition for their ‘independent statehood’ and at a minimal scale they 
might consider re-unifying with Russia. As Dov Lynch states the persistence of separatist 
leaders on absolute sovereignty has two implications: (i) the peace proposals based on federal 
power-sharing arrangements are unlikely to be successful and (ii) the de facto states will not 
allow the return of Georgian IDPs who fled during the wars.195 For Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia sovereignty has been ‘non-negotiable’ and principally Abkhazians reject the peace 
proposals that include the all-once return of Georgian IDPs, fueled by the fear that they might 
once more turn into a ‘minority’ within their homeland.196 
 Although the leaders in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been aware that the peace 
talks are heading towards a dead end, they have still been eager to participate in negotiations 
as party to the conflicts in order to increase the level of contact with the international 
organizations and member states. In other words, the fact that they have been treated as equal 
partners with Georgia on the negotiation table has strengthened the hands of the separatist 
leaders, gradually attributing them with some sort of ‘external legitimacy’. Consequently, the 
de facto authorities have not only sustained their power at the national level, but also have 
reflected it at the international in order to communicate and solidify their absolute control 
within their regions. Looking at the complete picture, one might claim that the 
uncompromising stance and radical attitude of the separatist leaders have made the conflict 
resolution increasingly difficult. Benefiting from the existing conditions and ultimately 
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enjoying authority and legitimacy, these leaderships have remained one of the key factors 
behind the lack of progress towards conflict resolution.   
 c. Lack of Trust and Credibility; the Source of Fear and Insecurity  
 To be able to understand why Abkhazians and South Ossetians have been refusing to 
accept a political solution that would place them under Georgian jurisdiction, one should 
comprehend the initial reasons behind their demands for ‘secession’. Faced with the 
oppression of the Georgian dominant group in 1980s, they perceived separatism as the only 
way to guarantee their security. The source of fear and insecurity, based on historical 
hostility, has transcended to contemporary times, as an internal dynamic that enforces the 
insistence of these breakaway regions on their demands for ‘self-determination’. In addition, 
the lack of trust deeply-rooted in their perceptions against Georgians has acted as a stimulus 
to hold on the power and sovereignty which they acquired ‘in the battlefield’ rather than in the 
political arena. Despite the intense efforts of the international community to mitigate the level 
of ‘insecurity’, the fact that Abkhazians and South Ossetians view Georgians as dishonest 
negotiation partners, sustains the perceptual barrier hindering an encouraging atmosphere in 
the peace talks.  
 Due to the constant perception of the Georgian threat, the local inhabitants of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia have only felt themselves secure since they achieved self-rule over their 
territories. Accordingly, they have long believed that they would ensure their security if they 
maintain their independence or if they merge with Russia. Hence, the idea of being a part of 
Georgia has never been appealing for these breakaway regions. Abkhazians and South 
Ossetians have little faith in Georgians who have held them responsible “for their woes in the 
disputed regions.”197  Indeed, the feeling of distrust towards Georgians has been inherited 
from the past, but has mainly been shaped within the present since long years of military 
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threats and economic blockades have elevated the intensity of fear and insecurity. Whereas 
Georgian authorities have acclaimed South Ossetians and Abkhazians to be the puppets of 
Russia, they have blamed Georgian governors to violate the ceasefires, as well as the 
subsequent bilateral and multilateral agreements. Besides, Ossetians and Abkhazians have 
held the belief that Georgia has subsidized paramilitary groups, hampered the humanitarian 
assistance and made plans in order to militarily annex the regions.  
 Although Georgians have expressed their commitment to resolve the conflict 
peacefully through negotiations and to protect the rights of the peoples in these separatist 
regions if a federal-power sharing is achieved, South Ossetians and Abkhazians believe that 
Georgians will act contrary to their promises. Moreover, Abkhazians and South Ossetians 
have little faith in the future implementation of civic policies involving tolerance towards 
their distinct identities. However the feeling of distrust is not confined to Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia but is indeed shared by Georgia as both adversary parties do not perceive each other 
as credible partners in the negotiations. 
 Additionally significant, ‘triumph’ on the battlefields has forged an integral basis for 
their determination to attain supremacy over their territories. Being on the victorious side has 
imprinted a fundamental intolerance regarding any attempted interference in their internal 
affairs. To be more specific, Abkhazian and South Ossetian authorities have gained an upper 
hand in the peace negotiations with Georgia, because their legitimacies have been partly 
drawn from the victories in the early 1990s. At the same time, however, they have been 
conscious of the fact that their victories would not be sufficient to infinitely guarantee their 
securities. Thus, they committed themselves to provide massive resources for military 
expenditure and the fortification of their defensive lines. As Dov Lynch stated, “behind all the 
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rhetoric of sovereignty, self-determination and justice, there are calculations of power that 
have led the separatist authorities to security based on force alone.”198  
 d. Militarization of the Regions 
 Years of isolation under unrecognized authorities have left Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia not only as weak functioning states with radical leaderships and constant atmosphere 
of insecurity, but also as highly militarized regions with societies susceptible to crime. 
Despite considerable efforts by the international community, the regions have not been fully 
secured and stabilized. As the conflicts remained volatile and the insecurity entrenched as an 
integral form of social life, militarization in these territories has developed in a profound way, 
ultimately shaping their political landscape. There can be little doubt that the military 
victories of early 1990s have contributed to the belief that strong armament along the self-
defense lines has been essential to protect the fragile statehood and independence. The 
perception of a Georgian military intimidation has also been prominent for these separatist 
regions to hold on military power as an explicit guarantor of security.  
 Equally important, the de facto state status attributed to Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
created immense opportunities in which illegal paramilitary organizations could flourish. It 
has reduced the capacity of the separatist authorities to effectively govern their territories and 
ultimately facilitated the conditions for illegal armed formations, as well as organized crime.  
Besides, benefiting from their international isolation, South Ossetian and Abkhazian 
authorities and civilians have promoted strong and harsh militarization as a source of security, 
opening the entire region to the forces of anarchy and generating a criminal infrastructure. 
Subsequently the weakness in the social and political structure combined with the ‘undefined 
status’ can ultimately explain why militarization in these breakaway state-lets has been 
                                                 
198 Lynch (2001)  
 73 
principally deep rooted and how this has created a negative environment in the conflict 
resolution process.  
 To begin with, Charles King states that “the products of the wars of the Soviet 
succession are not frozen conflicts, but are rather relatively successful examples of making 
states by making war.”199 Correspondingly, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have established their 
statehoods and solidified their sovereignties through military means, particularly by the armed 
conflicts in the early 1990s. Moreover, as Dov Lynch asserts, “historically, these peoples 
have rarely, if ever, won wars. Victory has left the de facto states bewildered.”200  Since a 
military victory has been viewed as the fundamental platform for their escape from the 
oppression of the dominant foreign rule, they tended to perpetuate their survival through 
military means.201 Furthermore, the armed forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia “have 
combat experience and victories have boosted morale”202 which in turn has increased their 
potency in defending their homelands. Hence, they have provided enormous resources for 
their military defense, leading to the high militarization of their societies.   
 Additionally significant has been the constantly perceived threat of an impulsive 
Georgian military assault. Since the prospects for reintegrating Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
through peaceful means have been perceived almost impossible, there has remained a 
widespread belief that Georgia might seek the military option in order to restore authority 
over the regions. Thus, the build of Georgian military strength, preceded by US’s efforts to 
establish a well-equipped Georgian army, and Tbilisi’s increasingly threatening rhetoric 
toward the de facto authorities  have elevated the fears in Abkhazia and South Ossetia over 
the last decade. Consequently, in their strategic thinking, military power has remained as the 
best measure to dissuade Georgia from attempting to resolve the conflicts by coercive means.  
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 Moreover, in the regions where the rule of law and good governance have been scarce, 
it should not be so surprising to witness the dramatic increase of separatist armed formations 
as well as illegal guerilla organizations. As briefly mentioned above, the long-lasting ‘war-
like’ situation and Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s emerging ‘undefined’ statuses have 
provided militarized groups in these regions with favorable circumstances to develop into an 
enormous scale, rendering borders transparent and creating a general atmosphere of chaos. 
Faced with poorly developed state institutions and with the turbulent and chaotic security 
environment, the separatist authorities in the regions have been unable to provide order and 
guarantee the well-being of its citizens. The virtual collapse of state control, in other words 
the dis-attachment from central governing authorities, accompanied by the absence of the rule 
of law and the lack of international legitimacy, have encouraged portions of the populations to 
ensure their securities and maintain their subsistence through military means.  
 e. Illegal Trade and Smuggling 
 Since the early 1990s, illegal trade and smuggling have become common features in 
Souh Ossetia and Abkhazia, destabilizing the entire Caucasus and hindering the peace 
process. In particular, the on-going skirmishes, lost infrastructure, high militarization and 
constant mood of insecurity that plagued the regions generated conditions for the 
development of shadow businesses and the criminalization of economic activities, leading 
these regions to turn into a safe haven for illicit traffickers and organized crime groups. 
Furthermore, the regions’ weak economies rendered organized crime a viable alternate 
employment opportunity and the transparency of national borders facilitated smuggling as the 
main source of income for the population. Ultimately becoming a serious source of revenue, 
illegal trade has not only contributed to the survival of these two entities, but also to the 
impediment of conflict resolution as the persistence of impasse in the context of the conflicts 
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proved to be advantageous for a variety of groups, not necessarily only for Abkhazians and 
Ossetians.  
 It is widely known that chaotic conditions create an ideal environment for the 
development of organized crime since “illegal activities easily go unchecked”.203 In the cases 
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the lack of recognition by the international community has 
stripped the legitimacy from their governments and consequently the power to effectively 
govern the region. Equally important, the devastation of the continuous wars and high 
militarization of society have disrupted the state and civil structures ultimately creating a legal 
limbo favorable to illegal enterprises. Longstanding disruption of order and law and the 
ensuing power vacuum facilitated easy access to illegal business ventures. As Walter A. 
Kemp rightly points out, “the absence of democratic government and the rule of law, 
combined with the ability of an authority to protect its security interest and maintain control 
over a particular territory fosters an environment which the regime can dictate its terms and 
control the means of subsistence”.204  
 One might claim that the attitude of the international community and particularly of 
Georgia contributed to the establishment of fragile institutions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
within which organized crime was allowed to flourish. First of all, although these de facto 
states have enjoyed substantial ‘internal sovereignty’, standing for authority over their 
territories, they have lacked external sovereignty that “stands to reason that their form of 
government will be considered illegitimate and their sources of revenue illegal.”205 This is 
simply because according to international law norms, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are still 
considered to be within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders. Since, Georgia does not 
recognize the ‘internal borders’ between itself and the separatist regions as ‘a legitimate 
frontier’, it refuses “to post border guards or impose any normal controls at the 
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administrative line.”206  Failing to enforce authority over the regions and to provide effective 
border and customs control on the line dividing itself from the de facto states, Georgia has 
contributed to these peripheries to operate as a transit zone in which illegal items are 
smuggled without any production taxes or tariffs imposition. Besides, since no economic 
activity in these de facto states is considered to be legal by the international community, the 
separatist authorities grasped the opportunity to provide excessive benefits through such 
illegal activities. 
  Moreover, although the unrecognized regimes of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
established the institutions essential for statehood, they were unable to construct them 
efficiently. The weakness of the state apparatus rendered these territories particularly 
vulnerable to organized crime infiltration and turned illegal trade and smuggling into 
dominant ways of life, enhancing the “demoralization of the whole society since the very line 
between legal and illegal becomes dangerously blurred and fluid”207 As the unrecognized 
regimes failed to provide basic administrative and social services; the transfer of drugs, arms 
and goods became considerably integral to the regions’ economies rapidly becoming a source 
of livelihood for its inhabitants.  
 Additionally significant, in these regions, separatist armed groups encouraged by their 
authorities have formed networks of criminal activities and have militarized the regions, 
carrying these acts in the name of a national struggle.208 This has not only given them a certain 
level of legitimacy for their illegal exploitation, but also further fueled nationalism among 
their populations. In other words, battle for state sovereignty pushed Abkhazians and 
Ossetians to engage in illegal activities in order to finance their armed conflicts while 
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cementing a cultural and ethnic bondage between their populations desecrating notions of 
legitimacy and lawful behaviour.  
 Particularly, South Ossetia is a landlocked province with no viable industrial 
infrastructure and with an economy buoyed with smuggling between Georgia and Russia. 
During the Soviet period, the region’s functioning industries, such as lead, zinc, wood 
products, enamel fittings and beer had been integral to the economy of Georgian SSR.209 
However, the continuous wars and out-flow of almost half of the population paralyzed the 
industrial enterprises leaving South Ossetia increasingly vulnerable to illegal activities. In the 
last decades, benefiting from its geographical position and controlling the significant 
Vladikavkaz corridor, it began to serve as a conduit for illegal trade of a variety of 
contraband, from alcohol to cigarettes, gasoline, drugs, weapons and people.210 The 
significance of smuggling for the economy of South Ossetia is further emphasized when 
Georgia in the summer of 2004 attempted to close the illegal Ergneti market in Tskhinvali, a 
violent conflict ensued.211 Located at the entrance to Tskhinvali, Ergneti market had been for 
years a significant source of income for the region’s residents in which ethnic Georgians and 
Ossetians traded together.212 The sensitivity of the issue is displayed by the willingness of 
Ossetians to fight and armed struggle rather than forfeiting their only source of livelihood  
 On the other side, Abkhazia has more potential sources of income than South Ossetia, 
such as tourism, substantial hazelnut and tangerine production, trade in scrap metal, as well as 
power lines. These sources in the region have become even more lucrative since no tax on 
them has been paid to the Georgian government. In addition to these, Sukhum(i) became a 
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significant transit point for smuggling between Russia and Georgia, especially for the trade of 
gasoline, arms and hazelnut, allegedly under the protection of Russian troops.213  
 The expansion of organized crime in the regions has benefited not only ethnic 
Abkhazians and Ossetians, but also a variety of groups such as Georgian officials, Russian 
peacekeepers, ethnic Georgians and other minorities living in the peripheries of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. In Abkhazia, as Dov Lynch argues the illegal operations are carried out 
through coordination and cooperation of Abkhaz, Armenian and Georgian militia, partisan 
and criminal groups and Russian peacekeepers, blurring “the lines between ethnic groups in 
the conflict, uniting them all in the search for profit.”214 The Abkhazian illegal market has 
also been the main source of revenue for Georgians who recently returned to Gali district of 
Abkhazia. Similarly, the Ergneti market in South Ossetia has been a ‘life-blood’ not only for 
Ossetians, but also ethnic Georgians living in South Ossetia.215  
 In particular, neither Georgian authorities nor the Russian peacekeepers have seemed 
to interested in controlling the smuggling, but rather allegedly they have been benefiting from 
the criminal networks stretching from Georgia to Russian borders. Aleko Kupatadze of 
Tbilisi's Transnational Crime and Corruption Center claims that Russian peacekeepers have 
been "either receiving illegal shares from smuggling operations or directly implementing 
contraband trade."216 On the other hand, illegal trade also has benefited some Georgian 
authorities and central police elites, opening them a window of opportunity to collect customs 
and tax revenues in the ‘internal borders’ which directly go into their pockets.217  
 Recognizing that international recognition seems unlikely in the near future, Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia have focused on preserving their de facto statuses. Thus, over the course of 
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time “a perverted and weak, but workable, incentive structure has emerged” sustaining their 
subsistence.218 In this vein, illegal trade and smuggling have been essential for these regions, 
flourishing as the most prominent economic activities in the absence of a de jure standing in 
international economic relations. Over the course of time, in both Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, the state of suspended conflict has proven to be beneficial for several parties. This 
has ultimately rendered the preservation of the the frozen peace process increasingly desirable 
from a number of perspectives. On the other hand though, the devastating impact on the 
Georgian economy due to the considerable loss from tariffs and taxes should not be 
undermined. However, an attempt to tackle smuggling in Soıth Ossetia in 2004 by 
Saakashvili’s government, illustrated that cutting off the ‘life-blood’ without providing any 
alternatives is definitely not a viable option.  
 In short, it is argued that the struggle to secure independence and the resulting power 
vacuum have laid the groundwork for the massive increase in organized crime activity in both 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Benefiting from the lack of regulations and of ill-structured 
institutions, both regions have been a channel for smuggled goods, drugs and weapons to and 
from Russia and Georgia, posing a serious security threat to the whole Caucasus region. 
Highly isolated in the sphere of international relations, there was no other choice for these 
unrecognized separatist states but to pursue illegal activities in order to sustain their 
subsistence. Eventually, Abkhazian and Ossetian politicians have become obliged to support 
illegal activities as they have comprised the economic infrastructure of their regions. It is 
further argued that since many alternate groups either inside or outside of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia have been gaining considerable benefits from illegal economic activities, prolonging 
the conflicts has ultimately outweighed the benefits of conflict resolutions 
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 5.1.2 The Role of Georgia  
 a. Introducing Georgia’s Role    
 Since 1980s, Georgian state policies have largely contributed to the ethnic conflicts in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, strengthening their national aspirations towards separatism.  To 
refresh, the existing Abkhazian and South Ossetian grievances with Georgia have mostly their 
roots in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Georgian policies towards these autonomous 
titular nationalities began to become increasingly threatening, creating a tense relationship 
between ethnic Georgians and non-Georgians in the regions. The fact that Tbilisi opted for 
single language and single culture policies has played a vital role in fostering ethnic 
disturbances in these two former Soviet autonomous regions, materializing the fears aroused 
by the perception of discrimination. The heavy-handed Georgian policies in the late Soviet 
era, such as attempts to reduce the already existent autonomies of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, raised the anxieties about the latent hostility of the majority Georgian population in 
these societies; ultimately turning inter-ethnic disputes into open warfare. The full-scale wars 
in early 1990s cemented these breakaway territories’ isolation from Georgia, while Georgia 
could only marginally function in them. The failure of Tbilisi to reinforce its control over the 
separatist regions for years has further consolidated their existence encouraging their 
determination for political separatism.  
 Equally significant, the highly demanding, uncompromising and stubborn attitude of 
Georgian governments, as well as Georgia’s weakness and inability to attract the populations 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have cultivated the lack of progress in the conflict resolution 
process. Besides, the use of consistently threatening policies, such as economic blockades and 
threats of military invasion; the existence of Georgian IDPs as well of alternative Georgian 
governments in the breakaway enclaves; have further contributed to the ensuing stalemate in 
the absence of a final political solution.  
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 b. How do Abkhazians and South Ossetians View Georgia? 
 Georgia had come on the brink of complete collapse in the early 1990s when two 
simultaneous ethnic wars and a civil war erupted in the country. Since then, Georgia has been 
a scene of turmoil, its statehood characterized by immense fragility. Not only Georgia has 
failed to suppress the secessionist ambitions of its minorities and territorial autonomies, but 
also has suffered from a number of domestic issues ranging from the economic to the political 
spheres. Kolsto rightly points out that: “as long as the parent state is mired in political chaos 
and economic misery, it is not only prevented from launching a new war to recapture the lost 
territory but also fails to attract the population of the breakaway region.”219 One part of the 
explanation for Georgia’s inability to convince its separatist regions to reintegrate within a 
federative arrangement is that it has failed to be appealing for these populations.  Aside to its 
economic and political weakness, Georgia has qualified as ‘fissile state’, which in Paul 
Jackson’s definition refers to ‘the state that has a tendency to break apart’.220 Faced with a 
number of internal conflicts, Georgian territorial integrity has always been cumbersome. 
Indeed, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have not been the only  regions threatening Georgian 
solidarity, but also the districts of Marneuli, Dmenisi, Bolnisi where ethnic Azerbaijanis are 
located, Pankisi Gorge which thousands of Chechen separatists use as a ‘safe haven’; Adjaria 
in which religious differences and broad autonomy have always created tense relations with 
Tbilisi  and Javakheti where Armenians demand unification with their neighboring homeland 
have been the other trouble ridden territories, undermining Georgia’s ethnic balance.221   
 The failure to establish and to maintain the state’s territorial integrity continues to 
remain Georgia’s larger weakness; however Georgia has also suffered from its failing 
economy, the mafia-style activities of the militia groups, lack of diplomatic potency in the 
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international arena and vulnerability to Russian pressure. Besides, due to the long-standing 
conflicts, not only Georgia has been deprived of access to a large portion of its territory and 
the significant income from valuable agricultural products and tourism, but also access to the 
prolific routes towards Russia and to almost half of its Black Sea Coast.222 Moreover, the 
communication links with these regions have been paralyzed; the investment in Georgia has 
been discouraged in addition to the increasing security risks for the oil and gas projects over 
the country. Failing to construct a well-developed economy and consolidated democracy, 
Georgia was ultimately unable to attract the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
 c. Georgian Military Threats and Economic Blockades 
 The fact that Georgia has preferred to use military threats and economic blockades to 
induce the separatist authorities to compromise has deteriorated their relations with Tbilisi, 
contributing to the lack of confidence and mistrust already rooted in the perceptions of 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian populations. Partly due to the provocations of the Georgian 
side and partly due to the ‘constructed’ perceptions in these regions, the inhabitants of these 
breakaway enclaves have been alarmed against a sudden Georgian military assault. Although 
Tbilisi has constantly announced its willingness to resolve the conflicts through peaceful 
means, it has not abandoned the use of the military option, rather employing it as leverage 
against the separatist demands. The aggressive rhetoric of Georgian officials has irritated the 
separatist authorities especially given the widespread belief that without a military invasion 
Georgia would never be able to regain these territories any time soon.223 The periodical 
military maneuvering, continuous skirmishes, military threats, the increasing defense 
expenditures and military build-up have further fed the fears in these societies, fostering their 
                                                 
222 Fawn, R. “The Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict: Perception of its Origins and Prospects for its Resolution”, p. 47.  
Available (pdf) at http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/cee/g81/G81.chap8/ 
223 For example see Walker, S. , “South Ossetia: Russian, Georgian…independent?,” Open democracy,  15 
November 2006. Available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-caucasus/south_ossetia_4100.jsp 
 83 
vigilance to show resistance against a Georgian attack.224 In order to justify the possibility of 
renewed war, Georgia has endeavored to grasp the attention of the international community to 
the instability in the regions and the operations of the separatist guerrillas. While Georgia has 
sought international support for its territorial claims, Russia has grasped the opportunity to 
gain the trust of the local populations in these two tiny lands by providing them security 
guarantees in case of a Georgian military assault.  The Georgian military threats have 
ultimately pushed the separatist states to rely on the protection of the Russian peacekeeping 
forces, which have acted as an additional buffer within the conflict zones.  
 Another military instrument for Tbilisi has been the Georgian paramilitary groups, 
weakening Georgian contentions that it does not seek to resolve the conflicts by coercive 
force.225 The paramilitary troops had especially played a major role in early 1990s when 
Georgia lacked a disciplined regular army.226 Although after the mid-1990s the regular 
Georgian army began to develop, the paramilitary forces continued their guerrilla activities 
dominantly around Kodori Gorge and Tskhinvali, receiving unofficial support from the 
Georgian authorities including advanced weaponry and military equipments.227 The ‘White 
Legion’ and the ‘Forest Brothers’, which have operated outside the state’s control have 
further destabilized the region, since skirmishes have sporadically broke out and organized 
crime has increased substantially.228 Although the allegations against Georgian officials’ 
assistance to these guerrilla organizations were not really substantiated with evidence, the fact 
that they have actually acted as a guard against separatist guerrilla troops and that Tbilisi has 
not been willing to fully terminate their activities have raised some eyebrows.  
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 Moreover, Georgia has for long imposed economic sanctions in Abkhazia basically 
aiming for two things: first to compel its de facto authorities to make concessions in 
negotiations and second to make sure that it will not flourish in the meantime.229 Although 
Georgian officials’ expectations were to ease the compromise during the peace talks, 
economic blockades not only have failed to produce positive effects for the conflict resolution 
process. Indeed, they have generated negative ones, reducing the possibility for personal 
contact and confidence-building measures, eroding inter-ethnic trust between the opposing 
communities  and ultimately reinforcing the ‘siege mentality’.230 Besides, economic sanctions 
could not avoid the existence of the de facto Abkhazian state and rather drove it to sustain a 
“skewed, but workable subsistence”.231  Bearing these in mind, one can suggest that Georgian 
military and economic policies towards the separatist regions have been ineffective in 
pressuring for a compromise, but instead have hardened the peace settlement, solidifying the 
polarization between the adversary parties.  
 d. The Particular Role of Georgian Leadership 
 Since its foundation, the Georgian republic has witnessed the rule of three presidents, 
namely Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze and Saakashvili. The role of these presidents and their 
leaderships has been instrumental in the evolution of the nature of the conflicts in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia and for the development of a stalemate which has eroded the resolution of 
these conflicts. In the early independence period, Gamsakhurdia, known with his authoritarian 
and hard-lined stance, institutionalized the unitary state building policies and exclusive 
nationalism, deepening the gap between Georgians and minorities and ultimately 
strengthening the determination of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to seek defection from 
Georgia. However, the conflicts were further consolidated during Shevardnadze’s period, 
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materializing in the ensuing deadlock between the opposing parties which up so far has 
seemed impenetrable to any conflict resolution process.232  
 When Shevardnadze replaced Gamsakhurdia, many believed that he would be 
influential in encouraging more inclusive policies, solving the problems with the separatist 
regions and providing the territorial integrity of Georgia with the help of his international 
reputation and reformist leadership. However, ironically it was during his rule, when the 
large-scale wars erupted in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Apparently, his ‘domestic weakness’ 
and his lack of legitimacy had made him susceptible to pressures from nationalist forces 
within the country, forcing him to adopt a tough line against the separatists.233 Although he 
consolidated his power in the mid-1990s, defeating the leaders of the paramilitary groups, he 
was still not legitimate enough to take big steps towards conflict resolution in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. He rather pursued a more neutral ‘non-policy’ towards these separatist regions, 
by trying to ignore the existing conflicts and the peace talks as much as he could not exploit 
the external forces to shift the conflict resolution process in Georgia’s favor. Thus, he was 
neither “willing to grasp the nettle of defeat suffered on the battlefield nor to entertain the 
possibility of serious compromise with Abkhazia or South Ossetia.”234 Though he ruled for 
twelve years, his fragile position and his lack of courage prevented him from changing the 
status quo ante, which he believed was more preferable than coming face to face with total 
failure.  
 After coming to power with the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili had achieved to gain the 
trust and support of the Georgian electorates. Holding great electoral legitimacy and a broad 
base of support, he had the means to develop a more active policy towards progress in the 
peace talks regarding the breakaway territories. Asserting his willingness to end the separatist 
conflicts and to reunify Georgia, he first sought compromise with the separatist authorities 
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through peaceful means, initiating his ‘hearts and minds’ project. Although he was more 
concerned with Abkhazia due to its strategic location and lucrative resources, he knew that 
first he had to reintegrate South Ossetia, which was perceived to be an easier target. Thus 
Georgia’s first move to change the status quo ante had come in the summer of 2004 in South 
Ossetia, which had ended with a great failure. Since then, Georgia has sought new 
opportunities to shift the dynamics gradually in its favor, having being further encouraged by 
its economic development, its rising status as an energy hub and the increasing Western 
involvement.  Keeping in line with this aim, Georgia seized the mountainous upper Kodori 
Gorge in 2006 and installed there the pro-Georgian Abkhaz government-in-exile, as well as 
supported the alternative de facto South Ossetian administration led by Sanakoev. 
 It is remarkable in retrospect that as Saakashili failed to reassert Georgian territorial 
integrity by peaceful means; he turned towards the use of military force, illustrating his 
eagerness to change the status quo ante on whatever grounds. His uncompromising stance 
combined with his reliance on military power opened up a new phase in Georgia’s relations 
with the separatist regions, what should be called as the resurgence of aggressiveness and 
threatening instability. Eventually, the events in the summer of 2008 diminished any 
credibility for Saakashvili’s efforts to reunify Georgia, as an unsuccessful military campaign 
crushed the hopes for a peaceful political deal between the two sides. 
 To sum up, the political leaders in Georgia have developed a form of unitary 
nationalism which has proven to be unrealistic in a country where only 70 percent of the 
population has been ethnic Kartvelians.235 Their tough-lined strategies could neither achieve 
to diffuse the tensions and resolve the conflicts, nor to shift the status quo in favor of Georgia. 
Their extreme positions and unwillingness to compromise were responsible, at least in part, 
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for the crystallization of the conflicts and the partial development of the dynamics that have 
been systematically weighing down any possibility for a resolution in the conflicting regions.  
 e. Georgia’s new method: Alternative Administrations  
 As noted before in chapter (3.3.4), since 2006 in South Ossetia, there has been 
established an ‘alternative administration’ supported mainly by the ethnic Georgians of the 
region. The same year, Georgia also moved the Abkhazian government-in-exile from Tbilisi 
to Upper Kodori Gorge with the aim of increasing its operational activities in and around the 
Gorge and Gali region. The establishment of parallel governments in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia has been perceived as a new Georgian political tool to pressure the separatist 
regimes, which Georgia never considered to be legitimate. Keeping in line with this policy, 
Georgia has announced to recognize these alternative governments as the legitimate 
representatives of the breakaway regions during the peace talks, rather than the separatist 
authorities. Although the Georgian officials believed that these regimes would contribute to 
President Saakashvili’s project to reintegrate Georgia’s secessionist territories, it soon became 
clear that these efforts were increasingly futile. That is to say, severing the dialogue with the 
separatist authorities actually rendered viable political solutions redundant.  
 f. The Question of IDPs and the Abkhaz Government-in-Exile 
 One of the biggest social and economic impacts of the 1992-1993 war in Abkhazia, as 
well as the war in South Ossetia, was the outflow of thousands of refugees and IDPs that more 
than halved the overall population in these regions. In respect to the South Ossetian conflict, 
there have been positive developments over the years. Particularly, since the de facto South 
Ossetian parliament’s resolution that allowed the return of ethnic Georgians who were not 
involved in the 1992 war, there has been reported that a number of ethnic Georgians 
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spontaneously returned to South Ossetia whereas Ossetians to central Georgia.236 However, in 
Abkhazia the question of IDPs has particularly remained significant and controversial, that is, 
the IDPs that flew from Abkhazia to other parts of Georgia have been a significant 
impediment for the peace settlement in this region.  On the other hand, the non-settlement of 
the conflict has continued to affect these high numbers of IDPs who have suffered from poor 
living conditions and difficulties to integrate into the local societies within central Georgia.  
 The war in Abkhazia in 1992-1993 had resulted in the outflow of almost whole 
Georgian population from the Abkhaz cities, aside to other populations who fled to Russia or 
back to their home countries due to the threat of personal violence and stagnating economic 
conditions. After the war, Abkhazia declared that the Georgian refugees had fled “as a result 
of their collaboration with the occupying forces and fear of accusation thereof.”237 On the 
other side, Georgia asserted that it was a part of Abkhazian strategy to cleanse the region from 
ethnic Georgians.238 Since then, the IDPs within central Georgia have continued to be a major 
problem for Georgian leadership, with their demands to return back to their perceived 
homeland, being one of the key parties to the Abkhazian conflict.  
 The Abkhazian Government in- exile was established by a number of ethnic Georgian 
deputies of the former Abkhazian parliament prior to the armed conflict. Created as an 
alternative to the de facto government of the Republic of Abkhazia, this ethnically Georgian 
structure composed of ministries, state committees and inspectorates.239 Not only Georgian 
authorities subsidized this government in exile, but also attributed it seats in the Georgian 
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Parliament until Saakasvili’s reforms in 2004 terminated this faction in the government.240 
The objective of such a structure was to represent the Abkhazia’s ethnic Georgian refugees, 
providing them an opportunity to voice their demands and to channel their political 
discontent, ultimately giving an upper hand to Georgian authorities in the peace process. 
Besides, Tbilisi has never accepted that the de facto government of Abkhazia has had any 
genuine jurisdiction over the Abkhazian territory. Indeed, the Georgian side has believed that 
such a structure with ‘no legitimacy’ was crafting a new gap between the Abkhaz population 
and Georgian refugees.241  
 For Tbilisi, the question of the return of IDPs has retained an important place due to a 
variety of reasons, as the continued presence of these refugees within Georgia has destabilized 
the country. First of all, the pensions for around 200,000 IDPs have been a big burden on 
Georgia, exhausting its economic and financial resources. Even more importantly, the non-
resolution of the problem has placed a great strain on Georgian leadership, challenging its 
legitimacy and authority since Georgian refugees have intensely pressured the Georgian 
authorities to solve the IDP question. Furthermore, the IDP problem has been highly related 
with the Abkhazian conflict and ultimately with Georgian claims over territorial solidarity. 
Thus, conceding from the demands of these ethnic Georgian refugees has been perceived by 
Georgian authorities as giving up from the right to govern the separatist territories. In short, 
these IDPs integrating highly into Georgian state-led mechanisms with the ability to pressure 
the governments and to question the legitimacy of the Georgian leaders by the means of 
lobbying, have played a great role in the course of the Abkhazian conflict. 
 In this respect, the radical demands of IDPs and the uncompromising stance of the 
Abkhaz government-in-exile have been influential in blocking the peace settlement and 
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eventually solidifying the stalemate. Living in compact groups, the IDPs have built up a 
distinct view of the conflict, making an ultimate compromise increasingly difficult.242 
Channeling the discontent of thousands of IDPs, the Abkhaz government- in-exile has placed 
stakes in the peace talks, rather than seeking a middle ground for the conflict resolution. The 
belief prevails that leaders of the Abkhaz government-in-exile have opposed the peace 
process, fearing that a final political solution will fail to adhere to their demands.243. 
 One of Georgia’s main goals during the peace talks has been to provide the safe return 
of Georgian IDPs to Abkhazia. Ethnic Abkhazians, however, have refused to succumb to 
Georgian demands in fear of turning back to a minority in their perceived homeland, as well 
the threat of a renewed conflict at the local level. Surprisingly though, in 2000 the de facto 
Abkhaz government unilaterally declared to entitle thousands of these IDPs to return in the 
Gali district, where Georgians used to be a compact majority before the fighting. Still, 
Abkhazia has taken a firm stance against large inflows of Georgians and has deported some 
informal returnees, rejecting the return of the whole IDP population, which would undermine 
the post-war demographic and ethnic balance of the region. On the other side, ‘the gradual 
staged return’ of refugees has not been objected by the Abkhaz authorities, but rather by 
Georgian officials. It has been asserted that the Georgian attitude has been such due to its 
perception of the staged return as an Abkhaz strategy to politically and socially integrate the 
returned IDPs into the Abkhazian state.244 Georgia has declared not to accept any conflict 
resolution process if it excludes the return of the whole IDP population to Abkhazia, whereas 
Abkhazians have announced their intention to reject any such proposal. Subsequently, despite 
the long-standing negotiations, the two sides have been unable to agree over the issue of 
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IDPs. As this question remains unresolved, Tbilisi will continue to exploit it as a ‘bargaining 
chip’ for humanitarian aid and as an additional leverage against Abkhazia in the conflict 
resolution process.245    
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 5.2 External Dynamics 
 5.2.1 The Role of Russia  
 a. Introducing Russian Role and its Implications over the Separatist Regions 
 The Russian foreign and security policy outlook has generally been favoring the 
preservation of the political and territorial status quo but along with a tendency towards 
unilateral intervention to neighboring regions. Hence, Russia has played a key role in 
Transcaucasia’s disputes and ethnic conflicts including the ones in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. The de facto statuses of these two breakaway states and lack of progress towards 
conflict resolution have lingered the Russian dominant position on the regions, giving Russia 
a prospect to exert political leverage on Georgia. Since the signing of the ceasefires in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia during the 1992-94 period under Russian mediation and the consecutive 
deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in the regions, Russia has attempted to fulfill the 
roles of an arbiter and a policeman. Moreover, maintaining strong military presence in 
Georgia,246 Russia has been an integral part of the on-going developments in the breakaway 
regions.  
 Russia for long has acted as an ‘outside protector’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
functioning as the unrecognized quasi states’ only connection with the outside world. Not 
only have the secessionist states’ economies and political considerations heavily depended on 
its ties to Russia, but also the Russian ruble has circulated as the official currency and Russian 
has persisted as the main language for inter-ethnic communication in the regions. 
Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of Abkhaz and Ossetian populations have held visa 
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privileges, if not Russian citizenship. Given its longstanding special relationship with 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia has been eager to retain its grasp over these two regions.  
 Caring similar weight, the Russian identity and reputation have been shaped to a great 
extent by its nostalgia for the imperial Soviet past. Similarly, Russia’s concern for 
maintaining its traditional sphere of influence over the former Soviet territories has played a 
fundamental role in determining its stance towards the conflicts in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Alarmed with US and European penetration into these conflicts, one of Russia’s 
objectives and priorities has been to keep its control over this strategically significant region. 
Equally important, Russia has perceived North Caucasia and South Caucasia within the same 
security complex. Thus, according to the Russian view, the stability of the North Caucasus 
and Russian territorial integrity heavily depend on the developments in and around Georgia. 
As Dov Lynch briefly explains, Russian policies in Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts 
“was based on two principles: i) “to localize the conflict in order to avoid a spill over  into 
the unstable North Caucasus region”, ii ) to “not let the vacuum that had emerged in the 
region be filled by outside forces.”247 Consecutively, Russian attitude has been reflected with 
its desire to sustain its strong military presence in Georgia and with its willingness to retain its 
position as the key mediator in the negotiations between the conflicting parties.   
 On the other side, Georgian political considerations have reflected anxieties over 
Russia’s imposing unilateralism, since Russia’s meddling in Georgian affairs with respect to 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia has imprinted a negative perception among Georgians. 
According to the official Georgian view, Russia could not remain a neutral and impartial 
party to the existing conflicts, failing to act as a trustworthy mediator and a responsible 
international stakeholder. Thus, the Georgian government has repeatedly accused Russia for 
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backing the ambitions of these separatist regions in order to reinforce its hegemony over 
Georgia and to undermine Georgia’s pro-Western attitude.  
 There are two different arguments concerning Russia’s role in Abkhazian and South 
Ossetian disputes. One claims that Russia’s heavy handed manipulation of the conflicts has 
been the major reason behind the lack of progress towards the conflict resolution, whereas the 
other asserts that Russia achieved to preserve the stability in the regions for more than 15 
years.248 Although these two arguments seem totally contradictory at first glance, they are 
rather complementary. Playing a significant role in the survival of the de facto regimes of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia largely contributed in the maintenance of the status quo 
ante. Besides, failing to pressure the conflicting sides to take steps towards a final political 
solution, Russia was unable to fulfill its task as an efficient mediator, creating an impasse in 
the conflict resolution process. On the other hand, Russian military presence and its 
diplomatic weight circumvented the eruption of a large-scale war between the separatist 
regions and Georgia for more than a decade and a half, furnishing a level of stability in the 
conflict zones. Yet, the unpredicted ‘five-day war’ of the last summer guided directly by 
Russia has illustrated the fragileness of this stability, as well as the ambiguity of Russian 
strategy. Still, it is remarkable in retrospect that Russia has been traditionally “a status quo 
power” which does not favor change, especially if the newly developed dynamics contradict 
its interests.249 In line with this attitude, Russia was keen in entrenching the status quo ante 
and keeping its historical influence over South Caucasus, driving Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
deeper into its embrace.  
  
                                                 
248 For the latter argument see Hewitt (2008).  
249 See Hill, F. (2003). “Seismic Shifts in Eurasia: the Changing Relationship between Turkey and Russia and its 
Implications for the South Caucasus,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 1743-9639, vol. 3, issue. 3, 
pp. 55-75. 
 95 
 b. Russian Geopolitical Interests in its Traditional Sphere of Influence 
 Russia did not only inherit the Soviet era’s glorious past of a multi-ethnic empire, but 
also a strong sense of supremacy, which guided its tendency to maintain its influence over its 
former Soviet subjects. Although the Soviet Empire formally dissolved in December 1991, 
Russia could not transcend the idea that it was no longer the center of today’s ex-Soviet 
territories. During the Soviet rule, there had existed a hierarchical system in which Moscow 
had a decisive say in the political and economic choices of the Soviet’s constituent republics. 
Moreover, all the central institutions were based in Russia, whereas Russian was the empire’s 
lingua franca250. Considering its historical ties with the ex-Soviet states, Russia has aimed to 
remain as the leading figure of their new political and economic realities. 
 Being a territory both under Russian and the Soviet Empire, Georgia and the 
surrounding region has been considered by Russia to be an integral part of its traditional 
sphere of influence. Thus, Moscow has always sought to express a voice in its southern 
neighbor’s foreign policy and economic assessments. Very much in line with this strategic 
thinking, when the wars erupted in Georgia’s autonomous regions in early 1990s, Russia 
directly intervened and showed its vigilance to pursue the role of a mediator in the established 
negotiation mechanisms for the resolution of the on-going disputes. In this period, conversely, 
the Western powers were not yet interested in Georgia, but rather were preoccupied with the 
post-Cold War arrangements and their implications for Europe. Grasping the opportunity to 
become the hegemonic power in South Caucasian affairs, Russia has tried to sustain the 
authoritarian Soviet-era political regime with an increasingly patronizing attitude.  
 Although accused of siding with the separatists, Russia’s initial goal was to keep not 
only Sukhum(i) and Tskhinvali, but also Tbilisi under its influence, circumventing emerging 
anti-Russian orientation in Georgia. Hence, Russia ‘encouraged’ Georgia to be a member of 
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the CIS in 1994 in order to keep it under its de facto sphere of influence.251 One might claim 
that what Russia aimed originally was to manipulate the conflicts in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia in order for them “to fall into line on joint defense of the external borders of the 
former Soviet Union.”252 In other words, Russia did not accept to stay in the periphery of 
these conflicts, but rather in the center of them. Giving Moscow a degree of leverage, the 
conflicts strengthened the hands of Russian leadership to sustain its dominance over Georgia 
and its separatist regions, leading them to remain dependent on Russian backing.  
 On the other side, the favorable conditions serving to Russia’s long-term security 
demands could only be maintained if the standstill in the resolution process continued and if 
the other external powers were eliminated from the scene. Therefore, although Russia has 
been considered an international player as a member of the UN Security Council and OSCE, 
its strategy with respect to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been extremely 
exclusionary. Circumventing the international community’s direct involvement, Russia has 
preserved its dominancy over the conflicts as well as the conflict resolution processes. For 
instance, despite the fact that OSCE and UNOMIG were attributed long-term missions in the 
conflict zones in early 1990s, their involvement in the conflicts have remained limited, 
primarily due to Russia’s negative attitude. Besides, until the August War in 2008, Russia 
allowed neither EU nor US to take a share of responsibility in the region, treating them as 
security challengers. Additionally, Russia’s reluctance to pressure the separatist regions for a 
compromise in the negotiations has raised questions whether Russia was promoting the 
resolution of the conflicts or their continuation. 
 In addition, a zero-sum approach has always leaned to dictate the Russian foreign-
policy outlook within the security complexes of the Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern 
Europe. Thus, Russia has viewed any Western engagement in these regions as naturally 
                                                 
251 See Bremmer, I. & Bailes, A. (Jan. 1998). “Sub-Regionalism in the Newly Independent States”, International 
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944-), 74:1, pp. 131-147. 
252 Herzing (1999), p. 49 
 97 
disadvantageous for itself.253 What has concerned the Russia the most has been the eastward 
expansion of NATO and the growing interest of the US in Southern Caucasus, which have 
been inherently incompatible with Russian objectives. As a result, Georgian-West 
rapprochement, particularly Georgia’s admission for NATO membership and Georgia’s 
strategic relationship with the US, has been perceived by Russia as a threat to its national and 
security interests. Hence, Moscow has constantly sent Western Europe, NATO and the US 
overt messages that read: “Do not come into my backyard.” 
 Equally significant, Russia has been so concerned about being the hegemonic power 
in Transcaucasus not only because of the Soviet legacy and its implications on its reputation 
and identity, but also because of the geo-political competition raging around the region. 
Energy politics has been the most critical element of this competition between various global 
and regional powers fascinated with the significant hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian 
Basin. Russia has been well aware of the potential advantages of this region and the current 
projects for Eurasian transportation routes and energy pipelines. As one of the primary energy 
suppliers to the European market, Russia has been very determined to secure its Caspian oil 
and gas supplies in order to maximize its profits. 
 c. Shifting of Russian Policy in 1990s 
 Within the first years following the dissolution of the USSR, Russia had acted more 
cautious and isolated in the international fora, trying to adapt to the new world order. 
However, this ‘passive’ and ‘neutral’ initial period did not last much long as Russia found 
itself surrounded by fierce conflicts around the Caucasus including the conflicts in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. Since then, for Russia, maintaining the ex-Soviet peripheries under its 
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sway, as well as avoiding the destabilization of these two conflicts, has become the main 
priority leading to the resurfacing of more assertive and coercive policies 
 Throughout the Abkhazian War of 1992-1993, Russian policy was characterized with 
incoherencies since Russia attempted to support Abkhazian, as well as Georgian forces. For 
instance, in the beginning of the war, Russia was sending military equipment to the Georgian 
side,254 however after a while began to direct its assistance towards Abkhazia, deteriorating its 
relations with Georgia. During the second half of 1993, a Russian airborne regiment in 
Abkhazia was blamed by Georgians for an attack on Georgian troops, as well as for the 
equipment of Abkhaz forces with Russian weaponry.255 This pro-Abkhaz intervention was not 
only backed by certain units in the Russian military and political circles, but also by the North 
Caucasus people within the Russian Federation. Encouraged by the Russian military, large 
number of voluntary soldiers from the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus arrived in 
Abkhazia to fight alongside Abkhaz in September 1993.256 As Dov Lynch argues, Russia’s 
basic strategy at the time was to induce Georgian government to comply with Russian 
demands.257 Keeping in line with its strategy, Russia conditioned Georgia to join the CIS in 
exchange for its support to Georgian military and for its diplomatic contribution to resolve the 
Abkhaz conflict. Faced not only with increasing Abkhaz attacks, but also with the Zviadists’ 
upsurge in western Georgia, Shevardnadze believed that Georgia needed the backing of 
Russia in order to combat against the Zviadists and to provide Georgian territorial integrity.  
 After Georgia became a member of CIS, Russia’s pro-Abkhaz stance transformed into 
a pro-Georgian one. The shift in Russian position was explained partly due to the emerging 
Chechen conflict and partly due to Russian desire to turn Georgia a ‘puppet’ state in South 
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Caucasus.258 In the aftermath of the Kremlin- sponsored Sochi Ceasefire Agreement in July 
1993, which foresaw the deployment of Russian-led CIS peacekeeping forces, Russia ceased 
its support to Abkhazians authorities, closed its border with the de facto state and imposed 
economic sanctions to the region.259    
 In the second half of the 1990s, it became clear that faced with the Chechen disaster, 
Russian strategy was devoted to strengthen the stability in the conflicts, which could “quickly 
envelop the Northern Caucasus and jeopardize the security of the oil pipeline extending from 
Baku to Novorossyisk via Chechnya and Dagestan.”260 On the other side, although the civil 
war with Zviadists was curbed with Russian assistance, Georgian demands over Abkhazia 
were never really fulfilled. Russia had neither forced Abkhazia for the return of IDPs nor had 
assured the territorial integrity of Georgia. Moreover, Abkhazia had continued to receive both 
military and economic support from Russia, chiefly from the North Caucasian people. 
Furthermore, Moscow had retained its connection with the Abkhaz armed separatist 
groups.261 Subsequently, the Russian ambivalent stance in the 1994-2000 period, sending 
mixed signals to both Abkhazia and Georgia,  had neither comforted Georgian nor the 
Abkhazian side, since they could no longer guarantee Russia’s backing. However, in line with 
the changing dynamics of the last decade, Abkhazia, as well as South Ossetia, could achieve 
to secure substantial Russian support, though still having question marks over Russia’s 
‘credibility’.262 Still, it has been in the interests of these two regions to maintain the strategic 
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deal with Russia and to use Moscow’s support to consolidate their statehood. Indeed, in the 
recent years both Abkhazia and South Ossetia expressed their willingness for the status of a 
free associated state with Russia, which would grant them international sovereignty.263   
 d. Russian Concerns over Stability in North Caucasus: The Chechen Question 
and Pankisi Gorge 
 Chechnya is a North Caucasian separatist republic within Russia that had remained de 
facto independent between 1996-1999 until Russia intervened by force, re-conquered the 
region and established a puppet administration.264 The Chechen conflict in 1990s had 
highlighted the dangers of the spill-over effect of the separatist tendencies, pushing Russia to 
be more prudential in its policies concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia believed 
that the instability in South Caucasus could generate instability in its northern districts; 
escalating separatist tendencies or favorable conditions for the Chechen militia. Russian 
analyst Markedonov claims that, also resembling the Russian official rhetoric, “Russian 
dominance of the South Caucasus is not a question of its ‘imperial resurrection’”, but rather  
“securing stability in the former republics of the South Caucasus is a principle condition for 
the peaceful development of Russia itself and the preservation of the state’s integrity.”265   
 Keeping in line with such a security approach, Russian military strategy in Georgia in 
the last decade has not only focused on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but also on Georgia’s 
Pankisi Gorge. Pankisi Gorge, which lies on the small valley high in the mountains of north-
east Georgia, near the Chechnya frontier, is claimed to be a safe haven for Chechen separatist 
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guerillas and a transit zone for international terrorists.266 Providing stability in North 
Caucasus and resolving the Chechen problem seemed only possible if Pankisi Gorge was 
effectively taken under control. Pankisi Gorge has become a focal point of attention as Russia 
used it as a mean to put pressure on Georgia and to justify its extensive military existence 
along its southern frontiers.  
 The Russian-Georgian tension over Pankisi Gorge was ignited as Russian officials 
indicated their willingness to crush these separatists while blaming Georgia for failing to 
suppress terrorist threat along the Georgian-Russian borders.267 Although Tbilisi initially 
denied Russian claims, Shevardnadze admitted the existence of Chechen militias in Abkhazia 
and Pankisi Gorge in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, indicating Georgia’s 
readiness to cooperate with Russia to fight against terrorism.268 Still, Georgians were 
preoccupied with Russian efforts to employ the anti-terrorism banner as an excuse to justify 
its military operations within Georgian frontiers.269 Georgian-Russian relations further 
deteriorated following the US’s declaration of plans to grant assistance to Georgia in 
controlling the terrorists activities in Pankisi Gorge.270 Russians were preoccupied with the 
increasing of US’ influence in Georgia which clashed with its strategic objectives whereas 
Abkhazians and South Ossetians concerns rose over a renewed Georgian military attack due 
to its increasing military power. 
 e. Russia’s Historical, Ethnic and Linguistic Links with the Separatist Regions 
 Russian Federation has inherited from the Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia a shared 
history with South Ossetians and Abkhazians in which the bilateral relations had fluctuated 
throughout the past two centuries. In particular, Abkhaz had an intense and hostile 
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relationship with the Tsarist regime, due to the deportation of more than half of Abkhaz 
population, predominantly of Muslims to the Ottoman Empire. Abkhazian-Russian rivalry of 
the 19th century transformed into an Abkhaz-Georgian one during the 20th century leading 
Abkhazians to side with Bolshevik Russians in the fight against the Menshevik Georgian 
Republic. Since then Abkhazians have developed a close affiliation with Russia, but the real 
rapprochement could only begin in the last decade as Russia took Abkhazians under its 
protection, considering itself as Abkhazia’s ‘big brother’. On the other side, by tradition 
Ossetians have had very close relations with Russians as they have been regarded as ‘loyal 
citizens’ both by the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. Since the termination of the Soviet 
rule and the de facto secession of South Ossetians from the new Georgian Republic, Russia 
has always provided them with shelter, safeguarding their interests and demands. 
 Abkhazians and Ossetians are ethnic groups distinct from both Russians and 
Georgians, but they feel historically and ethnically affiliated with the North Caucasus peoples 
which live under the Russian Federation. Particularly, Ossetia, is administratively divided into 
two as South Ossetians’ ethnic counterparts, the North Ossetians, populate the Republic of 
North Ossetia-Alania which is a federal subject of Russia. Although South Ossetians and 
North Ossetians are separated not only by the national frontiers, also by the high Caucasus 
Mountains, they have developed relations “on the basis of ethnic, national, historical-
territorial unity and social-economic integration.”271 The fact that North Ossetia, has been a 
constituent part of the Russian Federation and that North Ossetians have played an efficient 
role in lobbying Moscow, have ultimately enhanced the close ties between South Ossetians 
and Russia. Similarly, Abkhazians have enjoyed the political support of Circassians, Cossaks 
and other North Caucasus peoples, who have substantially pressured Moscow. Abkhazia and 
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South Ossetia’s ties with Russia’s North Caucasus regions are developed further through 
increased economic integration and commercial relations.272  
  Additionally, in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian language has held an 
important place. Retaining its status as the main language of interethnic communication in 
these territories, Russian has been recognized a state language by the constitutions of the two 
de facto states, on the equal ground with the official languages of Abkhazian and Ossetian.273 
The significance of the Russian language in these regions has been further emphasized with 
the existence of state-funded or private newspapers published in Russian.274 
 f. Russian Support and Involvement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
 Since the wars of the early 1990s, Russia has pursued an engagement policy towards 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia on political, economic and social levels, as well as providing 
considerable military backing. In the political sphere, Russia has provided substantial 
diplomatic support to the separatist regions. Particularly, the State Duma, the lower house of 
the Federal Assembly of Russia, has played a prominent role in addressing Abkhazian and 
Ossetian  demands, sending messages to Kremlin to back these de facto regimes. Since the 
mid-1990s, it has issued parliamentary resolutions calling for the recognition of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, for successful settlement of the conflicts through peaceful means and for the 
substantial assistance to the peoples of the regions. Although the Duma has not been directly 
involved in Russian foreign policy decision-making, its activities have been influential in 
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determining the course of the lobbying efforts. For instance, the Duma was instrumental in 
mitigating the level of Russian restrictions on Abkhazia in mid-1990s, voicing concerns about 
their consequences and emphasizing their illegality.275 The Duma’s position was further 
toughened following the appeal of Abkhazia on February 2004 to establish an ‘associated 
membership status’ for the Republic of Abkhazia within the Russian Federation.276  
 Similarly, in 5 August 2004, parliamentarians of the Duma compiled a statement in 
favor of South Ossetia, criticizing the Georgian acts that resulted in the outburst of violent 
skirmishes in the conflict zone. The statement backed North Ossetia’s declaration that if 
Georgia were to attack South Ossetia, they would defend their co-ethnics, the document 
reading that “the Russian Federation may be involved in it” due to “thousands of Russian 
citizens residing in the Caucasian region’s republics,” heightening Georgian concerns about 
Russia’s intention to undermine the territorial integrity of Georgia.277  Following Kosovo’s 
unilateral declaration of independence, the Duma intensified its efforts on March 2008 for the 
Kremlin “to consider the expediency of recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.” further enhancing the separatists’ determination for achieving independent 
statehood.278 Apparently, Duma’s pro-Abkhaz and pro-Ossetian stance has been a significant 
source of moral support for these separatist regimes.279  
 Moreover, Russia has been vitally interested in exerting its influence on the regions’ 
political affairs in order to sustain its reputation as their biggest patron. Russia’s intervention 
                                                 
275 By the decree issued on 24 June 1997, the Duma proposed the Russian government “to refrain from current 
sanctions against the poverty-stricken population of Abkhazia for the sake of ensuring Georgia’s territorial 
integrity.” “Decree issued by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”, Art 3, clause 
b,  24 June 1997,  taken from Collection of the Legislation of the RF, 1997, # 28, p. 5538-5539, 
http://www.rrc.ge/law/dekr_1997_06_24_e.htm?lawid=498&Ing_3=en Retrieved in 26 June 2009.  
276 The Abkhazian political party leaders and public political organizations sent an official letter to Boris 
Grizlov, the speaker of the State Duma, stating that they “regard such a treaty with Russia as a guarantee of 
their economic and cultural growth and their safety.” See “Abkhazia Asks the State Duma to Establish 
Relations”, RiaNovosti, 10 February 2004. Available at http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/ 
277 See “Russian Parliamentarians Adopt Statement on South Ossetia”,  RiaNovosti, 5 August 2004, 
http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/ 
278 “Duma Tells Kremlin to Consider Abkhazia, S. Ossetia Recognition”, Civil Georgia, 21 March 2008, 
www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17418 
279 Lynch (2001) 
 105 
in Abkhazian domestic politics became apparent during the presidential electoral process in 
2004. After Sergei Bagapsh defeated his opponent, Raul Khadjimba, who was backed both by 
Russia and the outgoing president Vladislav Ardzinba, a ‘two-month electoral crisis flared up 
and Russia threatened to impose a blockade on Abkhazia. The tense situation was diffused as 
the election results were annulled by the Supreme Court and a deal was made between the two 
rival candidates in which Bagapsh ran for presidency whereas Khajimba for vice 
presidency.280 This event resulted in the further growth of Abkhazian authorities’ dependence 
on Russia, revealing Moscow’s concern to keep pro-Russian administrations in the separatist 
regions. Similarly in South Ossetia, twice elected South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity 
holds a Russian passport and is known with his pro-Russian stance. 
 Moreover, Russia made it clear that neither the military annexation of the separatist 
regions by Georgia nor Georgia’s imposition of harsh blockades would be tolerated, even if it 
meant the direct Russian involvement in Georgia’s conflicts. During the Moscow Summit of 
February 2004, Russian president Putin affirmed once more that Russia did not intend to 
intervene in Georgia’s internal affairs, though simultaneously sending an ultimatum to 
Georgia to refrain from using coercive power against Abkhazia.281 In the same vein, the 
following month the Russian Black Sea Fleet conducted exercises in the international waters 
off the Georgian and Abkhazian coast. As the analyst Irina Isakova highlighted, “Russia’s 
intention was also to prevent a possible blockade of the Abkhazian coast by the Georgian 
coast guard with potential political or practical assistance from Turkey and the US.”282  
 Although the official Russian rhetoric was that the Russian Federation acknowledged 
and supported the territorial integrity of Georgia and that the conflicts should be resolved by 
political means, rather than coercive force, it has preserved its links with the Abkhaz and 
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Ossetian paramilitary troops. Besides, it has continued to supply considerable military aid to 
the regions paving the way for their extensive militarization.283 Furthermore, as Dov Lynch 
points out “many officials holding positions in the in the separatist regions are retired 
Russian military or security officers.”284  
 Additionally significant, Russia has been instrumental in the continued-existence of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as it attempted to financially restructure and economically 
reintegrate the regions. The infrastructure of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia were harshly 
destroyed following the wars of early 1990s. As analyst S. Markedonov points out without the 
Russian assistance, “the region would have suffered the same fate as the Republic of Serbijan 
Krajina… that was ultimately reintegrated back into Croatia.”285 To begin with, across the 
Russian border with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, there has emerged lucrative trade on a 
variety of goods, including petrol and gas, available to markets in Sukhum(i) and Tskhinvali. 
Especially, the commercial links between these de facto states and Russia’s North Caucasus 
have been strengthened dramatically, contributing to the regions’ economic integration. 
Besides, the regions have gradually begun to draw in Russian private investors and 
companies. In this regard, Abkhazia has been more appealing than South Ossetia , due to its 
strategic port, natural resources and tropical climate, attracting the construction of new resort 
complexes and the re-establishment of industrial enterprises.286  
 Besides, part of the Russian strategy in the regions has been the establishment of 
direct transportation and communication links. Particularly, for Abkhazia resuming the 
railway link between Sukhum(i) and the Russian border was of great significance. With the 
reopening of this railway line in December 2002, as well as with the introduction of ferry 
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transportation, it has become much easier for Abkhazians and Russians to travel and to trade 
along the common borders. Equally important, Russia began to contribute to the regions’ 
development through financial assistance, such as paying for the pensions of some thousands 
of residents.287 Highly integrated into Russian economic and financial structure, Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia have begun to use the Russian ruble, rather than the Georgian lari.  
 It is significant to mention here that Russia had been a signatory to the CIS Treaty on 
Abkhaz Sanctions in 1996 and had imposed an economic blockade on Abkhazia. Yet, in the 
following years Russian officials had turned a blind eye to the increasing trade between 
Russia and Abkhazia until Russia lifted all the sanctions in March 2008, announcing its 
withdrawal from the related CIS treaty of 1996.288 The signs for this political decision were 
already apparent in 2004 when Putin stated, “we think that an economic blockade, not to 
mention military pressure, do not result in resolving problems”289  
 In addition, Russian approach towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia involved an 
extensive passportization policy, solidifying these separatist regions’ existing reliance on 
Russia.  Since the end of 1990s, Moscow has issued passports to Abkhazian and South 
Ossetian residents in place of their former Soviet period travel certificates. 290 Even more 
interestingly, in December 2000, Russia put in force a visa regime towards Georgia, imposing 
visa requirements on Georgians crossing the Russian border.291 However, these visa 
requirements did not apply to Abkhazians and South Ossetians, who were already enjoying 
special privileges in traveling to and from Russian Federation. Eventually, ethnic Abkhazians 
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and Ossetians, Armenians, Russians and other non-Georgians living on these two territories 
assumed Russian citizenship, turning both “regions’ de facto dependence on Russia into a 
quasi de jure status.”292 It is claimed that an estimated 70 percent of Abkhaz and South 
Ossetian populations have become citizens of the Russian Federation.293 A Russian passport 
has enabled the residents in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to cross the Russian frontiers freely 
and gives them a chance to get education or job in North Ossetia or other parts of the 
Federation. Additionally, the passportization policy has provided additional leverage to 
Russia to interfere on Georgian soil. Eager to secure the safety and interests of these ‘Russian 
citizens’, Russia has repeatedly threatened Georgia to intervene into these regions’ affairs and 
to guard them in case of a Georgian attack.294  
 g. Russian Peacekeeping Activities 
 Peacekeeping has been a crucial instrument for Russian policy towards the conflict 
zones within the external territorial frontiers of the CIS, particularly in the 1990s due to the 
emerging environment of insecurity and uncertainty following the collapse of the SU and the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Both conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia raged on 
Russia’s borders elevating Moscow’s anxiety regarding the region’s safety and stability, most 
notably of the North Caucasus. Fearing that Georgia would completely lose the control of its 
borders, it felt obliged to take responsibility for ending the hostilities in both of the territories.  
 The direct involvement of Russian troops even before the ceasefire agreement reflects 
the reality that Russia had a stronger incentive than any other state to do so. In this vein, 
                                                 
292  Hill (2003)  
293 The majority of Abkhaz and South Ossetian  populations have indeed ‘dual citizenship’, Russian, as well as 
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294 .  In response to Russia’s statements “on its intention to protect its citizens in South Ossetia and Abkhazia”, 
Saakashvili in stated that it was Georgia’s obligation and right to protect its citizens living on the Georgian soil. 
“Saakashvili says it is up to Georgia to protect its citizens,” RIA Novosti, 16 February 2008 from 
http://en.rian.ru/world   
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Russia was instrumental in the signing of the ceasefires in early 1990s, which conditioned 
Russian peacekeeping forces to permanently station in the breakaway enclaves, creating a 
buffer zone between the warring factions. Specifically, in South Ossetia, the Sochi Ceasefire 
agreement had foreseen the deployment of JPKF, which consisted of battalions from four 
parties: Russian, North Ossetian, South Ossetian and Georgian. Besides, in Abkhazia the 
1994 Moscow agreement had announced the deployment of CIS peacekeeping forces along 
the Inguri River, the borderline between Georgia and Abkhazian controlled territories.. In 
particular, the CIS peacekeeping forces deployed in Abkhazia have been in practice under 
nominal Russian control, composing of originally around 3,000 troops converted from already 
existing Russian troops in Abkhazia. These troops had been heavily pro-Abkhaz oriented and 
in fact they had fought on the side of the Abkhazians during the war, one example being the 
Armenian Marshall Bagramion battalion.295 In the same way, Russia has had an upper hand 
over the peacekeeping activities in South Ossetia since the commander of JPKF has always 
been of Russian nationality. Consequently, despite the CIS and JPKF cover, Russia has 
achieved to retain its dominance over the regions’ peacekeeping operations.   
 Russia’s strategy to form its peacekeeping forces in the conflict zones had been 
shaped both by the instability in North Caucasus heightened by the Chechen conflict and 
Shevardnadze’s willingness to cooperate with Russia.296 Concurrently, Russia had grasped the 
opportunity to strengthen its influence over Georgia and its separatist regions, using 
peacekeeping activities as “an instrument for hegemonic re-engagement”297. Eventually, 
Russia has maintained a balance between its interests concerning both domestic security and 
foreign policy. Georgia had also voiced a preference for Russian peacekeeping, in order to 
restore its territorial integrity and to ensure the safe return of Georgian IDPs. On the other 
hand, Abkhazia and South Ossetia believed that Russia would be a safeguard against a 
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Georgian military attack, maintaining the status quo ante “in circumstances propitious for the 
preservation of” their independence.298  Although their expectations were contradictory, the 
resulting situation was apparently desirable for all the parties involved from the vantage point 
of 1993.   
 Although in the period of 1996-2000, Russian military forces abstained from 
expanding their tasks in the security zone faced with the high costs of providing unilateral 
peacekeeping operations in the region,299 after Putin came to power in 2000, Russia became 
even more eager to advance its hegemony in the pursuit of wider strategic interests. 
Consequently, the Russian strategy in the South Caucasus has been more unilateral and heavy 
handed. Recently, Russia has begun to articulate its support for the breakaway enclaves 
explicitly, threatening not only the other external actors, but also Georgia to not intervene in 
their affairs. As noted before, the international security organizations, notably the UN and 
OSCE, overwhelmed by a number of wars plaguing other parts of the world, neither achieved 
in controlling the conflicts in the former Soviet Union territories nor exerted enough pressure 
on Russia to refrain from unilateral acts regarding the regions in question. Although since the 
late 1990s, the external powers, particularly the US, has become more aware of their potential 
interests in these conflict zones and ultimately more willing to get involved into the disputes, 
Russia has achieved to maintain its dominant military existence within the region. 300   
 The way of conduct and the tactics of Russian peacekeeping forces in the conflict 
zones along its frontiers emphasized the unique approach of Russia to keep its military 
existence in the former Soviet territories. In contrary to the traditional peacekeeping practices, 
it has been asserted that Russian peacekeeping forces have been willing to use coercive force 
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if necessary,301 while their subjective pro-separatist stance and monopolistic position has 
undermined its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.302   
 Although Russian officials have asserted that the presence of peacekeeping forces has 
ensured the stability and peace in the conflict zones,303 Georgia has repeatedly raised criticism 
for Russia’s role as a ‘peacekeeper’. Similarly, Western politicians and analysts have raised 
questions about the ‘impartiality’ and ‘neutrality’ of Russian peacekeeping activities in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, emphasizing their failure to provide the necessary conditions for 
a final political solution. Consequently, in the last decade the Georgian government has 
sought to expel the Russian peacekeepers in the regions and rather replace them with an 
international contingent. In 2005 Georgian officials threatened Russia to terminate the 
peacekeeping deal in case Moscow continued to back the separatist elements in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia.304 Despite the rejection of the accusations by the Russian commander of JPKF 
and Russian Foreign Ministry, in June 2006 Georgia blamed Russia for deploying forces in 
South Ossetia exceeding the predetermined quota.305 Finally, by a decree signed by Georgian 
Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze in 27 August 2008, Georgia has declared the 1994 Moscow 
Agreement void, concluding all Russian peacekeeping operations in its territory.306  
 On the other hand, ethnic Abkhazians, Ossetians, as well as other non-Georgian 
minorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been supportive of the continued existence of 
Russian peacekeeping activities.307 In their letter to Russian State Duma in February 10 2004, 
the heads of political parties and non-governmental organizations of the non-recognized 
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Republic of Abkhazia emphasized that “the presence of the peacekeeping contingent, 
consisting of Russian servicemen ... helps preserve stability in the region and prevents the 
renewal of military actions.”308 Similarly, South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity rejected 
the replacement of Russian-led peacekeeper contingent with an international one.309 
 h. Evaluating Russia’s Role: a Peace Spoiler?   
   Although the short-term Russian strategies have resembled erratic and sporadic 
behaviors, in hindsight it is noteworthy that Russia’s foremost long-term objective in the 
region has been to provide security in North Caucasus and to consolidate supremacy vis-à-vis 
miscellaneous external powers, in pursuit of its wider military strategic interests over its 
traditional sphere of influence. To elaborate, considering its historical ties with the former 
Soviet regions, Russia has aimed to remain as the leading figure of their new political and 
economic lives. Adhering to its primary intentions, Russia has played an immense role in the 
context of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has secured its exclusively 
hegemonic position in their resolution processes. Yet, contrary to its responsibility as an 
arbiter and a peacekeeper, Russia has exhibited no inclination towards the settlement of the 
conflicts, but rather has actively supported the de facto states. That is to say, Russia’s role has 
been highly intertwined with the region’s conflicts and its ‘spoiling’ attitude has greatly 
contributed to their prolongation.  
 Russian policies were overtly or covertly designed to provide substantial political and 
financial support for Abkhazian and South Ossetian de facto states. Without a doubt, Russia 
has been the main contributor for the subsistence of these regions. Holding Russian passports, 
speaking Russian as their ‘second language’, as well as using Russian ruble, the 
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overwhelming majority of the local Abkhazian and Ossetian residents have been highly 
integrated into Russian realm. Additionally significant, the Duma’s sympathy, together with 
the North Caucasian peoples’ empathy for these breakaway enclaves has also played a 
prominent role in shifting Russia’s attitude in favor of the Georgia’s separatist regions. Since 
the end of 1990s, Russia has chosen to back Abkhazia and South Ossetia in expense of its 
relationship with Georgia, ultimately fortifying the determination of these regimes to sustain 
their de facto independence. Moscow has not only tolerated various forms of financial aid and 
economic cooperation with these breakaway enclaves, but also has aimed to de facto absorb 
the regions through improved transportation and communication links. Eventually, South 
Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities have held on Moscow as protector of their fragile status 
and indeed have begun to formally seek a level of associate relations with Russia.  
 On the other side, harboring the belief that Russia has orchestrated and maintained the 
separatist conflicts, Georgia has sought to extend the other external actors’ involvement in its 
security affairs and internationalize the peacekeeping contingents. Faced with Georgia’s 
increasing Western orientation and United States’ rising interest in the region, Russia has 
been further determined to use the existence of Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts as a 
means of pressure against Georgia, limiting Tbilisi’s freedom of maneuver in its domestic 
policies. Aside to this, the conflicts’ prolongation has proven to be lucrative for Russia’s 
military and strategic interests. In the absence of international commitment, Russia had taken 
the sole responsibility for authorizing the peacekeeping operations. Undoubtedly, Russia has 
desired to use its peacekeeping activities and its mediator role within the on-going 
negotiations as a mean to advance its strategic interests, sustaining an active role for 
controlling the conflicts, as well as the regions. Lingering its exclusive role in these conflicts’ 
peace processes, as well as its military existence within Georgia and its separatist regions, 
Russia has gained an upper hand over South Caucasus’s security mechanism. In this light, one 
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can easily suggest that the prolongation of Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts have 
grained a deal of advantages for Moscow. Hence, Georgia’s separatist regions have remained 
within its vital sphere of interest. 
 Russia has long been aware that the favorable circumstances serving to its long-term 
security demands could only be sustained if the standstill in these conflicts persisted. Without 
a doubt, Russia’s role has solidified the survival of these entities as de facto states, as well as 
has been part of the causal explanation for the stagnation of the peace processes. Moscow still 
holds its monopoly over the peacekeeping operations. Despite the CIS and JPKF cover that 
was initially used to justify its peacekeeping activities, Russia has failed to retain a semblance 
of neutrality in the conflict zones. It holds true that Russia has been unable to fulfill its task as 
an efficient mediator. Despite its military existence and diplomatic weight, Moscow has not 
been willing to pressure the conflicting sides to take steps towards a final political solution. 
 Apparently, Russia has contributed very little to putting an end to the hostilities in the 
regions, but to a large extent to the continuation of the conflicts and maintenance of the 
standoff in the on-going peace processes. Aiming to preserve its longstanding obligations and 
strategic interests, Russia has acted as a ‘peace spoiler’, further impeding the resolution of the 
conflicts. In brief, Russia’s this ‘spoiling’ attitude can be solely explained by its desire to 
benefit from the conditions arising by the perpetuation of the conflicts, since it has been eager 
to use the existence of the conflicts as a tool to keep its military presence and dominant 
political role in the region and as a  bargaining chip against Georgia.  
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 5.2.2 The Role of the United States and NATO   
 The United States’ involvement into the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has 
been indirect, yet considerably significant. Although the US has never taken the role of a 
major ‘mediator’ in the conflict resolution process, it has been an inalienable part of the 
mechanisms of UN, OSCE and FoG. Its great significance within the international 
organizations, combined with its support for the concurring principle of inviolability of state 
borders has been clearly intimidating for the de facto authorities. In addition, its military and 
economic cooperation with Georgia has been interpreted by Sukhum(i) and Tskhinvali as a 
threat for their lasting control over their regions. Besides, Russia has viewed increasing US 
involvement in Georgian affairs as an impediment to its interests not only within the conflict 
zones, but also within the wider security complex of the South Caucasus.  
 The expansion of US’s influence over the regions has been mainly through the 
Washington-led NATO, which has increasingly concentrated its attention in Georgia, 
primarily due to its proximity to zones with wider security concerns. The developing ties 
between Georgia and the Euro-Atlantic Alliance have been based on mutual benefits. Being 
discontent with the miniscule roles of OSCE and UN within Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
Georgia has begun to look more towards the US and NATO to mediate its local conflicts and 
to internationalize Russian peacekeeping contingents in the conflict zones.310 Moreover, from 
the Georgian perspective, they have been the sole potential challengers against the Russian 
hegemonic position within its territory, as well as within South Caucasus boundaries.  
  In 1990s, the US, as well as other Western European countries had considered the 
security matters within Georgia peripherally, dealing with them with apathy.311 Following the 
11th September attacks in 2001, eager to combat with the terrorist groups ranging from Middle 
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East to Caucasus, the US introduced its military into Georgia in order to assist Tbilisi in its 
operations to control cross-border movements in Pankisi Gorge, as well as to train and equip 
the Georgian army.312 In addition to its military support, in 2005 US government’s assistance 
to Georgia on a variety of spheres, reached up to 160 million USD, combined with the US 
humanitarian program and USAID that shipped and distributed to Georgia humanitarian 
commodities.313 In September 2005, the US government included Georgia into the 
Millennium Challenge project, providing Georgia with 295.3 million USD over five years in 
order to improve regional development, economic infrastructure and particularly the 
agribusinesses in Georgia.314 Most importantly, US began to broaden its diplomatic 
appearance in the Georgian security issues, including its separatist conflicts, enthusiastically 
backing Georgian demands for territorial solidarity.  
 Svante Cornell claims that Georgia, located in the middle of the West-East axis, 
ranging from US to Uzbekistan and North-South axis consisting of Russia, Armenia and Iran, 
has been a central actor in the competition between these rival sides.315  Although the 
alliances have not been so rigidly formed, he correctly points out that Georgia has been a 
focal transit zone for the US to access the rich oil and natural gas resources in the Caspian 
Basin and Central Asia and a strategically significant region for US’s security-based 
aspirations. Consequently, the US has begun to pursue more active involvement in Georgia’s 
security issues, as well as more diplomatic appearances in the peace settlements of the 
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Apparently, the US has been eager to solve these 
issues in favor of Georgia, aiming to provide the stability in the region and eventually 
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securing the multi-billion dollar US backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.316 On the 
other side, Washington’s increasing support for Georgia has alarmed Russia, accentuating the 
fragility of the relations between the two states over the region. Although over the last decade 
there have been developments towards a Russia-West rapprochement, as well as for NATO’s 
and US’s cooperation with Russia for the advance of a peaceful settlement of the conflicts, the 
symbolic rivalry between US and Russia over the sphere of influence in South Caucasus has 
continued to prevail.317 Ultimately, any kind of US or NATO involvement has been perceived 
by Russia as a threat to its strategic interests, as well as to its leading role in the conflict 
zones.  
 Additionally significant, throughout the last decade Georgia has increasingly become 
Western oriented because of its desire to adapt Western values and to integrate its economy to 
the Western framework. It also urgently needed to diversify its external sources of support, 
facing with a firm and dominant Russian posture. In this respect, Georgia’s interest in US and 
in the NATO began in the period of President Shevardnadze, who was greatly advocating the 
expansion of NATO in the South Caucasus and who took the initiatives to deepen Georgia’s 
relations with US, NATO and its member states, such as Turkey and Germany.318 After 
Georgia’s incumbent foreign minister Chikvaidze signed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
programme in 1994, Georgia increasingly became an active participant of the program, 
building up bilateral cooperation with NATO. Shevardnadze’s Western-oriented policies have 
been inherited by his successor Saakashvili, who has been even more eager to develop fruitful 
and close cooperation with the US and NATO.  In line with this, Georgia agreed to develop 
an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP in October 2004), with the aim of joining 
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NATO, as well as signed numerous agreements with the US on military and economic 
cooperation.319  
Particularly, Saakashvili has believed that the greater the involvement of the US and 
NATO, the greater will Georgia’s advantages be regarding its long-standing conflicts, as well 
as its country-wise development. On the other side, Abkhazians and Ossetians have feared 
that US’s cooperation with Georgia would provide it with the strength and determination to 
seek military means in the resolution of the conflicts. From their perspective, the involvement 
of pro-Georgian US in the conflicts, will be threatening for their continuing existence, 
diminishing Russia’s role as the patron state.  
 Many analysts and scholars have argued that the Euro-Atlantic community should be 
more actively involved, assuming direct and widespread responsibilities for conflict 
resolution in the regions and contributing to the internationalization of the peace process, as 
well as the peacekeeping contingents.320 However, as long as the key players, the separatist 
authorities and Russia, remain deeply suspicious about US and NATO’s increasing 
involvement in Georgia, it remains a distant prospect for them to play a vital role in the 
conflict resolution processes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Though, they will certainly 
continue to shape the future of the region ‘indirectly’.  
 5.2.3 The Role of the International Organizations: UN and OSCE 
 The involvement of the international community in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
conflicts has been predominantly through international organizations, most notably the UN 
and OSCE. In the case of South Ossetia, the OSCE and in the case of Abkhazia the UN have 
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been one of the main custodians of the peace process on the basis of the signed agreements 
between a group of states consisting of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany 
and Russia, the so-called ‘Group of Friends of the UN Secretary General on Georgia’ 
(FoG).321 In Abkhazia, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was 
established in August 1993 “to verify the compliance with the ceasefire agreement between 
the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities in Georgia.”322  Its most significant 
missions have been to monitor the CIS peacekeeping forces and contribute to the 
demilitarization of the conflict zones. On the other side, the OSCE has maintained a presence 
within South Ossetia since the 1993 ceasefire, in order to promote a comprehensive peace 
settlement and to monitor the activities of JPKF and the Georgian government. Besides, it 
funded development projects, such as the recent Economic Rehabilitation Program in South 
Ossetia.323  
 It is important to mention that originally neither the UN nor OSCE were interested in 
becoming keenly involved in the post-Soviet space, being preoccupied with conflicts 
elsewhere in the world. However, as the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia evolved 
from local conflicts in remote and isolated parts of the world into widely-known with 
international significance, these security organizations have begun to pursue a more active 
role, allocating more resources for the settlement of the conflicts. Their increasing 
involvement has been particularly encouraged by the West, which desired to counterbalance 
the prevailing position of Russia. Nonetheless, comprised of not more than 200 unarmed 
military observers, UN and OSCE have been, in the words of Vladimir Socor, ‘passive 
bystanders’ due to their failure to acquire an effective role in the promotion of conflict 
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resolution.324 Both the UNOMIG and OSCE Mission in South Ossetia were heavily 
dependent on Moscow’s consent, since Russia, as a participatory state of FoG and a 
permanent member of SC, was holding the right to veto the expansion of their mandates. 
Consecutively, the poor handling of the disputes have been in part due to their reluctance and 
inability to pressure Tskhinvali and Sukhum(i),325 and in part due to Russia’s heavy-handed 
manipulation of the conflicts in order to sustain its hegemonic pose.  
 Equally significant, the UN has pursued the role of a ‘mediator’ in both cases over the 
last decade.  Although in the early 1990s, the UN had minimal presence in the regions, after 
the mid-1990s the special representatives of the UN secretary generals began to organize 
meetings and host delegations from both Georgia and the separatist states. They have 
launched negotiation talks between opposing parties under UN auspices and have issued 
numerous resolution and peace proposals. Regrettably, the UN has constantly failed to be 
successful in the mediation of the conflicts. This was not only because its leading role has 
been challenged by Russia, but also because it was unable to gain the trust of the separatist 
authorities, which firmly believed that, the UN had taken a pro-Georgian stance since the very 
beginning. To explore more, a number of independent analysts and Abkhaz and Ossetian 
politicians have claimed that the UN has not addressed their concerns, failing to treat the 
separatist regions in equal positions with Georgia.326 Indeed, the UN was accused by Abkhaz 
historian and influential political figure Lakoba “to preserve the Stalinist pattern of dividing 
peoples into ranks.”327 
  To begin with, all UN resolutions have called for the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of Georgia, undermining any possible political solution on the basis of a right to 
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self-determination, taking a rigidly pro-Georgian stance.328 On the other side, the separatist 
authorities repeatedly rejected to discuss any possible solution for their political statuses that 
would incorporate them into a Georgian framework, rendering UN resolutions increasingly 
pointless.329 One other problem has been that the separatist regions have lacked direct access 
to these international security mechanisms, since they have not been considered to be 
sovereign states. Still, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia continued to participate in the on-
going negotiations, not because they believed that UN mediation would contribute in the 
conflict resolution, because they viewed using international intervention as a source of 
legitimacy for their authority over the regions, as well as a source of humanitarian aid.  
 Additionally, it was not only Abkhazian and Ossetian authorities expressing 
discontent for OSCE’s and UN’s involvement in the conflict settlements, but also Georgians, 
though obviously for different reasons. Georgian officials were not satisfied with their tiny 
roles within the regions, thus constantly demanded the expansion of their functions.330 
Particularly, Saakashvili’s desire has been to internationalize the conflicts and to eliminate the 
“exclusive role for Russia as a guarantor of peace in the regions,” presenting Russia as a 
threat to the new world order.331  
 To sum up, the UN and OSCE could succeed neither in promoting a mutually 
acceptable solution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia nor in preventing the heavy militarization 
of the conflict zones. Preoccupied with protecting the norm of territorial integrity, the UN and 
OSCE have failed to express the aspirations of these separatist regions, considering them 
principally ‘illegitimate’. The pro-Georgian stance of these international organizations 
eventually drove the separatist regions deeper into Russia’s embrace, giving Kremlin the 
                                                 
328 For some examples see UN Security Council S/1996/165, S/1999/813 and  S/2002/1393 from the website 
http://www.un.org/documents/scres.html.  
329 Coppieters (2004) 
330 Lynch (2006), p. 14  
331 Markedonov (4 September 2008) 
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chance to hold the upper hand both in negotiation talks and in peacekeeping operations within 
the conflict zones.  
 5.2.4 International Law and Debates over Kosovo 
 The debate over international legal principles has been one of the core elements of the 
negotiations between Georgia and its separatist regions, revealing contradictory arguments 
and incompatible demands. While Abkhazia and South Ossetia invoke the right to self-
determination and seek international recognition, Georgia claims that they do not qualify for 
independence according to UN principles. The UN resolutions on these two cases have 
supported Georgian claims, taking a clear stand in favor of the principle of territorial integrity 
over self-determination. Though UN proposals have been considered the most significant and 
legitimate basis for the peace settlement, the international law has been generally open to 
confusion and controversy. Furthermore, the fact that Kosovo, an ex-de facto state, has 
achieved wide international recognition, heated the global atmosphere. Accentuating the 
rivalry between the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination, the debates over 
Kosovo have split the international community into two.  
 Although both have been fixed as the general and basic principles of international law, 
particularly the principle of territorial integrity has overridden the principle of right to self-
determination in general international practice.332 However, during the course of time there 
                                                 
332 In the post-WW 2 period, there have been introduced many international documents on the subject of the 
rights of nations to self-determination. For instance, Article 1 and Article 55 of UN Charter, the backbone of the 
international law, called for “respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” (for the 
full text of the UN Charter http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter) whereas Common Article 1 of the twin 
International Covenants on Human Rights of 1966 declared that all peoples, not just the inhabitants of colonies 
had the right “to determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development”. For the full text of 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see 
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html and for the full text of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights see http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm)  However, these legal texts were not explicitly 
referring to the right to secede. Equally important, the Declaration on Friendship, 1970 and the Vienna 
Declaration of 1993 have put a ‘safe-guard clause’ for the territorial integrity of states, declaring that the right to 
self-determination shall not “be constructed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of Peoples and 
thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of 
 123 
have been some notable exceptions in which the international community has supported 
secession on the grounds of self-determination “with the proviso that boundaries could be 
changed by peaceful means and by agreement.”333 Still though, in general it has championed 
the principle of territorial integrity due the fear of global instability.334 
 On the other side, the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
interpret the national self-determination principle as the inalienable right to establish 
sovereignty over the territories they control, which they consider their historic homelands. 
Thus, they bring out debates over the right to claim independence over a territory, which lies 
within the boundaries of another state. However, the UN SC resolutions unambiguously have 
acknowledged the Georgian territorial integrity, adhering to the concurring principle of 
inviolability of state borders.335 Yet, as an Abkhaz scholar expresses, the separatist regions in 
Georgia have the “growing confidence that many nations will achieve independence in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
any kind (as to race, creed or color” See  Crawford, J. (2006). The Creation of States in International Law, (2nd 
ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. pg. 417-418) For the full text of the ‘Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations’ adopted in 24 October 1970 see 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdf?OpenElement and for the 
full text of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en. Similarly, the Helsinki Act of 1975 
constraints the right to self-determination with conformity with the principle of territorial integrity of states in an 
attempt to avoid conflict between them. For the full text of the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference 
http://www.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html#H4.3.  
333 Dudwick, N. (1996). “Nagorno-Karabakh and the Politics of Sovereignty,” in R. G. Suny (rev. ed.), 
Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, (pp. 
427-440). The University of Michigan Press, p. 492.  
334 Indeed, the political self-determination has been achieved very rarely in the post-de-colonization period, 
Bangladesh being the only clear-cut example. See Crawford (2006), p. 391-393. It is worth noting that even 
Bangladesh was admitted into UN after Pakistani government allowed it to do so. For instance, the union-
republics of the multi-ethnic federations of Yugoslavia and SU, achieved independence, not through ‘unilateral 
secession, but dissolution’, since the predecessor federal states as a whole ceased to exist.(See Crawford, (2006), 
p. 390) In the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the divorce was arranged in a peaceful manner, with the 
consent of the two separating states whereas Eritrea could not achieve international recognition until it was 
actually supported by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, its home state.  
335 For  UN Security Council resolutions on the issue of Abkhazia calling for ‘respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Georgia see S/RES/1752 (2007), S/RES /1716 (2006), S/RES/1615 (2005), S/RES/1554 
(2004), S/RES/1494 (2003), S/RES/1427 (2002), S/RES/1393 (2002), S/RES/1364 (2001), S/RES/1225 (1999), 
S/RES/1187 (1998), S/RES/1124 (1997), S/RES/1065 (1996), S/RES/971 (1995), S/RES/937 1994), S/RES/934 
(1994), S/RES/ 892 (1993), S/RES/876 (1993), S/RES/858 (1993), S/RES/ 849 (1993)) 
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future and a large number of new independent states will be formed.”336 This confidence has 
been further elevated with the developments in Kosovo since February 2008.  
 The recognition of Kosovo by more than 60 countries in a very short period of time 
after its unilateral declaration of independence has brought the issues of ‘self-determination’ 
and ‘territorial integrity’ on the top of the international agenda, raising concerns its probable 
worldwide repercussions. Particularly, being the second example of successful secession after 
Bangladesh, Kosovo’s new status as a widely-recognized state has fuelled heated debates 
around whether or not it would set a precedent for the other de facto states, seeking 
recognition.337 It was definitely not a coincidence that within three weeks after Kosovo’s 
declaration, South Ossetia and Abkhazia called for their own international recognition.338 
Being by-products of communist multi-ethnic federations, neither Kosovo nor Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia had been granted independence following the breakdown of their federal 
centers, since at the time only the union-republics, which were considered to be the ‘first-
level’ administrations, were allowed de jure status. Hence, the developments in Kosovo have 
encouraged Abkhazia and South Ossetia, increasing their determination to perpetuate their de 
facto status in search for international recognition.  
 Besides, the fact that 62 countries, including 23 EU members, have recognized the 
unilateral declaration of Kosovo has divided the international community, revealing the 
inconsistency of the international law and the way states interpret it. Particularly, the US, 
enthusiastically sponsored Kosovo’s independence, but paradoxically has continued to 
support Georgia’s territorial integrity. On the other hand, Russia, condemning the 
international community for backing Kosovo’s secession, declared to recognize the sovereign 
                                                 
336 Adzhindzhal, E. K.  (2007)- Abkhazia’s Liberation and International Law, (The Public Fund for Science in 
Abkhazia), Sukhum from http://www.circassianworld.com/Abkhazia_Liberation.html 
337 Though accepting that many parallel ties might be drawn between Kosovo and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
this paper does not come up with a final answer to the level of Kosovo’s precedence for these two cases. 
338 “Abkhazia Calls for International Recognition”, 7 March 2008, www.civil.ge/eng,  and “Georgia: South 
Ossetia Cites Kosovo 'Precedent' In Call For International Recognition”, 5 March 2008, www.rferl.org 
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state statuses of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These two examples clearly have demonstrated 
how international legal principles might be utilized for biased political approaches.  
 International law, being a doctrine introduced in the 20th century has developed over 
years as a consequence of the evolving trends in world politics. Indeed, the history of the 
international principles on self-determination and territorial integrity became parallel to the 
trajectory of Western political thinking. 339 In other words, these legal norms have largely 
been constructed and formulated by the Western political leaders in a structure favoring the 
permanence- or at least stability- of their regimes. In the Abkhazian and South Ossetian cases, 
the international community has been predominantly reluctant to recognize them, believing 
that it would destabilize the whole region. However, the on-going ambiguity within the 
international law has opened a window of opportunity for these de facto states to increase 
their activities towards full sovereignty from Georgia, citing the Kosovo ‘precedent’ and 
gaining Russia’s support as well as its diplomatic recognition. In other words, inconsistency 
in the approaches of the international community has served to entrench the existence of these 
de facto state-lets, ultimately adding to their uncompromising stance in the peace process. 
                                                 
339 Gottlieb, G. (1993), Nation against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of 
Sovereignty, New York: Council on Foreign Affairs, p. 14.  
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6. The Evolving Dynamics after the 2008 Georgian-Russian War  
 The ‘five-day’ war between Russia and Georgia in early August 2008 that initiated 
with the eruption of the conflict in South Ossetia and ended with fierce fighting as Russian 
troops entered into Georgian territory, has placed itself in the historical scene of the South 
Caucasus as the most significant event of the new millennium. As the Georgian analyst Ghia 
Nodia put into words, “the war was unexpected and anticipated at the same time”.340 Since 
2006, Russia and the separatist regions on one side and Georgia on the other had repeatedly 
got involved in activities that were intentionally designed to provoke each other, ripening 
conditions for escalation. Although many analysts had warned months before the war about 
the danger of ensuing violence in one of the Georgia’s breakaway enclaves,341 it still came as 
a surprise. Russia, contrary to its previous attitude, was directly involved in the conflict. What 
was even more unexpected was the rapidity and intensity of the Russian response.  
 Although in retrospect the allegations over which party initiated the first deployment 
of troops remain contradictory,342 one thing has been for certain that Russia has easily had a 
military victory, with severe consequences for Georgia. The most important outcome of the 
war was that with the Georgian defeat, the already fragile status quo in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia has finally collapsed. To refresh, status-quo refers in this essay to the status of the de 
facto states that remained persistent as the conflict resolution process failed to progress or to 
the lack of major attempts, at least successful ones, to shift the balance of power in favor of 
one side. Yet, unpredictably, this short, but sharp war has had far-reaching implications for 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, bringing out immense changes in the regions’ dynamics and 
                                                 
340 Nodia, G. (2008, 15 August), “The war for Georgia: Russia, the west, the future”, OpenDemocracy, 
www.opendemocracy.net) 
341 For instance, see Special Report of Centre for Eastern Studies (CES) “Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-
Karabakh: unfrozen conflicts between Russia and the West” published in  9 July 2008. 
342 For a detailed discussion on the Russia’s official claims justifying its the intervention and Georgian counter-
claims see Allison, R. (2008). “Russia resurgent? Moscow’s campaign to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’”, 
International Affairs, 84:6, pp. 1151-1155.  
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transforming the course of the conflicts to a new phase. It also had implications for global 
politics, as it portrayed the new rules of the geopolitical game in the region. 
 To begin with, the renewed violence came with a huge number of human losses and 
psychological and moral depression, adding up to the hostility and deep mistrust already 
imprinted in the memories and perceptions of the populations in the region. The opposing 
sides have constantly accused each other for the outbreak of the fighting and the humanitarian 
crisis, with the aim to justify their moves and actions. Consequently, the level of credibility 
between the separatist regions and Georgia has diminished even further, wiping out all the 
international efforts to build confidence between the adversary sides. Besides,  
Saakashvili’s menacing attitude has increased Abkhazian and South Ossetian determination to 
remain separated from Georgia. In such a highly insecuritized environment, the possible 
prospects for a mutual compromise seem to have been dashed, weightily impeding the 
peaceful resolution of the conflicts at least in the foreseeable future. 
 Second and perhaps most significantly, the August war that ended with the Georgian 
defeat has evaporated the hopes in Georgia to reintegrate Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
terminating President Saakashvili’s project of ‘hearts and minds’. After coming to power, 
Saakashvili’s main objective has been to change the context of the conflicts gradually in favor 
of Georgia. In this vein, it is easy to judge in hindsight that when the crisis erupted in South 
Ossetia, Georgia was ready to take firm actions to re-annex the separatist territories, altering 
the status quo to a large extent. Ironically, after the war the status quo has shifted greatly, but 
not in line with Georgian expectations since the latest developments have almost completely 
disseminated the likelihood for the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity.  
 Third, the Georgian defeat yielded an immediate impact on the domestic political 
dynamics in Georgia as opposition to Saakashvili’s regime grew considerably, mainly due to 
his poor handling of the war. For instance, in November 2008 thousands attended anti-
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governmental protests, illustrating the rapidly shrinking support for Saakashvili.343 Combined 
with the global financial crisis which deteriorated Georgia’s foreign investment conditions, 
Saakashvili’s increasingly authoritarian attitude have provided a platform for social 
dissatisfaction.344 Yet, as International Crisis Group’s report in November asserts 
Saakashvili’s seat has remained secure, at least temporarily, since Russia’s recognition of the 
breakaway enclaves has redirected public discontent towards Moscow.345  
 Fourth, the catastrophic war revealed the weakness of the Georgian armed forces and 
its inability to settle its separatist conflicts, raising questions over its eligibility for NATO 
membership. Georgia had long aimed to reintegrate its separatist regions to clear off the way 
to the desired membership in NATO; however with the defeat in August, Georgia’s chances 
for accession have been substantially weakened.346 Expectedly, in the NATO ministerial 
meeting on 2 December, the proposal for Georgia to be included in Membership Action Plan 
(MAP) was rejected, yet the foreign ministers reconfirmed Georgia’s eventual membership.347 
Arguably, Georgia is likely to remain for long at the doorstep of NATO, as it has failed to 
resolve its separatist conflicts peacefully. It is also noteworthy that if Georgia is granted 
membership, NATO might come to a direct confrontation with Russia in conformity with the 
Article 5 of its Treaty, which obliges all member states to fight on the side of one member. 
However, this seems very unlikely given the high risks of such an act for NATO, as well as 
the re-warming of relations between Russia and NATO in recent months.348  
 Fifth, Georgia’s irritation with Russia’s role in Abkhazia and South Ossetia has 
reached its climax. Georgia has long been frustrated with Russia’s involvement in its 
                                                 
343 Vartanyan, O. & Schwirtz, M. “Protesters Condemn President of Georgia”, November 7, 2008) 
344 “Georgia: The Risks of Winter,” International Crisis Group Europe Briefing, no: 151, 26 November 2008. 
345 Ibid.  
346 Foley, C. (2008, 17 December).“Keeping Watch in Georgia”, guardian.co.uk. 
347 NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated that the accession process would continue under the 
auspices of NATO-Georgian Commission (NGC), which was established after the war. See “US Softens Stance 
on Russia at NATO Summit”, NYTimes, December 2, 2008 and http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-
georgia/index.html) 
348 http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm 
 129 
conflicts, believing it to be the main obstacle for their settlement. In this light, it had aimed to 
show to the West that its conflict was actually with Russia, not with Abkhazia or South 
Ossetia, raising suspicion over Russia’s expansionist policy in South Caucasus. Witnessing 
the realization of its fears with Russia’s direct participation in the war, Georgia has ultimately 
demonized Russia, labeling it as its number one national threat. After formally cutting their 
diplomatic ties after the war, Georgia and Russia have not yet normalized their bilateral 
relations, demonstrating the unprecedented level of mutual hostility.349  Indeed, keeping in 
line with its decision after the war, Georgia officially and finally withdrew from CIS on 18 
August 2009,350 symbolically quitting from the Russian realm over the former Soviet space.  
 Sixth, the war provided Russia with a pretext for granting recognition to Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. For more than 15 years, Moscow had avoided extending formal recognition to 
these breakaway republics, rather upholding the principle of territorial integrity with the aim 
to keep its own separatist-minded regions under its authority. Yet, on 26 August 2008, 
Russian President Medvedev announced the enclaves’ recognition, a self-proclaimed civilian 
and moral act confronting the violent manner of Georgian leadership.351 Russia’s move, 
which was highly condemned by the international community, especially by the US352 was 
interpreted in Western media as partly “retaliation for the West’s support earlier this year for 
the independence of Kosovo from Serbia.”353  
  Gaining Russia’s (besides Nicaragua’s) recognition has increased hopes in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia for achieving their ultimate aim of becoming a member in the states’ 
club. Backed by Russian support, these two breakaway state-lets have begun to seek new 
opportunities to increase their dialogue with the international community, such as the Geneva 
                                                 
349 “Georgia and Russia Cut Diplomatic Ties,”29 August 2008, NYTimes. 
350 “Georgia Finalizes Quitting CIS,” Civil Georgia, 18 August 2009.  
351 “Medvedev’s Statement on South Ossetia an Abkhazia,” 26 August 2008, NYTimes. 
352 “Bush Tells Russia not to Recognize Abkhazia, S. Ossetia”, 26 August 2008, Civil Georgia, 
http://www.civil.ge/eng), 
353 Levy, C. F. “Russia  Backs Independence of Georgian Enclaves”, 26 August 2008 ,NYTimes. 
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process, if not yet to achieve recognition.354 Moreover, Russian recognition, as acclaimed by 
Russian officials, has provided these separatist regions guarantees for protection from future 
Georgian military attacks.355 On the other hand, the informal dependency of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia on Russia has eventually become formal with the recognition. Dependence on 
Russia for years has been an alternative option for these separatist regions to the reunification 
with Georgia. After the recognition, Russia has obtained a chance to exploit resources in these 
regions, which became legal and profitable for Russians. For instance, Russia’s state-run oil 
company Rosnet has signed an agreement with Abkhazia to explore its naval oil fields.356 
Although the opposition groups particularly in Abkhazia have claimed too much dependence 
on Russia might bring negative economic consequences,357 Russia has substantially increased 
its presence in the regions after the war, extending far beyond the provision of financial aid.   
 Seventh, taking Abkhazia and South Ossetia formally under its shelter, Russia has 
sought to strengthen its military existence in the regions. Immediately after the war, Moscow 
unilaterally declared ‘additional security measures’ and established security zones adjacent to 
the South Ossetian and Abkhazian administrative borders.358 After the negotiations with EU 
in September, Russia had agreed to pull out of these buffer zones and allow the EU observers 
to sustain security in the outer lines, but however refused to withdraw from the separatist 
regions despite the requirements of the six-point ceasefire.359 Without a doubt, Russia has 
shown its reluctance to leave Abkhazia and South Ossetia, by announcing to double its troops 
in the regions, as well as by refusing to allow the EU mission to access the territories within 
them. Moscow claims that “realities have changed” after it granted them recognition.360  
                                                 
354 “Abkhazia seeks to develop contacts with intl community”- FM”, ITAR-TASS, 9 July 2009. 
355 “Russian recognition of S-Ossetia, Abkhazia guarantees absence of new attacks”, 19 May 2009.ITAR-TASS.  
356 “Abkhazia and the Perils of Independence”, June 19, 2009, RFE/RL. 
357 “Despite Russian recognition, Abkhaz prospects uncertain”, Hurriyet Daily News, July 9, 2009, 
www.hurriyetdailynews.com 
358 Allison (2008), p. 1158-1159 
359 The agreement had asked all sides to withdraw their forces to the positions they held before the war. 
360 “Russia begins finall pull-out from Georgia buffer zone”, guardian.co.uk, 8 October 2008. 
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 Furthermore, Moscow has pledged to establish military bases for the Russian troops to 
permanently settle in the regions despite Georgian protests and Western criticisms.361 Indeed, 
by October, Russia had already begun to build a garrison in South Ossetia between Tskhinvali 
and its border, designed to accommodate more than 2000 soldiers.362 According to the official 
announcements so far, Russia will not build new bases in Abkhazia, but rather will 
reconstruct the former Soviet bases in the region, the air base at Gudauta and the naval base at 
Ochamchire.363 Recognizing the administrative borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
their official frontiers, Russia has signed bilateral agreements with them on joint protection of 
the state borders, initially for a five-year term.364 Guarding these breakaway enclaves’ 
frontiers, Russia has deliberately intended to turn these regions into de facto Russian 
territories and avoid any possible Georgian move towards the regions. 
 Eighth, one of the most considerable consequences of the August war has been the 
major change in negotiation formats, as well as in the perceived role of Russia as the key 
mediator in the conflicts. Before the war, negotiations were unilaterally dictated by Russia, 
who was accepted to be the arbiter of the negotiation talks, as well as the sole peacekeeper of 
the regions since the early 1990s. UNOMIG in Abkhazia and OSCE mission in South Ossetia 
had only had a partial involvement, holding discussion in the relevant task forces and working 
groups and observing the negotiations and peacekeeping activities. Ignoring all the Georgian 
calls to change the negotiation and mediation formats and to internationalize the peacekeeping 
activities, Russia had set its foot firmly in the regions. However, after the war Russia has lost 
                                                 
361 “EU ‘Concerned’ over Russia Base Plans in Abkhazia, S. Osseia, Civil Georgia, 6 February 2009.  Before the 
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364 “Russia To Defend Abkhazia, South Ossetia Borders”, RFE/RL, March 20, 2009, and “RF, Abkhazia, S. 
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its credibility as a mediator in the eyes of the international community, proving itself to be a 
direct rather than impartial party to the conflicts.  
 Since Russia has no longer been perceived as a neutral arbiter, the international 
community has begun to seek an internationalized negotiation format. In this regard, Geneva 
talks initiated in 15 October 2008 hosted UN, OSCE and EU as the joint mediators as well as 
Russia, US and Georgia as the official partners. Before the talks, Russia declared that it would 
not attend the meeting on Abkhazia and South Ossetia if delegations from Sukhum(i) and 
Tskhinvali were not seated at the negotiation table on equal par with the other participants. 
Similarly, Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities insisted on their involvement in the 
negotiations along with Georgian and Russian delegations as the official representatives of 
their ‘states’.365 Eventually, the first round of Geneva talks failed while the next rounds were 
relatively more successful, but nevertheless after the six rounds of talks up to 1 July 2009, 
very little progress was visible.366 
 Ninth, with the new developments after the war, the role of the UN, OSCE and EU in 
the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have largely shifted since the UN and OSCE 
have ceased their monitoring operations within the regions whereas the EU emerged as the 
most significant organization in the conflict resolution process. Although the UN and OSCE 
have been involved in the new negotiation mechanism as mediators in the Geneva talks, their 
roles have shrinked considerably following Russia’s veto over the extension of their missions 
in Georgia and its separatist regions, in May and June 2009 respectively. Russian veto came 
due to arising contradiction over whether treating Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign 
                                                 
365 “Geneva Talks on Georgia Get Off to Rocky Start,”, 17 October 2008, RFE/RL. 
366 Geneva talks have so far focused on security arrangements as well as humanitarian questions. The most 
significant outcome of the recent talks was that South Ossetian, Russian and Georgian sides agreed the 
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states or as Georgian districts.367 The fact that Russia as a member of OSCE and a permanent 
member of UN SC has the right to veto every decision given by these organizations has raised 
questions over their capability to resolve disagreement among their member states. On the 
other hand, Russia’s termination of nearly sixteen year old missions has arguably 
demonstrated the new Russian strategy, which aims to use the ‘recognition’ card to oppose 
the international community’s involvement within the territories. 
 Russian opposition to UN and OSCE missions has provided opportunities for the EU 
to develop its role within the conflict resolution mechanisms of the region. Before the war, no 
European leader had showed specific interest in Georgia’s separatist conflicts and EU’s 
involvement in the region had mainly focused on humanitarian issues such as rehabilitation 
and development programs.368 By strengthening the mandate of the European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR) Team369 in January 2006, the EU had assumed greater liability in the 
region with special focus on its engagement in post-conflict reconstruction.370 However, its 
real active involvement in this critical region came after the August war by playing a key 
diplomatic role mediating the warring parties.  
 After the crisis erupted in August, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, holding the EU’s 
rotating presidency, became the key mediator of the conflict, brokering the initial six-point 
armistice on 12 August 2008, as well as the addendum of September 8. With his successful 
diplomatic initiative, not only a ceasefire was signed, but also the continuation of the violence 
was prevented with the rapid demilitarization of the conflict zones. Recognizing the 
significance of stability beyond its eastern borders, the EU has progressively acquired 
responsibility for post-conflict management with the deployment of EUMM (EU Monitoring 
Mission), designed to observe the ceasefire and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the 
                                                 
367 See www://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unomig  
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buffer zones within Georgian territory after 1 October 2008.371 Paradoxically, Russia’s 
termination of UNOMIG and OSCE missions in the region has left EUMM the sole observer 
mission in which Russia has no authority to interfere.372 However, Russia has refused to 
permit the EUMM to have access to territories within either Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Thus, 
EU’s engagement in the region is likely to be interrupted by Moscow’s willingness to retain 
control and administer the rules of any EU involvement.373  
 Lastly, the war also tested the level of US and NATO’s involvement in the region, 
which however gradually waned against Georgian expectations. Immediately after the war, 
although the US and NATO reverted from directly interfering in the conflict, they firmly 
opposed Russia’s hegemonic posture and actions in Georgia, as acclaimed by the incumbent 
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, straining the relations between Moscow and 
Washington.374 Russia’s announcement of the suspending the implementation of CFE Treaty 
had already created a wall of mistrust between the NATO countries and Russia.375 After the 
war, NATO decided to suspend the future meetings of NATO-Russia Council.376 Similarly, 
Russia decided to sever its diplomatic relations with the alliance, expressing its complaints 
about NATO’s pro-Georgian stance, as well as the threatening presence of its vessels in the 
Black Sea.377 Although the rising tension between Russia and Washington-led alliance was 
exaggeratedly interpreted in the Western media as the resurgence of the ‘Cold War’,378 it soon 
became clear that NATO and Russia had too much at stake to resort in a direct confrontation. 
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As such, NATO has reopened its dialogue with Moscow while the US and Russia have 
initiated bilateral negotiations on offensive arms reduction with the first round of talks taking 
place in May 2009. The US-Russia negotiations on START seem to determine the future of 
their reciprocal relations to a great extent, as well as the level of US’s intention and ability to 
press Russia to mollify its aggressive stance in South Caucasus, most notably in Georgia.379  
                                                 
379 Erlanger, S. (2008, 2 December). “US Softens Stance on Russia at NATO Summit” and Feigenhauer, P. 
(2009, 25 June). “U.S.-Russia Moscow Summit Presents Last Opporunity to Avoid War in Georgia”, Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, Vol: 6, Issue: 122.  
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7. Concluding Remarks 
 With the current developments last summer, international attention has once again 
been directed to South Caucasus. What constitutes the fascination that underpins the region is 
not only that for years it has played host to fierce ethnic tensions and regional divisions, but 
also its historical affinity to attract the competition for influence among the great powers for 
this tiny, but geopolitically significant land. Located at the edge of both European and Middle 
Eastern security spaces, the region has been prone to the political games of external actors. 
Hence, it witnessed complicated and inter-related political, strategic, socio-economic events 
and in particular violent conflicts since the end of the Soviet rule. Being among the most 
troublesome ex-Soviet republics of the region with its two ethnic separatist conflicts, namely, 
Abkhazia, and South Ossettia, Georgia has been an arena of political turmoil and constant 
warfare. The persistence of these conflicts has not only been the major obstacle to peace and 
stability in Georgia, but in the whole region. 
 In this vein, this paper has aimed to illustrate, through a systematic analysis of a broad 
range of structural and interactive conflict prolonging factors, those underlying features that 
determine the course of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It has been argued these 
conflicts have been intractable in nature depicting those inherent properties that by definition 
contribute to the persistence of the stalemate in the conflict resolution process. What is more, 
the dynamic forces that drove the sustainability of the de facto state structures have evolved 
through the last two decades in a fashion that both complicates and impedes the peace 
settlement, while transforming the parameters that shape the underlying context. As 
established, the level of intractability of these conflicts has shifted over the course of time, but 
nevertheless has remained stable in that the conflicts have never displayed tractable qualities, 
blocking the possibility of arriving at a moment for transcending their insolubility. As such, 
the evolving context and the embryonic features of the conflict have given rise to a wide 
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range of conflict prolonging factors that obstruct the resolution process. Hence, the analysis of 
this broad range of conflict prolonging factors has been imperative for developing an 
understanding of the reasons behind the protracted nature of these conflicts, as well as 
explaining the combination of elements that stagnates the conflict resolution process in these 
two specific cases. 
 The dynamics, spoiling the materialization of necessary conditions for the progress in 
conflict resolution and thus crystallizing the peace process into an impasse, have involved a 
multitude of players and motives, directly or indirectly determining the impenetrable 
characteristics of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Consequently, within the 
already established background that has been shaped by long-term dynamics, there has 
emerged a large array of internal and external forces which interact to plague the conflict 
resolution process. To begin with, long-term conflict prolonging factors are embedded within 
the very structure of the conflicts and thus less amenable to alteration. These involve 
historical cleavages, competing nationalist projects, ethno-demographic perspectives, as well 
as ‘constructed’ ethnic identities that ultimately generate a mixture of perceptions that 
produce incompatible demands and ethnically-divided societies. In particular, this ethnic 
dimension outlined within the historical context has invariably added to the pervasiveness and 
durability of the unresolved situation of the conflicts.  
 On the other hand, short-term conflict prolonging factors are constantly evolving and 
open to change. These refer to a number of internal and external dynamics that have been 
formed predominantly within the geo-political, economic and political context concomitant to 
the progress of the conflicts. In order to simplify the impact of such factors, they have been 
categorized mainly as key actors and their intentions. Although analyzed in isolation, it has 
been concerted that only by considering their organic interaction can one achieve to draw a 
complete picture of the conflicts and their underlying forces. As such, a portion of the actors 
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involved in the conflict, by pursuing their perceived self-interests, have resorted in either 
intentional or unintentional spoiling behaviour. Besides, some other actors, as well as a 
number of miscellaneous factors, have directly or indirectly contributed to the spoiling 
activities.  
 The directly engaged parties to the conflicts, that is Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
and Russia, have deliberately or not, implemented policies that resulted in the fortification of 
the impasse in the peace processes. In particular, the Abkhazian and South Ossetian de facto 
states have developed a structure in which the forces driving their subsistence have 
simultaneously combined to impede the conflict resolution process. In spite their very 
statehood has remained at stake, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have survived years of 
international isolation, achieving to endow with almost full control over their local 
populations. Their lasting lives can be explained by the internal forces stimulating their 
endurance compiled with Russia’s active support, perpetuating the conflicts propitious for the 
preservation of their de facto statuses.  
 Being on the victorious side of the armed struggles in early 1990s has imprinted a 
fundamental intolerance regarding their absolute sovereignty, forging the idea of forming an 
independent state that has been institutionalized by the establishment of the basic attributes of 
statehood. With the intention to protect their fragile statehoods against the perceived Georgian 
threat, has emerged a mental thinking in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that rendered the 
military power and the illegal trade as the main vehicles for their subsistence. As a result, it 
has created many groups either inside or outside of them, who have been gaining considerable 
benefits from the maintenance of the conflicts.  
 Additionally significant, fearing to lose their local level of power and taking a radical 
stance, Abkhazian and South Ossetian leaderships have effectively used nationalist tools, as 
well as the constructed ethnic identities and the ‘them-us’ illustration to justify their demands 
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over jurisdiction in their territories. Subsequently, a perceptual understanding has prevailed in 
these de facto states in which lack of credibility against Georgia has materialized, generating 
a state of suspended conflict. What is more, the prejudiced perceptions of the past amassed 
with the constant fear of a possible Georgian military assault ultimately have produced an 
elevated level of animosities, hindering the encouraging atmosphere in the peace talks.  
 On the other hand, Georgian policies that for long have intended to push Abkhazians 
and South Ossetians towards conceding to Tbilisi’s demands over the protection of the 
country’s territorial integrity. These policies have paradoxically consolidated the existence of 
its breakaway enclaves, both intentionally and unintentionally spoiling the conflict resolution 
process. First, the fact that Georgia was unable to attract the populations of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, failing to qualify as a strong and prosperous country has remained a perceptual 
barrier for the integration of these regions into Georgia. Suffering from economic and 
political difficulties, mafia-style activities and lack of diplomatic potency Georgia could not 
achieve to be appealing for these regions, further fortifying their determination for political 
separatism. 
 In addition, the fact that Tbilisi has attempted to use military power and economic 
sanctions to induce Abkhazia and South Ossetia into a final compromise has added to the 
resentments in these de facto states, generating negative effects for the conflict resolution 
process. Georgia’s harsh economic blockades on Abkhazia have not only forged a sense of 
mistrust, but also contributed to the logic driving its continued existence, pushing it to 
develop an efficient economic structure essential for its subsistence. Furthermore, even before 
the 2008 war in South Ossetia, Tbilisi’s threatening rhetoric, the boost in Georgian military 
spending, as well as the increasing build-up of its armed forces had alarmed the separatist 
regions, engendering constant mood of insecurity. With the Georgian military deployment on 
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South Ossetia in August 2008, the fears aroused by the constantly perceived Georgian threat 
have been ultimately materialized, damaging the prospects for the settlement of the conflicts.   
 Shevardnadze, the previous Georgian leader who ruled the country for twelve years, 
had pursued sort of a ‘non-policy’ towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He was willing 
neither to accept the separatist aspirations nor to encourage a compromise on the negotiation 
table with the de facto authorities, harboring the belief that the status quo ante was more 
preferable than facing with a total failure. On the other hand, Saakashvili, enjoying a broad 
support of electorates, was determined to exert Georgian control over the separatist regions 
putting an end to the impasse in the peace settlements. However, the latest developments have 
revealed that Saakashvili’s strategy directed to alter the dynamics within the context of the 
conflicts in favor of Georgia have ironically succeeded to do the opposite, hampering the 
ability to reach a conflict resolution indefinitely. 
 The lion’s share of responsibility for the current situation that has underpinned the 
solidification of a stalemate in the conflict resolution processes can be attributed to Russia as 
the ‘outside protector’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, who have been very influential in 
blocking the peace settlements and rendering the survival of these de facto states. Although 
initially it was labeled as an external actor, confronting Georgia in August 2008 in South 
Ossetia, Russia has turned out to be a directly engaged player of the region’s conflicts. Even 
before the war though, Russia has been invariably intertwined with the on-going conflicts, 
lingering its exclusive role in their peace processes, as well as its military presence within 
Georgia.  Although Russia has been from the outset the leading peacekeeper and mediator in 
both of the cases, it has taken an overt stance on behalf of the separatist states. Moscow’s 
policies designed to provide moral, diplomatic and financial support for the breakaway 
regions, entitling their citizens eligible for Russian citizenship, have been viewed by 
Georgians as a political tool to vitiate its gradual integration with the Euro-Atlantic structures. 
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 Russia’s involvement in the region’s conflicts can be explained by a combination of a 
variety of its military, strategic and political motives. Russia has been enthusiastic to reassert 
its hegemony in the post-Soviet space. Besides, feeling anxious due to the danger of 
instability along its southern frontiers, Russia has sought to retain its military presence in 
Georgia and its separatist regions in order to avoid the resurgence of the ‘Chechnya disaster’. 
To elaborate, Russia has understandably been keen in providing stability in North Caucasus 
and sustaining its traditional sphere of influence. Keeping in line with its primary objectives, 
it has sought to maintain an exclusive role in the resolution processes of the conflicts, 
exceeding the constraints of its potential role as a mediator and a peacekeeper. Playing an 
immense role in the conflicts, Russia has exhibited no inclination towards their settlement, but 
rather has contributed to the prolongation of the conflicts, which has been of vital significance 
to the endurance of the de facto states, Russia’s controlling interests in perpetuating the 
insolubility of the conflicts have further fueled the separatist states’ determination to revert 
from granting any concessions regarding their sovereignties. Without a doubt, Russia’s 
spoiling attitude has been crafted with its desire to benefit from a great deal of advantages 
created by the impasse in the conflicts, manipulating the existence of this deadlock as an 
instrument to preserve its hegemonic position in the region, as well as a bargaining chip 
against Georgia. 
 Perceiving a threat of Russian expansionism, Georgia has increasingly relied on the 
West, most notably on Washington to solve its problems. As the major backer of the BTC and 
South Caucasus pipeline projects, the US has a calculating interest in partaking in the region’s 
conflicts and providing its stability. Accordingly, it has not only broadened its diplomatic 
appearance in the Georgian security affairs, but also has begun to provide assistance to 
Georgia for the advance of its military capacity. The US’s increasing interest in the region has 
accentuated the perceptual rivalry with Russia who perceives any Euro-Atlantic involvement 
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in the region as a threat to its strategic benefits. The indirect, yet considerable roles of the US 
and NATO in the conflicts have been influential in deteriorating relations between Moscow 
and Tbilisi, as well as alarming the de facto states over a possible shift in the balance of the 
conflicts towards the Georgian side. 
  Moreover, the picture will not be entirely clear if the roles of the international 
community and the international law in the context of the conflicts are excluded. Particularly, 
until the war in 2008, the UN and OSCE were the major international organizations mediating 
the conflicts and monitoring the Russian-led peacekeeping activities. However, they could 
succeed in neither promoting a political compromise, nor in avoiding the heavy militarization 
of the conflict zones. Preoccupied with protecting the principle of ‘territorial integrity’, which 
has been a controversial and vague norm of the international law, they failed to consider the 
demands of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, further driving these regions into Russia’s embrace. 
After the war, both the UN and OSCE’s influence in the region has considerably shrinked 
whereas EU has assumed greater responsibility in the conflict resolution mechanisms.  
 It is remarkable to note that, although Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts have 
generally resembled common trends, they have also engendered case-specific peculiarities. 
Particularly, in South Ossetia the ethnic affinity with the North Ossetians has been a major 
factor for the region’s economic and political integration into the North Caucasus community 
as well as its developing ties with Russia. What is more, South Ossetia has not been an 
appealing spot like Abkhazia due to its lack of industrial infrastructure and export-oriented 
agriculture, rendering it more dependent on illegal activities for sustaining its subsistence. 
Although Abkhazia has been a bigger prize for Georgia with its lucrative resources as well as 
with its strategic port of Sukhum(i), it has also been a more difficult target. This explains why 
Tbilisi has directed its reunification plans initially on South Ossetia, rather than on Abkhazia 
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 Equally important, in the Abkhazian case the conflict resolution process has been 
more complex and open to dead-lock, due to the lingering presence of the IDP question. With 
the constant fear of being turned into a minority in their perceived homeland, Abkhazians 
have rejected any peace proposal that conditioned all-and-once return of these IDPs. 
Conversely, the Abkhazian government in-exile has constantly pressured Tbilisi not to 
concede from these refugees’ aspirations. Eventually, the contradictory demands of these 
ethnically Georgian refugees and the Abkhaz authorities have not allowed the resolution of 
this problem, further strengthening the forces behind the impasse in the settlement of the 
Abkhazian conflict. 
 The war in August 2008 has brought immense changes in the regions’ dynamics, 
transforming the course of the conflicts and ultimately altering the status quo. With the 
recognition of Kosovo’s independence by more than sixty countries, the conflicts in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia had already begun to shift into a more intractable phase, as the de facto 
states raised claims over Kosovo’s precedence for their own statuses. After the war, the 
intractability of the conflicts has reached to an unprecedented level, since the separatist 
regions have enhanced their motivation to remain detached from Georgia. This has 
diminished the Georgian hopes for its territorial integrity, as well as its prospects for NATO 
membership. Moreover, taking the separatist regions into its realm and granting them 
recognition, Russia has proved itself to be a direct party to the conflicts, draining its 
reputation as a credible mediator.  
 Furthermore, the latest events have raised questions over the stability of the conflicts 
and the likelihood of their future explosiveness. The absence of large-scale conflicts in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia for over fifteen years had reinforced a misleading image that a 
level of stability was enshrined in the course of the conflicts, which were generally labeled as 
‘frozen’ in the international parlance. In reality though, since the very end of the wars in early 
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1990s the regions have been trapped in a chaotic stalemate in which sporadic clashes have 
been flaring, perpetuating a vicious cycle of violence.  
 It is remarkable in retrospect that Abkhazian and South Ossetian cases have displayed 
some disparities in their level of ‘stability’- or better to say in their level of proneness to 
violence- throughout the progress of their conflicts. Since the 1993 ceasefires, Abkhazia has 
always been host to perilous incidents, such as military maneuvering and occasional fighting 
along the Inguri River, as well as large-scale skirmishes in the Gali district, exhibiting the 
constant and high level of insecurity. On the other hand, in South Ossetia in the period of 
1992-2004, confidence building measures were enhanced, surfacing a certain level of stability 
in which a serious acceleration of fighting was avoided. With the conflict in 2004 summer, 
which broke the existing stability in the region, South Ossetia eventually became prone to the 
danger of ensuing violence. Thus, in both of these cases the conditions were already ripe for 
escalation in August 2008 when Russia’s assertive stance compiled with Georgia’s aspirations 
of restoring its territorial integrity has ultimately triggered a crisis. From the vantage point of 
today one can easily suggest that the possibility for renewed violence in both of these 
separatist regions is very high, with the future remaining uncertain and unpredictable. 
 To conclude, Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts have been violent and durable 
as a result of their intractability, materializing the ensuing deadlock in the resolution 
processes. As acknowledged in this paper, in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia a complex 
web of overlapping players has found a space to maneuver the conflicts, as such a large array 
of dynamic forces has accounted for the current impediments, stimulating the persistence of 
these de facto states and of the standstill in the conflict settlements. Not only should it be 
recognized that a multitude of actors have accumulated for the creation of the contemporary 
stalemates in these two cases, but also that some actors have been more powerful than the 
others in affecting the parameters of the conflicts.  
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 Particularly, external forces have dictated the course of the conflicts as the internal 
actors have been prone to heavy-handed manipulation due to their structural and diplomatic 
weakness. Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as the internal players of the conflicts have 
failed to maintain the driver’s seat in the on-going conflict resolution mechanisms. As the 
outside actors have competed to extend their control over Georgia and more broadly over the 
South Caucasus security complex, they have sought to oblige the domestic players to comply 
with their strategic aspirations. Particularly, Russia and the US have aimed to increase their 
relations with the directly engaged parties of the conflicts so as to enhance their authority over 
the region. On the other side, Georgia and the de facto authorities have been reluctant to 
compromise, but instead have been looking for foreign support to back their unyielding 
demands. Indeed, they have begun to use their alliances with these powerful external players 
as a bargaining chip against each other. This subsequently has strengthened the roles these 
external actors play in influencing the dynamics driving the conflicts, as well as has made 
Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia vulnerable to foreign exploitation. In line with their 
self-interested motives, the powerful external players have intentionally or unintentionally 
spoiled the peace processes, contributing to the prolongation of the conflicts. Thus, the 
irreconcilable demands and clashing interests within such a geopolitically competitive 
environment have been inextricably linked to the persistence of the conflicts in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. Besides, the failure of the international community to promote a mutually 
acceptable solution has further added to the solidification of the stalemates.  
 What is more, Georgia has chosen to ascribe the insolubility of its problems to an 
‘external enemy’, asserting that Russia has endeavoured to exploit the ethnic divisions in the 
regions. It is beyond doubt that Russia’s involvement in these conflicts has served to entrench 
the continud existence of these de facto states. Benefiting from the conditions existed by the 
maintenance of the conflicts, Moscow has intentionally pursued spoiling activities, ultimately 
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blocking the peace settlements. Yet, holding solely Russia responsible for the on-going 
standoff between Tbilisi and its separatist regions is a deficient observation, since Russia’s 
role has been a partial explanation for the prolongation of the conflicts. A number of directly 
or indirectly engaged parties have secured their role in the course of the conflicts and they 
have more or less contributed to the persistence of the impasse in the peace processes. As 
suggested in this paper, deeply understanding these case-specific actors and dynamics, as well 
as their combined effect, which have delayed or hindered the resolution processes, will 
provide a valuable insight for designing new frameworks to settle the conflicts in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia.  
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